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4Introduction
This work – unlike the title might seem to suggest – is not a 
material-ethical	 reflection	on	 the	duties of the human collec-
tive. It is also not an appeal to today’s societies or other human 
groups to take more civic responsibility in order to counteract 
possible undesirable political or economic developments. It is 
also not intended to be a foundation for a formal concept of col-
lective responsibility such as legal duties and liabilities. In oth-
er words, it is neither an ideological program nor a legal phil-
osophical	treatise	but	rather	a	social	analytical	reflection.	It	is	
meant to be a contribution towards exploring the requirements 
for assigning explicit moral responsibility to certain forms of 
human coexistence.
About the concept	 of	morality:	Unfortunately,	 the	field	of	
philosophical	inquiry	has	yet	to	establish	a	distinct	difference	
between ethics and morality. The most plausible to me seems 
to	be	a	distinction	based	on	the	difference	between	theory	and	
practice. If we followed this line of reasoning, ethics would 
be the theoretical considerations for evaluating social behav-
ior, while morality, in contrast, would be the judgmental as-
pect of human behavior in action. If we understand morality 
this way, there is really only a small area that can be rationally 
justified.	This	is	because	morality	usually	arises	from	negative	
emotions—in the form of rejections, indignation, accusations, 
contempt, discrimination etc.—while ethics, in contrast, is an 
attempt	to	develop	emotionally	neutral	standards	for	judging	
with the axiom of argumentative coherence. Thus, there can’t 
really be a science of morality but rather only moral practice. 
However,	 there	 is	a	scientific	way	 to	 look	at	how	morals	are	
practiced; this can have a more sociological-empirical or phil-
osophical-abstract focus. The following essay, as a more philo-
sophical-abstract	perspective,	is	the	latter.
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Morality, as a social phenomenon of habit-based customs 
and evolved traditions should be distinguished from the mutu-
ally agreed-upon norms which came about through decisions 
and decrees. Customs and traditions are legitimized through 
their long-term, practical social success; that is the ideological 
core of political conservatism. Mutually agreed-upon social 
relationships, in particular, statutory law, have always taken 
their legitimacy from the correct procedure of their formal 
coming into being (today, so-called ‘procedure legitimacy’). 
In many countries, the tip of the statutory-law hierarchy is a 
constitution which, by itself, is only weakly procedurally legit-
imate.	It	is	a	codification	of	basic values and their relationship 
to one another. And these values, in turn, are based on tradi-
tions. Morality is a third, and methodologically speaking may-
be the ‘muddiest’ area for controlling human behavior besides 
customs and traditions, on one hand, and statutory law on the 
other.
 Morality is unclear and inconsistent in its totality, and also 
under constant threat of heavy emotions. It is also a practical 
amalgam of other fragments of social order which are carried 
out by compressing very abridged feelings and arranging the 
details	differently	for	each	one	of	us	so	that	they	can	be	quickly	
and	efficiently	used	in	everyday	life.	We	all	know	the	imme-
diate	effect	of	the	smallest	critical	gesture	and	all	of	the	moral	
undercurrents in apparently trivial comments. However, from 
an evolutionary point of view, morality is the oldest system of 
human social control. It is primarily based on biological behav-
ior	patterns	that	force	group-conform	behavior,	i.e.,	the	fear	of	
inner-species aggression among individuals along with a tiny 
bit of empathy. Some behavioral researchers, such as Frans de 
Waal,	would	like	to	attribute	morality	to	the	ability	of	higher	
organisms to feel empathy.1	But	many	find	that	illusory.
1 See de Waal	[2001],	p.	19ff.	For	an	extreme	opposite	position	see	Kondylis 
[1984], to whom I refer in more detail. – The book is structured so that De 
Waal,	as	a	behavioral	researcher,	first	presents	his	thesis	of	empathy	as	the	
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The topic of collective moral responsibility is thus intellectu-
ally	difficult	and	socio-psychologically	exhausting.	However,	
while it’s possible to downgrade moral judgments to a private 
thing	 which	 has	 no	 final	 accessible	 explanation,	 we	 cannot	
ignore large, collective waves of moral feeling. These can be 
ethically ‘tamed’ or at least partially brought into a theoretical 
framework for evaluating them. By creating such a framework, 
it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 between	 rationally	 justifi-
able, and thus entitled/valid, collective judgments and those 
that	are	unjustifiable	(for	instance,	based	on	ethnic	prejudices).
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1.1 On the concepts of actors and action
In sociological literature, the participants in a social interaction 
are usually seen as the objects or targets of the events (which are 
seen as ‘actions’) assigned to them and referred to as ‘actors’. In 
the simplest case, it is a two-part relationship of an actor and 
an action. Actors and action have a common feature which mu-
tually	defines	them:	their	respective	unity as either an actor or 
an action. The concept of the unity of an object or an event, in 
general, has been a recurring topic ever since the early times 
of Western philosophy. In the pre-Socratic period and later in 
Neo-Platonism, however, the discussion was not initially about 
the unity of an individual object, in other words, the unity of an 
actor and ‘his’ action, but rather the unity of the entire world 
in the sense of the consistency and coherency of all objects and 
events. Even in ancient Chinese Taoism as well as all of the 
great	nature-based	religions,	the	conception	of	the	world	first	
begins with an act that brings together all givens into a great to-
tality	into	which	every	individual	human	needs	to	find	his	own	
root of morality and then responds to all of the following philosophical 
contributions to it. None of these follow de Waal’s thesis, even if for very 
different	reasons.
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place. This great big whole is originally completely separate, 
both from the natural cosmos as well as the unity of its own col-
lective. In this state, humans and nature are rooted in the same 
super-ordinate order. In the myths of such early societies, the 
unity of nature, which is populated and controlled by the gods, 
is still a reproduction of the social structure of exactly the col-
lective that these myths cultivate.2 It is only through a very long 
development process that humans become aware that it is indi-
viduals and their individual actions which separate them from 
the natural background, and that it is worth considering them 
in	order	to	specifically	understand	human	existence.	Since	the	
European Enlightenment,	Western	culture	finally	understands	
that humans are no longer purely natural but actually stand 
in opposition to nature. This is for Kant,	as	he	confidently	ex-
plained in his Groundwork on The Metaphysics of Morals, the ori-
gin of all practical reason in the sense of freedom from nature.
It will become apparent that the concept of the unity of the 
actor and his action will be central to our further investigation. 
It	has	frequently	been	attempted	to	reduce	this	concept of uni-
ty, not only for the person and his action but also for objects and 
events in general, to the sum total of their components, i.e., to 
replace the concept of unity with that of totality. What’s inade-
quate here is that the sum of the parts of a totality can appear in 
very	different	forms.	The	totality	of	a	number	of	loose	threads	
is	obviously	different	 than	 the	 same	 threads	as	 soon	as	 they	
have been woven into a cloth. Many threads create a totality in 
both	cases,	but	only	in	the	latter	case	can	we	speak	of	a	unity.	
This example applies to the unity of actor and his action as well. 
If we were to understand these as only the sum of individual 
physical movements and nerve impulses, etc., both the unity of 
the actor as well as his action would be lost. From that it follows 
2 Émile Durkheim gives a very instructive summary of the already exten-
sive ethnographic reports on the world view of the Australian hunter 
and gatherer cultures in his book “The Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life”, even if the details of his conclusions are not very current today, see 
Durkheim [2007].
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that the unit of actor and action is always more than the sum of 
its parts: By integrating analytical components into a new uni-
ty, something is added to these components that was not there 
before. But what distinguishes the unity of an object compared 
to just the totality of its parts in general? There have been lively 
discussions on this point ever since pre-Socratic times – even 
if these took place mostly on a side stage to more important 
topics.3 The concept of objective unity is so fundamental that 
it’s not only a basic concept for all theoretical thinking but is 
practically needed for concept formation. It is an indispensable 
precondition for any life forms – not just humans – in order 
to orient themselves in the world. I’m not going to go into the 
further metaphysical implications of this assertion here, even 
though	it	is	truly	significant.	In	terms	of	the	topic	of	this	essay,	
I can only say that it is not the quality of being able to split ac-
tors into partial actors or divide action into partial actions that 
makes up the unity of an actor or an action. However, for both 
the following applies: If we separate an actor or an action into 
its separate parts or segments, the actor as well as the action 
soon get lost in the course of the analysis.
The question of the unity of the actor and his action does not 
only apply to individuals, each of whom is more than the sum 
of his body movements. In the case of the so-called ‘collective’ 
actor – in so far as such a thing exists – it is also a question of 
whether it forms a unit that is more than the sum of the indi-
3 In ancient times the concept of unity already had an indirect precursor in 
thinkers like Parmenides (on the unity of human existence and nature) 
and Heraclitus (for the unity of process in the world). In the European 
Middle Ages, the Christian philosophers were primarily interested in the 
soul, following in Aristotle’s footsteps. But, interestingly, they focused on 
this primarily because only such individual responsibility to God can be 
justified,	which	also	justifies	God’s	concern	for	individual	souls.	In	mod-
ern times, Hermann Schmitz	has	been	concerned	with	the	metaphysical	
concept of objective unity from a phenomenology perspective in his many 
books. See his latest work “selbst sein” (‘being oneself’) (Schmitz	[2015],	
especially	the	first	essay,	p.	13ff).	A	process-ontological	derivation	of	the	
concept and the development of objective unity can also be found in my 
works on process ontology (Sohst [2009]).
91   Actors and Moral Action
vidual actors and their actions. Although this idea is hard to 
avoid when considering many mass psychological phenom-
ena and must always be reconsideration, I prefer to reject it: 
Speaking about a ‘collective actor’ is misleading and therefore 
wrong because it upholds a conceptual indecisiveness between 
multiplicity and unity among actor(s) and action(s), which then 
makes it impossible to explain fundamental questions. If this 
argument and the subsequent conceptual realignment is car-
ried to its end, the answer to the question of what are the con-
ditions where we can even speak of a unit of an actor and thus 
uno actu also of a unit of an action, is all the more clearly lacking 
(see Section 4 on this).
The question of prerequisites of unity for both an actor and 
his action can be put thusly: Under which conditions can we 
plausibly justify, and with that, be entitled to assume a unit of 
an actor or an action? Laws, duties and obligations are essential 
features that distinguish human social existence clearly from 
the physical and purely biologically determined level. What 
might or might not be a unit at the physical or biological level 
may be only partially binding for the social reality of life and 
vice versa. Social subjects (e.g., persons, organizations, institu-
tions) and their outcomes as a unit are practically never accessi-
ble for a physical or biological analysis because they inherently 
contain a substantially higher concept of normative. Humans 
are distinguished from the nature they emerge from and which 
they are surrounded by in that they have ‘ought to’ and per-
mission. It would be silly to designate this as a lack among all 
non-human nature. Nor do we believe anymore that all this 
‘ought to’ and granting permission originated in some godly 
intention,	even	if	we	still	feel	religiously	committed.	This	has	to	
do	with	completely	mundane	secular	differences	that	need	to	
be	looked	at	first	in	terms	of	the	biological	and	then	the	social	
reality,	both	of	which	 then	need	 to	be	 treated	 from	different	
points of view. We can only decide from the social contexts that 
a unit of actor or action is present when considering the indi-
10
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vidual psychological aspects, such as the cognitive maturity of 
the person in question. That’s why we should be conscious of 
the fact that we always already assume the unity of actor and 
action as soon as we speak of an event in which humans are 
involved. We assign uniform actions to individual people and 
sometimes view groups or formally created bodies as uniform 
actors as well. The question then becomes, when is such an as-
signment	of	unity	 to	an	actor	and	action	 justified,	and	when	
not.
For the purpose of reconstructing social reality, the only for 
analytical purposes separated unit of the actor and his action 
have to be re-combined in the next step into an integrated unit 
of	‘actor-action’	through	the	definition	of	the	actor	and	his	ac-
tion. It is only by recognizing this unity of actor and action do 
we arrive at the socially unmediated, i.e., primal level of con-
sideration.	And	it	is	first	at	this	level	that	the	assignment	of	re-
sponsibility	to	the	actor	becomes	possible,	i.e.,	socially	justifi-
able. And this unit of a second order – where it can be plausibly 
asserted – is a necessary prerequisite for the individual actor’s 
personal responsibility. This applies regardless of the fact that 
all unfolding of events and actors are always determined from 
the	outside,	i.e.,	as	under	continuous	influence	by	the	environ-
ment. The postulate of personal responsibility is a purely nor-
mative one that starts with the original unit of consideration of 
the actor-action. This responsibility, however, only applies to 
the actor for his action. Which is why an analysis of the over-
all event into actor and action is always necessary. When we 
reverse	the	direction,	based	on	this	clarification	of	terms,	it	be-
comes self-evident from a social perspective: The primary ma-
terial of our social perspective is the integral actor-action.  It 
is only when we need to assign responsibility that it becomes 
essential to separate this unity into individual actors and in-
dividual actions. This primal unit of examination is also the 
reason for the continuing uncertainty about how one should 
deal with spontaneous violent groups and large collective, his-
11
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torical events: The phenomenon of the pronounced unity of an 
overall event competes with the necessity of analyzing it into 
individual actors and actions in order to be able to assign any 
responsibility. If this is not possible, such as in complex, ethni-
cally motivated outbreaks of violence, an urgent, uneasy feel-
ing remains because no single individual can be accused of an 
obviously serious act of wrongdoing.
There are borderline cases where, because of a lack of ma-
turity, emotional states of emergency, or mental	deficiencies,	
for example, it is not quite clear whether one can speak of an 
actor’s personal responsibility in an individual case, even in a 
successful analysis.4 All these border cases and exceptions do 
not have an impact on the basic idea of the ideal/typical actor as 
unified	and	acting	with	personal	responsibility	because	of	his	
inner autonomy. Such a unit of action can be granted to both an 
individual as well as to a collective body, as I will show.
As I will also show, we can assert common responsibility of 
multiple actors even under very close conditions also when the 
participating group or collective are not uniform actors. With 
that	we	avoid	one	of	the	most	difficult	points	of	dispute	in	the	
entire history of sociology from the outset, namely, the onto-
logical reality of groups. Furthermore, by understanding the 
actor as an accountable acting being, we still have not made a 
4	 The	attribution	of	events	to	actors	without	responsibility	is	also	possible.	
We have to forego the regular responsibility of the actor for his action if 
special reasons are present for this, for example, the mental immaturity 
of children, mental disturbances or inescapable external forces (vis abso-
luta legally). Furthermore, action is a true subset of the superset of events 
of the type ‘behavior’. Large portions of human behavior, e.g., all of the 
involuntary	metabolic	 and	movement	 impulses,	but	 also	 significant	ar-
eas	of	cognitive	and	emotional	control	(involuntary	perception	patterns,	
generally	recognized	as	reflexes,	emotional	and	motor	reactions,	etc.)	are	
not actions in the normative sense of ‘action’ and thus those persons are 
not accountable for them from the outset. Incidentally, not only humans 
show behavior. Almost all other life forms (including plants in a restrict-
ed sense) and autonomous artifacts, in other words self-controlling ma-
chines, do as well. Schulz-Schaeffer	[2007,	S.	433ff.]	even	go	as	far	as	to	
recognize	in	the	latter	a	limited	form	of	a	capacity	to	act.
12
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statement about how a partial event separated out from an en-
tire event can become the action of an actor. Such an analysis is 
necessary in order to be able to assign responsibility to an actor. 
In other words, an action can only then be present when we 
can	separate	a	single	event	from	the	great	flow	of	the	world’s	
events	and	declare	it	a	unified	actor-action,	and	in	turn,	show	
uno actu through analysis who or what the basic object of the 
assignment is for the action in question. This cognitive execu-
tion is so self-evident for us that we normally aren’t even aware 
of doing it. And yet, it is only with its result that can we create 
the possibility of bringing actor and action together in a rela-
tion of accountability.
1.2 The simultaneous emergence of actor and action
In the following I will talk about collective responsibility, but 
first	some	concepts	need	to	be	made	explicit	so	that	my	argu-
mentation is understandable. The two most basic concepts for 
our analysis, as already mentioned, are those of actor and ac-
tion. Sociological theory of action, independently of its schools 
and various perspectives, assumes that both of these elements 
come	 into	 being	 through	 a	 process	 of	 reciprocal	 attribution:	
Only an actor can bring forth an action and, in the reverse, an 
action	first	makes	the	one	who	brought	it	forth	an	actor.	While	
this	seems	trivial	at	first,	or	like	a	circular	definition,	it’s	not.	
This idea can be found in almost all human cultures before the-
ory even existed (see Fig. 1 on the next page), and it is the social 
sciences which have construed their view on this basis.
But who is the one who assigns portions of events to an actor 
and,	with	that,	qualifies	him	to	even	be	such?	This	question	is	
not easy to answer because such an assignment turns out to be 
dependent	on	two	different	levels	simultaneously.	Obviously,	
it is other actors who undertake such an assignment. But that 
opens the question of how an actor can even come into being if 
it is always other actors who must decide in order for such an 
13
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attribution	to	be	made.	In	other	words,	some	ontologically	pri-
or,	‘generative’	social	level	must	exist	that	first	enables	an	actor	
to appear while at the same time provoking him. This primal 
level where all actors are generated at a given time uno actu 
becomes self-formed through the milieu of collective living5; 
this type of milieu is in no way only a human collective. Nu-
merous studies especially of primate groups, as well as other 
animal species, such as elephants and dolphins and large wild 
cats, demonstrate a separation of individual groups or herd 
members as causal carriers of certain functions, thus show-
ing that actions do not at all depend on human language or 
other	specifically	human	skills.	Although	the	end	effect	is	that	
individual actors are constantly generating other actors (and 
the human actor also perceives himself as an actor and judges 
himself	correspondingly	so),	these	individual	attributions	are	
always carried by a cultural and, ultimately, even biologically 
conditioned sphere of the social. This is both the basis and the 
continuation of the dynamic context of this interaction between 
event and action.
5 See Kondylis on this [1999], II. Section: Sociology and social ontology. 
Kondylis’ sharp analysis demonstrates that the most well known repre-
sentatives of the sociological schools of the 20th century all made the mis-
take (except Durkheim) of either denying the priority of the social nature 
of humans before their individual constitution for ideological reasons or 
simply ‘constructing it away’ so as not to endanger the theoretical coher-
ence of their models.
ActorFlow of events
acts and therefore 
extends the
Attributing portions of 
individual action to
Fig. 1: The reciprocal creation of actions and actors
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Thus, it is not just the individual actor and the individual 
action	that	emerge	in	the	process	of	this	attribution	but	rather	
the prior ones. This means that the original generative context 
is	based	on	collective,	culturally	traditional	patterns	and	spe-
cies-specific	abilities.	This	doesn’t	need	to	concern	us	any	fur-
ther. A corresponding model creates an ongoing context in the 
temporal	flow	of	social	events.	It	is	first	this	flow	of	events	that	
makes it possible to view some of what happens around us as a 
separate social event and not simply as a natural, huge, undif-
ferentiated flow	of	events	from	everything	else	that	is	happen-
ing.	The	individuation	of	single	events	in	that	flow	of	‘cosmic	
events’	is	the	first	prerequisite	for	deriving	concrete	social	con-
sequences from such events.
If this idea was to be projected onto a temporal axis with the 
present as its center, a continuous spiral of reciprocal events 
and updating of actors and actions would result which would 
influence	our	perception	of	the	ongoing	human	social	life	(see	
Fig. 2 below).
Well-known schools of sociology are distinguished here by 
the focus of their analysis, which results from their perspective 
on	the	social.	The	structural	schools,	for	instance,	(Talcott	Par-
sons in USA, Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss 
Present
Flow of events becomes 
Sequence of Actions
Past
generates ongoing contexts
Future
So
ci
al
 R
ele
va
nc
e
Fig. 2: The transformation of the ongoing flow of events into a sequence of 
individual, causally linked actions.
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in France, Niklas Luhmann in Germany being the most well 
known) are less interested in the individual psychology of 
how individual actions arise. It is more the phenomenological 
schools that are interested in this. What I will be showing is 
essentially based on the phenomenological model of action as 
developed most prominently by Alfred Schütz.6 In this mod-
el – and in the sociological theory of action in a very general 
sense – personal responsibility is an essential property of hu-
man action. Even animals act in way that can be seen as inten-
tional, i.e., pursuing a planned purpose.7 In contrast to human 
behavior, however, the animal’s action lacks an important fea-
ture. Animal behavior only becomes an action through the in-
tent or purpose of the behavior.8 Human behavior, however, 
adds to this feature an additional and very important one as 
well: namely, the determination of whether purposeful behav-
ior corresponds to an abstract permission and/or ‘ought’. This 
feature is what I refer to as the normative quality of action.
6 See Schütz	[1974].	The	above	illustration	is	a	summarizing	abbreviation	of	
the phenomenological concept of action from the perspective of the issue 
under discussion here.
7 It was disputed for a long time but today is recognized by almost all socio-
logical schools.
8 Not every adaptive behavior is also purposeful behavior. If this were 
the case, we would have to grant purposeful behavior more or less to all 
forms of life, even to single-cell organisms and plants. This prerequisite 
of purposeful behavior is still being discussed with great controversy. 
A well-founded position, especially in terms of collective actors, is that 
of Philip Pettit,	see	Mantzavinos	[2009],	p.	69ff.	However,	the	difference	
between	the	German	attributes	‘purposeful’ and ‘intentional’ needs to be 
considered here because it is frequently blurred or not even perceived in 
English. While the German word Intentionalität (translated here as inten-
tionality) is a philosophical term referring to the relation of human per-
ception and cognition to individually existing objects and events, Zweck-
haftigkeit (translated here as purposefulness) means the directionality of 
the own behavior towards the goal of what is to be realized through an 
activity, in other words, a future condition. In German, the distinction be-
tween those two concepts has a tendency to get lost, as well, in the com-
parison	of	 the	definitions	 for	 Intention (intention) and Zweck (purpose). 
Intention is commonly used as a synonym for Absicht (aim) and regarding 
one’s	 action	only	 a	minimal	 semantic	difference	 exists	 between	Absicht 
(aim) and Zweck (purpose).
16
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Naturally, animals and machines	are	permitted	and	ought 
to do some things and not others. But it is never the animals or 
the machines who determine this permission or obligation but 
rather human sociability that transfers it to them. Animals and 
machines, in other words, are subject to human permission and 
obligation	only	heteronymously;	they	have	just	as	little	bearing	
on this normative determination; they are just as unilaterally 
subjected as the mandatory requirements of biology, chemis-
try	and	finally	physics.	The	expression	 ‘normative quality of 
action’ for humans alone includes not only the unilateral sub-
jectivity to rules which are foreign to the actor, but also much 
more to the reciprocal continuation of the permission and obli-
gation in question. Humans are the only beings that participate 
in an essential way9 in the creation and structure of the social 
norms to which they are subjected.
Furthermore, social norms are not rigid rules such as so-
called natural laws which always apply regardless of the situ-
ation. They are dependent on their validity; in other words, on 
being recognized and continuously enforced. The validity of a 
norm cannot only be practically hindered by an actor, it can be 
disputed	at	any	time.	A	fleeing	criminal	simply	withdraws	his	
enforcement of the norm. But he is not disputing the validity 
of	the	prohibition	with	that	action.	In	contrast,	the	plaintiff	in	a	
possible norm control procedure in Germany is disputing the 
validity of the norm without being able to prevent its enforce-
ment	until	the	dispute	is	clarified.	This	difference	will	become	
very important in the further exposition of this analysis.
Disputing a valid norm by an individual actor who has not 
been formally authorized to do so – such as a constitutional 
judge or high religious authority – is practically impossible 
anywhere these days and also only conceivable in completely 
9 To the extent this is allowed by the collective. For example, while only 
people who have reached legal adulthood are allowed to participate in 
political elections, within their families they already have a limited and 
informal right to participate, in so far as it concerns the rules of conduct 
within the family.
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despotically governed societies. However, as individual vot-
ers,	the	collective	has	the	possibility	of	influencing	the	ongo-
ing writing and development of social norms, for example, 
through marketing measures or as lobbyists. Thus, they are 
all a part of a reciprocal process that generates and upholds 
norms. It is the participation of the voters as actors that creates 
the normative quality of actions in the sense intended here. 
Neither animals nor machines are capable of this. And it is ex-
actly this that leads to the strong argument for not only the 
legal but also the moral responsibility of at least all formally 
constructed bodies.
Human	action,	in	other	words,	is	qualified	moreover	by	be-
ing accessible to normative evaluation, unlike animal behavior. 
While animals can absolutely learn intelligent and purposeful 
behavior, one always speaks of human behavior under inclu-
sion of its normative quality. I also use the term action in this 
sense here.10
1.3 The difference between a unit of event and a unit of action
Now, it’s possible that a confusion between the phenomeno-
logical unit of an event and the conceptual unit of an action has 
resulted from the above analysis. That should be prevented. 
The essential reason for assuming a collective actor (whose ex-
istence I will actually dispute in what follows) can be found in 
our perspective: Humans have an inclination to accept the con-
ceptual unity of an event, for example, a political demonstra-
tion,	a	parliamentary	sitting,	even	a	war,	as	a	uniform	action	
by the participating actors through their ability to conceptually 
10 I would like to disregard the determination of certain machines capable of 
learning as addressees of assignment of action because it does not directly 
contribute to answering the questions posed here. See Schulz-Schaeffer	
[2007],	p.	433ff.	on	this.	The	expression	‘human	action’	does	not	include	
only the actions of single people but also those of collective actors in so 
far as they prerequisite individual human participation within the social 
sphere.
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summarize an excerpt from a continuous flow	of	events.	Unit	
of	event	and	unit	of	action	are	two	completely	different	things.
Unit of action is solely the result of a cognitive function cou-
pling our direct perception with our linguistic ability. Unit of 
action	 can	 only	 result	 through	 normative	 justification,	 i.e.,	 a	
mutually agreed act of assignment. That’s why we must detach 
ourselves from the – perhaps pronounced but still wrong – in-
tuition that the unit of event ‘obviously’ corresponds to a unit 
of action; this is the basis of the works of many authors on the 
topic of collective responsibility. This perspective is deceptive 
because it claims more than it can honor. We frequently expe-
rience this, without falling victim to that fallacy, when we, e.g., 
tentatively construe group dynamic actions within a working 
group or a group of friends as a unit of action even though it 
is	clearly	only	a	unit	of	event.	This	tentative	redefinition	some-
times makes it easier for us to handle such events methodically.
However, when such a cognitive tool for orientation be-
comes	the	basis	of	scientific	redefinition	with	the	claim	of	de-
scribing a fact, the fallacy line is crossed. I’m going to dispute 
the existence of a collective unit of actors in what follows. How-
ever, this does not forego the possibility of continuing to speak 
of uniform events, even if these consist of a majority of actions 
which cannot be combined into a unit of action.
1.4 The difference between legal and moral responsible action
Every	type	of	responsible	action	first	depends	on	the	existence	
of a normatively existing obligation. Responsibility in the sense 
of a sanctioning behavior11 is only possible if the required and 
11 Of course, the concept of responsibility includes not only the results of 
behavior that is contrary to norms. Being responsible means exactly that 
one is accountable for the consequences of one’s behavior very abstractly, 
in	other	words,	independently	of	whether	one	can	fulfill	the	obligations	
these responsibilities are based on or not. The expression ‘act responsibly’ 
describes	exactly	this	norm-fulfilling	behavior.	However,	in	every	respect,	
this is about the retroactive consequences of behavior contrary to norms, 
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the actual behavior of an actor deviate from each other in the 
sense of non-fulfillment	of	an	obligation.	Every	assignment	of	
such responsibility therefore refers to the results of a previous 
comparison between the obligatory and the actual behavior. It 
usually emerges through a lack of fulfillment,	not	 through	an	
excess.12 The moral accusation of poor fulfillment	of	behavioral 
expectations requires the generality of this expectation just like 
every other accusation of wrongdoing. This is why every moral 
accusation	and	the	responsibility	attached	to	it	is	also	based	on	
the existence of a norm and its violation. This also applies ex-
plicitly under the formal norms, such as laws. For example: If I 
ask the person at a neighboring table during dinner to pass me 
the carafe of water, and he or she just turns their nose up at me 
and doesn’t do it (let’s assume that I didn’t give them a reason 
for doing so earlier), I can later say that this person behaved 
badly in the sense of a moral accusation. But I can only do this 
because I can assert with reason: “One just doesn’t do that kind 
of thing.” But what does ‘that kind of thing’ mean? And who 
is ‘one’? Such ideas presuppose a norm in the sense discussed 
above to the extent a fairly undetermined class of actors is as-
sumed to exist. For all elements of this class - whoever that may 
be	 in	specific	cases	 -	 it	 is	valid	 that	 they	should	respond	 in	a	
helpful way to such requests at the dinner table unless there are 
higher reasons against doing so. Only when I can invoke such 
a norm – in this case, the conventionally correct way to behave 
– do I have the possibility to make a moral accusation towards 
the	specifically	 involved	person	as	a	subject	of	norms.	This	 is	
applicable independently of questions like whether the current 
in other words, a considerably narrower area of that which we call respon-
sibility with a certain linguistic brevity.
12 In the event of exceeding the norm, we normally do not speak of respon-
sibility but rather express ourselves in various forms of agreement and 
reinforcement of such behavior, for instance, through praise, acknowledg-
ment of respect, addition remuneration, awards, titles and such things. 
That	 reveals	primarily	 the	prominent	emotional	difference	 in	 the	social	
reactions to the under-fulfillment	vs.	over-fulfillment	of	a	norm.
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norm	actually	exists,	or	the	specific	actor	even	falls	into	the	spe-
cific	addressee	class,	or	whether	the	questionable	action	is	the	
object of a norm, etc. If it turns out that the alleged norm doesn’t 
even exist, the accusation becomes completely invalid because 
the other prerequisites of the accusation cannot be met anymore 
anyway. In other words, in this fundamental regard, the moral 
accusation	is	not	different	from	the	formal	legal	responsibility:	
Every responsibility has the prerequisite of a general norm be-
cause it is the only thing that can provide a basis for comparison 
between expected and actually realized behavior.
However, there is also an important difference	 between	
moral and formal legal responsibility: Morally reprehensible 
behavior	 justifies	an	emotional	 response	of	evaluation.	Who-
ever behaves in a morally reprehensible way must expect the 
indignation, contempt, anger, disgust etc. that the accusation 
brings, rightfully so. A legal judge, in contrast, – as the one who 
enforces formal law – should refrain from such emotions as 
much as possible because they endanger the technically correct 
legal application of the formally valid rules. The president of 
the notorious National Socialist German People’s Court, Ro-
land Freisler, got his shocking reputation exactly because of 
this mixture: “With his bad tempered presence and court lead-
ership that often humiliated the accused, Freisler is considered 
a	 personified	 example	 of	 the	 malicious	 misappropriation	 of	
court law in the service of the NS government.”13 Morality and 
law should, therefore, be unconditionally separated, as this re-
pulsive example shows, not for reasons relating to norms but 
because of the necessity of withholding of all emotional values 
in the enforcement of legal norms.14
Fulfilling	a	norm	and	violating	a	norm,	however,	can	be	the	
subject of a formal legal accusation as well as of a moral ac-
13 Wikipedia entry for “Roland Freisler”	at	 	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Roland_Freisler	(last	modified	on	16	August	2016).	The	same	applies	to	the	
judges of the fake Stalin court cases.
14 This does not apply to legislative procedures, in other words, events 
where	a	legal	norm	must	first	be	brought	into	existence.
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cusation on both levels, even if not within one and the same 
action.	If	the	victim	of	an	offense	brings	the	perpetrator	before	
a court, the judge will soberly decide on the case. Those pres-
ent during the case are to behave quietly so that the judge can 
soberly	administer	his	office.	However,	before	and	after	 the	
process,	the	offended	person	can	present	his	or	her	subjective	
feelings about the act at any time. Their outrage is basically 
covered by the moral violation of a norm.
2   The Continuum Between Individual 
and Corporate Actor
2.1 The relationship between a single human actor 
and a corporate actor
One of the most thorough current analytical examinations on 
the nature of the collective before assigning any kind of re-
sponsibility	 –	 something	 that	 can	 only	 be	 clarified	 based	 on	
the conditions of forming a uniform body as ‘carrier’, i.e. the 
supportive bearer, for  the action – was done by James S. Cole-
man in his Foundations of Social Theory.15 However, he uses the 
15 See Coleman [1994]. One could think that the nature of collective behav-
ior should be a subject for any sociological theory. But, strangely, this is 
not the case. Neither the phenomenological school, which was founded 
by Alfred Schütz	and	then	developed	into	so-called	social	constructivism	
by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, nor the collective tradition 
(Émile Durk heim) or structuralist traditions	(Talcott	Parsons, the French 
structuralists or, in Germany, above all Niklas Luhmann) put collective 
behavior as a regular interaction between individuals at the core of their 
theories. The phenomenological school looks at social phenomena from 
the perspective of the individual while Structuralism doesn’t even initial-
ly look at the individual but starts with the assumed agreement of social 
structures from which individuals are then just inferred. Coleman, in con-
trast, looks at the analysis of collective behavior from an economic point of 
view which means very utilitarian and game-theory based. For Coleman, 
humans	are	first	and	foremost	homines oeconomici. This one-sidedness has 
often been criticized. However, it has the advantage of being able to de-
liver	significantly	better	prognostic	results	for	larger	social	units	than	the	
perspective centered on the individual.
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term ‘collective’ for very ephemeral forms of coordinated ac-
tion while I reserve it for more permanent social structures. 
A	better	–	because	it	is	a	clearer	designation	of	what	Coleman 
calls ‘collective’– would be a crowd (in German, a Menschen-
menge).16 Crowds are capable of spontaneous, hugely uniform 
behavior. For example, situations where panic breaks out or 
aggressive mobs. Mass psychology, as a part of social psychol-
ogy, has been interested in the inner laws of such events for at 
least a century now. Similar examples are primarily seen from 
the point of view of laws of process not the possibility of a unit of 
a collective actor. I am interested here in determining the fea-
tures that qualify a human group to be considered a responsi-
ble collective before this collective can be treated as a formally 
construed, uniform actor, not about regularities in the process. 
All the many arguments for and against assuming an inde-
pendent collective actor make at least one thing clear: There is 
not only a formal relationship between an individual and a so 
called	‘collective’	actor,	in	so	far	as	the	latter	is	comprised	of	the	
former, but rather there is a continuum of form between them 
as well. This continuum can be illustrated most simply using 
a scale: The two extremes of the unit ‘actor’ are individuals at 
one end and corporately constituted associations at the other, 
which correspond to a unit of the individual and a unit of the 
many. Between the two there are innumerable forms of more or 
less coordinated actions by multiple individuals which are not 
concise, complete units of actor. The two extreme ends of the 
scale are typical ideals and only represent theoretical, possible 
forms of units of action.17
16 French [1984] also uses the term in this sense. Coleman sometimes even 
speaks of so-called expressive crowds, but this is only as a type of the ge-
nus ‘collective’, see Coleman	[1994],	p.	220ff.
17 Corporate bodies are frequently composed of other corporate bodies, like 
nesting boxes, and often mix individual and corporate elements without 
a problem. For example, in all legal cultures known to me, corporate law 
allows the completely unproblematic possibility that within one and the 
same company (in other words, a corporately constitute commercial en-
terprise) various ownership shares can be held by both natural and legal 
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Fig. 3: The continuum of form between the extremes IP (‘individual person’) 
and IC (‘collective individual’) for the unit of actor18
What	we	are	interested	in	here	is	the	difficult	middle	area	be-
tween the two extremes of, at one end, a uniformly acting indi-
vidual actor and, at the other end, the so-called collective actor. 
The more clearly it can be shown that an event is an action by a 
corporately constituted association, the more plausible it is that 
such a social formation is also independently responsible. The 
more a collective is similar to a spontaneous, uncoordinated 
group, however, the more we tend to ‘pick out’ only individual 
participants as responsible.
This means that we grasp at the next, lower, conceptually 
clearer, level of actor. Unfortunately, the ambiguous, in-between 
area of social reality is very large because almost all of our actions 
can	also	be	understood	as	 the	 result	 of	 collective	 influence	 in	
some	regard.		Subsequently,	the	questionable	event	is	classified	
as an individually or collectively assigned action based on what-
ever interests are at stake and then that interpretation is public-
ly enforced. Usually the assignment of responsibility has to do 
persons at the same time. But this does not disrupt our scale here.
18 The vertical arrangement of the intermediate forms simply serve as a com-
pact	representation	and	has	no	significance	on	its	own.
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with accusations of incorrect conduct, but sometimes the reverse 
is also true. For example, we usually like to treat artistic achieve-
ment	as	 individual	action	without	much	reflection	 in	order	 to	
better	place	our	enthusiasm	and	admiration.	However,	we	could	
make	just	as	many	counter-arguments	against	such	definitude	
as we could against individually assigning guilt. Take, for exam-
ple, the unlawfulness of some other action for which the offend-
er tries to excuse himself before the authorities by asserting ‘cir-
cumstances’ (e.g., in the case of bad parking: some unavoidable, 
unaccountable urgent need to park right exactly in that place; 
in	 the	case	of	a	criminal	offense:	 the	biographical	background	
or the current social circumstances, etc.). All of this could just as 
well	be	submitted	as	an	argument	against	definitively	attribut-
ing a work of art to its author. This example is intended simply to 
show that we are on highly interpretable terrain here and in no 
way should we expect to discover absolutely valid facts when it 
comes to assigning action.
2.1.1 The primary responsibility of the individual actor 
and the ontological status of the collective
With	all	the	uncertainty	that	still	needs	to	be	clarified	regarding	
the conditions that need to be met for asserting an act of collective 
responsibility, for reasons of social coherence it should be kept in 
mind that collective responsibility ultimately only makes sense if 
the concept extends all the way to the individual person. Because 
that is the only way that the individual has an incentive to follow 
the behavioral expectations of the collectively assigned respon-
sibility. Corporate	bodies	are	ultimately	not	floating,	completely	
detached in some ontological nowhere land. They depend on 
their layer of organization, or what I call ‘carrier’ layer i.e., the 
social relationships among the individual people.19 This even ap-
19 I have extensively explained my position on the concept of the ontological 
constituting body elsewhere in my work Prozessontologie. There, I use the 
expression ‘carrier’ frequently in the conventional sense. For example, an 
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plies to the extreme of a formal, corporately constituted associa-
tion, such as a registered business or a recognized international 
legal entity. Sometimes the objection is made, that if collective re-
sponsibility is understood at least partially as an irreducible phe-
nomenon, as in methodological collectivism, there would be no 
one left to whom responsibility could be assigned. That would 
make individual assignment completely useless. But the oppo-
site conclusion, that collective responsibility can be traced back 
to individual persons, leaves no reason to speak of collective re-
sponsibility. It would become a dependent epiphenomenon that 
contributed nothing to clarifying the current problem.20 I dispute 
this conclusion. If it were applicable, then the phenomenon of 
responsibility, which is important and individually strongly 
felt	 as	well	 as	 absolutely	 required	 socially,	would	 be	 omitted	
or be swept from the table. And this frequently has historically 
far-reaching	effects.	Collective	responsibility	is	a	social	fact,	both	
in terms of assigning it to oneself as to another. As a fact, it must 
thus be explained, i.e., it cannot simply be denied.
However, there is something that is practically completely 
ignored in the literature. It is imperative that we distinguish 
between	two	different	meanings	of	the	term	‘collective	respon-
sibility’ in regards to the individual: namely collective respon-
sibility
object is the carrier of its properties. The process ontological model de-
veloped there, however, implies a layering of levels of existence. Each of 
these layers, e.g., the biological versus the chemical, which in term is in 
contrast to the physical, has its position in a linear structure of levels of 
existence or being, each of which overlaps the other. It is exactly in this 
sense that the existence level of  individual, socially linked, humans is the 
carrier level of the abstract entities to which, for example, corporate bodies 
belong	(see	Sohst	[2009],	p.	744ff).
20 Lewis says: “And that is what is wrong with collective responsibility. Pre-
cisely	because	it	will	not	reduce,	it	precludes	you	from	getting	at	anybody	
[…].”(Lewis [1948]., p. 185) Thus, his solution is: We have to assign respon-
sibility at the individual level and, in fact, to the extent of how intensely 
the person under consideration was involved in the collective misconduct 
(because that is what it is about, and not the entitlement of collective com-
mendation).
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a) as the individual’s responsibility for collective action 
and 
b) the collective’s responsibility for its own action. 
These only have the appearance of leading to the same thing. 
From	the	very	beginning,	the	two	things	differ	in	their	perspec-
tive:	Do	 I	view	the	 individual	or	 the	collective	first	and	sub-
sequently the other? The answer has ontological consequenc-
es. Whoever looks at collective action from the perspective of 
the individual contribution will be more likely to come to the 
conclusion that the expression ‘collective action’ is just a ge-
neric term for the action of individuals and that the collective 
cannot even have the property of being an actor. The reverse 
applies to all approaches in sociology that see the collective as 
primary, for instance under the keyword ‘mass psychology’. 
Émile Durkheim became known for his defense of the ontolog-
ical independence of the collective. His arguments are still not 
convincing today. Although Panajotis Kondylis, most recent-
ly	and	significantly	more	soberly	than	Durkheim, has shown 
that the existence of society before any individual analysis of 
action is the prerequisite for a consistent understanding of any 
sociality.21 Even today’s mass psychology sees itself more as a 
statistical method for predicting the behavior of large groups 
of people for that reason and makes no ontological claims re-
garding the object of its research. As far as I know, no single so-
cio-philosophical theory of collective moral responsibility has 
yet been developed.
Even here, the position is that collectives are not yet uniform 
actors when seen on their own. This property is reserved only 
for individual persons, on the one hand, and for formally con-
stituted corporate bodies on the other. From that it follows that 
the expression ‘collective responsibility’ refers only to the re-
sponsibility of the individual actor  – whether this is an individ-
ual person or a corporate body – for the common results of the 
action of a collective and not that of the responsibility of this 
21 See de Waal	[1999],	p.	91ff.
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collective in and of itself. I do not compile the collective into a 
socio-ontological object.
2.1.2	Additional	arguments	for	putting	collective	
responsibility onto the individual actor
Additional	and	strong	arguments	 for	putting	possible	collec-
tive responsibility onto individual members also result from 
the above perspective under a). Such a sociol-psychological 
argument is that of social identity: Part of the established knowl-
edge base of sociology and not just individual schools is that 
the individual only develops his individuality through the 
interaction of his roles and his practical contribution within 
the interwoven norms and interests of the commonality. The 
unavoidable communication that arises from that interaction 
is	the	source	of	constant	confirmation	and	development	of	our	
social identity.22 We are thus existentially linked to many so-
cial groups and communities, collectives and associations of 
all	kinds	even	if	with	different	intensities.	It	follows	from	this	
that collective responsibility is recognized as a given to the ex-
tent that it always concerns individual members because they 
identify themselves. However, in the reverse, there is a strong 
argument for why it is very obvious to even speak of collective 
responsibility:	If	social	identification	is	an	essential	part	of	our	
entire existence as humans, it can hardly be ignored that the 
individual in any form also has to stand up for that which it has 
joined,	in	whatever	form.	Social	identification,	from	a	norma-
tive point of view, is not a one-sided relationship.
A third argument in favor of the individual responsibility 
(always including here that of the corporate actor) concerns 
the larger explanatory power of such a reduction. The asym-
metry between inseparable and constituted individual actors 
– in other words, at one extreme individual persons and at the 
22 George Herbert Mead and the school of Symbolic Interactionism should 
be thanked for this view, see Mead [1975].
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other extreme the corporate body – should be mentioned in 
this regard. The actions of a corporate body can fundamental-
ly be traced back to the contributions of some of its individual 
members	(if	they	can	be	traced	back	to	human	effects	at	all	and	
are	not,	for	example,	due	to	‘godly’	or	other	alien	influences)	
– because this is exactly the aim of its inner organization, as 
explained above. For the individual person, such traceability to 
some elementary unit of actor is not possible.23 The end point of 
the scale (IC) in the preceding illustration on p. 23 is an absolute 
in terms of social practice, and we don’t go beyond it in pub-
lic communication. The extreme point IC, in contrast, is not an 
absolute. We can always imagine a stronger compression and 
integration of individual people into a collective until we reach 
totalitarianism. Here there is no distinct end point. This asym-
metry also fosters the methodological traceability of collective 
actions to the contributions of individuals: Whoever wants to 
understand an action as ‘absolute’, even if it is assigned to an 
actor constituted as a corporate body, must at least make an 
effort	to	discover	the	contributions	of	individual	people	even	if,	
at the end of the determination, irreducible shares of collective 
responsibility remain. The idea that collective action is always, 
i.e.	 even	 in	 its	 non-unified	modes,	 only	 a	 theoretical	 fiction	
does not follow in any way, as, for instance, Uwe Schimank has 
recently again asserted.24 
The discussion that has continued over broad stretches of 
the past century between the adherents of methodological in-
23 Only Sigmund Freud was able to break through this approach with his 
theory of the unconscious. This resulted in a great irritation all the way 
to everyday ideas of humans in western culture because it posited a more 
elementary unit of action than the external, overall individual actor with 
the	relatively	stable	behavior	patterns	of	 the	unconscious psychological 
functions and, exactly with that, also put the principle of responsibility se-
riously in question. This so-called psychoanalytic level will not, however, 
be considered any further here. I am much more interested in the axiomat-
ic	unified	actor,	whether	in	the	form	of	an	individual	person	or	in	the	form	
of a constituted corporate body.
24 Schimank [2010], p. 327.
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dividualism and those of collectivism has led to the insight - at 
least in broad circles - that both claims can only be understood 
by considering the other. In this case, it has to do with a clas-
sic case of non-complementary convictions and, consequently, 
with distinguishing concepts among the basic concepts they 
characterized.25
It then follows from this asymmetry that in the event of an 
irreducible excess of collective responsibility, those members 
of the collective for whom at least a corresponding contribution 
cannot be directly demonstrated will have to be responsible be-
yond the individual contributions. Here too, we are looking at 
a progressive scale. If the member of a collective responsible 
for some event did not provide any kind of contribution to the 
event for established reasons, in spite of his membership, one 
would hardly call him responsible. For example, if an original-
ly harmless sports club turned into a criminal association, ev-
ery original member who no longer did anything with the club 
and simply forgot to formally leave the association and thus 
was completely ignorant of its development, could hardly be 
expected to have the collective responsibility passed through 
to his person. The pure knowledge of the current members 
during the period of the criminal activities, however, is usually 
sufficient	to	bring	such	passively	accepting	members	into	the	
sphere of moral responsibility.
2.2 The levels within structural consolidation
While it seems to be factually undisputed that formally con-
stituted and publicly recognized corporate bodies, whether 
under private law or under public or even international law, 
are	unified	and	independent	actors26, this certainty fades to the 
25 Anthony Giddens	is	a	pioneer	in	the	field	of	uniting	methodical	collectiv-
ism or, respectively, structuralism, on the one hand, and methodological 
individualism, on the other; in this regard, see his main work The Constitu-
tion of Society (Giddens [1977]).
26 See the very thorough socio-ontological analysis by Colin Wight (Wight 
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extent that a formal corset of recognized ‘corporateness’ no lon-
ger	clearly	exists:	Is	some	officially	registered	citizens	initiative	
still a single actor, or is it considered an aggregate of individual 
human actors? Is a so-called non-registered club an individual 
actor?27 How should this be understood for an informal reli-
gious community without a central spiritual authority or orga-
nization?28
In the above-mentioned continuum of form, we are only con-
sidering	the	middle,	diffuse	area	between	the	conceptually	dis-
tinct extremes of the individual, on one side, and the corporately 
constituted association on the other. In order to create analytical 
clarity regarding which type of human interaction we deem ap-
propriate, and also to be able to project multiple individual as 
so	called	‘collective’	responsibility,	we	should	first	make	a	few	
more or less broad divisions in the continuum of form in this 
[2006]) on the uncertainties behind this alleged certainty. See Erskine 
[2004] on the individual aspects of the institutional responsibility in the 
international	field,	especially	of	representatives	of	international	subjects.
27 Unregistered associations	 are	 much	 more	 frequent	 and	 more	 influen-
tial than one would think with such an unassuming name. In particular, 
unions, political parties and religious communities are often corporately 
organized yet exist through membership but are independent of changes 
among individual members. They are neither registered as an association 
in an association register nor with corporate status (in the case of religious 
communities within the meaning of Art. 140 GG (Grundgesetz, the German 
constitution) in connection with Art. 137 para. 5 of the Constitution of the 
Weimar Republic. Such associations are not legal persons. In other words, 
they do not represent an independent legal subject separate from its mem-
bers and they are generally not able to be the carrier of rights and obliga-
tions, as long as there is no special governmental recognition stipulating 
something else in individual cases. They are referred to in German law 
under civil law in § 54 BGB (German Civil Code) as ‘associations without 
legal rights’.
28 There are currently countless cases of this, for example, the structurally 
manifested	and	very	violent	attacks	by	Buddhist	extremists	on	the	Islamic	
population groups of the Rohingyas in Myanmar and many other areas 
of tension, especially in Central Africa, China, Vietnam and many other 
countries. They all illustrate the question posed particularly sharply here 
– as well as in similar cases, see Horowitz	[2001]	on	this	in	detail	–	to	the	
extent	that	there	are	definitely	inciting	figureheads	who	are	not	granted	
formal authority and the organized violence, if it ever ends, shows trans-
parent structures.
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section. This gives us the possibility to assign features to these 
sections from which we can then derive criteria for responsibili-
ty.	I	suggest	the	following	five-level	scale:
Individual person
↓
Crowd:
Internal chaotic aggregates of natural and legal persons as carriers of action.
Example: All spontaneous, accidental collections of individual 
social actors29, e.g. on free markets; informal political or cultur-
al movements; encounters of corporate bodies in international 
spheres practically free of the law.
↓
Group:
Crowds which behave temporarily in a coordinated way in space and 
subject matter. 
Example: Weddings and other celebrations, political demon-
strations, processions, living communities, informal citizen ini-
tiatives, etc.
↓
Collective:
Permanent and integrally organized groups
In general, all socially permanently organized structures sub-
ject to corporate organization, i.e., either completely without 
corporate structure or by ignoring this structure, in so far as 
they exist.	Collectives	are	thus	not	a	unified	acting	actor.
↓
Corporate bodies
All	 unified	 acting	 actors	with	 collective	 and	 formally	 recog-
nized social interior structure for decision-making responsibil-
ity and distribution of tasks.
Fig. 4: Categorical distribution of the social continuum of form
29 A social actor can clearly be a corporate body at this level, for example, a 
company as a participant in informal digital markets.
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The spectrum of tangible social phenomenon above the lev-
el of spontaneous crowd extends from informal groups with 
secular or religious beliefs, practical life style communities or 
circles which are factually involved in any kind of event-con-
text, all the way to recognized inner-government associations, 
business enterprises and organizations of all kinds, as well as, 
beyond that, to the international stage with every type of NGO 
and new internet agitation groups (e.g., AVAAZ or Campact) 
to larger groups of persons aiming for statehood (such as the 
Palestinian proto-state, the so-called ‘Islamic state’ in the area 
of today’s Iraq and Syria as well as the South Sudan up until the 
time of its independence). The diversity of form, purpose and 
level at which all of these groups and their organizations can be 
classified	seems	almost	endless.
The phenomenon of so-called flash	mobs appearing around 
the world – a gathering of many participants spontaneously 
organized through digital communication platforms for the 
purpose of carrying out very short public actions or calls for 
spontaneous political demonstrations – are examples of how 
spontaneous	groups	can	definitely	demonstrate	a	certain	lev-
el of prior planning. Furthermore, their members are usually 
linked to varying degrees by a common world view. All of 
these	are	qualification	features	that	already	strongly	separate	
them from simply a crowd.
The	above	five-way	division	ultimately	results	from	a	com-
plex criterion of many individual aspects that can still be clear-
ly named: It is the interior structure of the form of community 
which is judged in regards to its temporal durability, its inte-
gration of individual participants, its organizational solidity 
and, with that, ultimately, it social whole in view of the dis-
tinctiveness	and	efficiency	of	its	external	effect.	Such	a	division	
makes	 it	possible	 to	first	 justify	assigning	responsibility	only	
subsequent to the interior degree of cohesion referred to as 
a	collective	here.	 I	use	 the	 term	 ‘collective’	 thus	 significantly	
more distinct than is usual in the literature. A collective is lim-
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ited by its structural precursors as well as its successors, the 
formally constituted and in some way publicly recognized cor-
porate body.
This	results	in	something	very	important.	It	is	first	the	col-
lective that can be usefully considered as  norm addressee. I will 
briefly	address	what	a	social	norm	is	below.	However,	it	is	clear	
that such a social norm needs something more than to be deter-
mined by itself in order for it to be followed. There must also 
be	an	addressee	who	is	capable	of	fulfilling	it.	The	assignment	
of responsibility for an action is not possible without reference 
to an obligation. In other words, it is based on a comparison of 
the actual with the socially required behavior. If the result of 
such a comparison is to be convincing, it must refer to distinct 
relationships between the norm addressee and the norm being 
referred to. Such a disambiguation is, in my opinion, only pos-
sible starting from the structural level of the collective in the 
above	figure.
2.3 A different schematic view: Community, Society, State
However, we can’t leave things at the above structural develop-
mental schematic of People → Crowds → Groups → Collective 
→ Corporate bodies. The on-going discussion about collective 
action in sociology ever since its founding is too extensive to be 
able to call things done with such a simple schema. In particu-
lar,	the	schema	does	not	fit	into	the	usual	conceptual	trinity	in	
sociology of community, society and state.
Every social science tradition that goes back to Max Weber 
explaining all collective phenomenon as epi-phenomena of de-
pendent behavior aggregates made up of individual people de-
nies any ability for cognition for any form of an acting plurality 
of persons.30
30 The explanatory strategy of ‘methodological individualism’ is often traced 
back to the well-known explanations in Weber’s Economy and Society: “9. 
Handeln im Sinn sinnhaft verständlicher Orientierung des eigenen Verhaltens 
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On the other hand, Max Weber himself referred acknowl-
edgingly to Ferdinand Tönnies and his very popular work at 
the time, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Communities and Society), 
which appeared in 1887 under great acclaim.31 Tönnies sees the 
expression of human sociality primarily  in the form of two so-
called social norm types which he refers to as ‘community’ and 
‘society’. For him, the community is the older and structural 
predecessor type because the individual human relationships 
here are based on the most directly personal, i.e., familiar/fam-
ily types of ties. In contrast, society is a more abstract social 
structure in so far as the relationships between the people are 
no longer based primarily on personal solidarity but rather on 
more or less on anonymous relationships of exchange. For this 
gibt es für uns stets nur als Verhalten von einer oder mehreren e inzelnen Per-
sonen.” [Action in the sense of meaningfully understandable orientation of 
one’s own behavior is always to be understood for us as only the behavior 
of one or more individuals.]; Weber [1980], p. 6; highlighting in original). 
Such a methodologically fundamental interpretation of this sentence is, in 
my opinion, not quite correct because Weber himself never systematically 
attempted	to	understand	historical-collective	phenomena	as	a	dependent	
sum of separate actions by human individuals. This contradicted the view 
of sociology as an independent science of the social, which it vehement-
ly supported. Otherwise, the following would apply: There would be no 
more hold for increasingly narrower reductions along the precipitous path 
of rigorous reductionism	once	the	first	step	was	taken.	Social	phenomena	
would	first	have	to	be	traced	back	to	the	individual	psychological	level,	
which in turn would ‘have to’ go back to the neurobiological, and this, for 
its part, necessarily to the biochemical, and at the end, to the elementary 
physical,	i.e.,	quantum	mechanics	and	ultimately	even	to	quantum	field	
theory	where	finally	every	possibly	useful	explanation	of	the	social	would	
have	been	long	forgotten.	The	reductive	strategy	of	methodological	indi-
vidualism is not yet fundamentally wrong, however. One just needs to 
know the limits of its applicability. Weber, incidentally, never explicitly 
exceeded this, in my opinion. It only leads to a literal reductio ad absur-
dum when methodological individualism	is	used	as	a	weapon	to	attack	
the emergent autonomy of the collective sphere. If I were to take such a 
challenge	seriously,	this	text	would	be	superfluous.
31 Weber [1980] refers to Tönnies right at the beginning on page 1, indicating 
the ‘factual but above all beautiful work by F. Tönnies “Communities and 
Society”. Further mention of it is on  ibid. p. 17, for example, in the expla-
nation of the term ‘convention’ and especially in the important explana-
tion of the term ‘socialization’ (ibid. p. 22) in which Weber does not want 
to	take	on	the	specifics	of	Tönnies’ terminology
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exchange of services to function in large societies, a general or-
ganization is required and a corresponding body of applicable 
rules for its enforcement.  Tönnies, however, does not step be-
yond the dualism of society to state but rather sketches an or-
ganismic theory of natural law.32 State organization is obvious-
ly only a dependent epi-phenomenon of a developed society. It 
was Max Weber who was able to fundamentally transcend this 
relationship and very critically; his entire work can be read as 
exactly this antagonism in its diverse cultural forms from the 
viewpoint of the Enlightenment.
In this regards, a contemporary of Tönnies’,	Otto	von	Gierke, 
is interesting. Reinhold Zippelius, who’s philosophy of law has 
been a standard work in the curricula of German law faculties 
for decades, also looks at the community as an element of the 
legal order in reference to Gierke in Chapter VII of his book.33 
While he cites von Gierke, according to whom the community 
is ‘a whole which incorporates an actual entity’34, in his sum-
mary of the term ‘community’, he ultimately follows an ap-
proach that ‘is removed [...] from the facts of experience.’35 In 
this sense, the so-called relationship sociology, for example, of 
Georg Simmel	and	the	legal	positivism	of	the	influential	Hans	
Kelsen, in particular, has turned away from such an approach. 
This might be because of the pathetic exaltation of that which 
is community based on von Gierke’s concept of community 
when he writes:
Are the human associations of actual entities which, by 
recognition of their ‘personhood’ through law, only re-
ceive what actually corresponds to their properties?
I and many others respond to that with:  Yes!  And it ap-
pears to me that everyone needs to answer like this who 
has broken with the individualistic approach to society 
32 See Tönnies	[1887],	third	book	Proömien	des	Naturrechts	(p.	195ff.)
33 Zippelius	[2007]	(p.	145ff)
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. p. 9f.
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and views human co-existence as a life of higher order 
into which the individual life is incorporated.36
Regardless	 of	 the	 actual	 legal	 and	 social	 benefits	 von	 Gi-
erkes	 work	 brought	 –	 in	 that	 it	 significantly	 contributed	 to	
the cooperatives being acknowledged as legal personalities in 
Germany – such a heroism is suspicious nowadays and quite 
unsuitable to be convincing for the perspectives behind it. But 
the following is not about opposing individualism with collec-
tivism, and I especially do not see it as von Gierke does in that 
any form of ‘communal life’ has a ‘higher order’. Much more, 
the	still	young	sociology	was	fighting	for	general	recognition	
as an independent academic discipline at about the same time 
as Tönnies and von Gierke	 published	 their	 most	 influential	
works. Their demand has meanwhile been realized. It means, 
seen soberly, that social communities as an independent area of 
phenomena can no longer be completely reduced to individual 
behavior according to general understanding today.
Zippelius, in turn, concludes from this development that the 
community	can	be	construed	just	as	little	from	a	purely	norma-
tive stand as law.37 In other words: It is primarily a social fact 
phenomenon that is dependent on ‘the loyalty, care, respect, 
tact, style’ that abounds in it and therefore cannot be tangible 
in a purely legal-normative way.38 It is insofar a form of pre-le-
gal phenomena. Even if Zippelius’ approach is understandable 
in principle, no one disputes that this pre-legal property of 
communities – I’m speaking here rather more neutrally about 
collectives in order to escape the somewhat tempting way of 
expression that Tönnies	has		–	is	the	germ	layer	of	all	juridifi-
cation of social relationships and, with that, an indispensable 
prerequisite. 
But there are also collectively assigned events that cannot 
be so easily be pushed into legal informality, as Zippelius pos-
36 Gierke [1902], p. 11
37 Zippelius [2007], p. 146
38 Ibid., p. 147
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tulates here – completely in harmony with the positive law of 
most jurisdictions in today’s world. Consider the international 
War Reparations Centre as an example here.
War restitution has been common since antique times, for ex-
ample, in the victory of Rome over Carthage (146 BC).  In the 
19th century, it was imposed on the defeated opponents of war, 
especially by the colonial powers in Asia. Restitution became 
historically	prominent	for	the	first	time	through	the	Treaty of 
Frankfurt when France had to pay the Prussians indemnity 
after the Prussian victory in 1871. And then, after WWI, there 
was a decisive change. Suddenly world peace was in the inter-
est of the entire human race and not just individual states. The 
so-called Fourteen Points speech by the American President 
Woodrow Wilson in Mount Vernon on July 4, 1918 was about 
the rights of individual citizens to peace and not, as it had been 
up until then, about states and subjects.39 That was absolutely 
39 Wilson’s speech can be summarized as follows:
 “The following are the goals for the allied people of the world which must 
be fought for and granted before peace can reign:
 I. The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere that can disturb the 
world’s peace for its own purposes, secretly and according to its own choice, 
or, if it cannot be destroyed, at least reduced to factual powerlessness.
 II. The regulation of all issues, whether they are about state territory, sov-
ereignty, economic agreements or political relations, on the basis of free 
acceptance of this regulation on the part of the directly concerned people 
and not that another regulation could be wished for on the basis of ma-
terial	interests	or	benefits	for	any	other	nation or any other people for its 
external	influence	or	its	dominance.
 III. The consent of all the nations to allow their behavior to be guided by 
the same principles of honor and respect for the common law of a civilized 
society which applies to the individual citizens of all modern States in 
their relations with one another, so that all the promises and agreements 
are	diligently	observed,	 that	no	 special	 attacks	and	conspiracies	 can	be	
plotted,	 that	no	selfish	damage	can	be	 inflicted	with	 impunity	and	that	
mutual trust is created on the basis of mutual respect for the law.
 IV. The establishment of a peace organization that should guarantee that 
the total power of free nations is protected from any legal infringement 
and will serve to make peace and justice even more secure, that it will 
create	a	defined	tribunal	of	opinions	to	which	all	must	adhere	and	through	
which any international readjustment for which the parties directly in-
volved cannot come to friendly agreement about, should be sanctioned.
38
2   The Continuum Between Individual and Corporate Actor
new. How does a state decision now correlate with the volontée 
générale of the concerned citizens, especially when it is about 
war and peace? This is the central question when we speak of 
collective responsibility at a national, i.e., political level.
Even the Treaty of Frankfurt after the victory of the Prus-
sians over France provided an occasion for decades of outrage 
by the French, and, as is well-known, the peace treaty of Ver-
sailles after the 1918 war paved the way for Hitler to come to 
power. In both cases, ‘the people’ rebelled even though those 
in	power	had	settled	everything	for	them.	Obviously	there	was	
a collective carrier of opinion that needed to be taken serious-
ly,	no	matter	how	difficult	it	was	to	understand,	that	one	has	
called ‘the people’ since the French Revolution. This form of 
political collectivity has increasingly been understood as some-
thing sovereign since the Enlightenment and thus as the actu-
al germ of social order from which the state only receives its 
power as a loan and thus cannot claim on the basis of its own 
right. But who is actually ‘the people’ apart from purely formal 
conceptual	definitions	if	not	a	somewhat	vague	expression	of	
community or even social collectivity?  It can only be viewed 
as a unitary actor through its condition of being a state. ‘The 
people’, or the society as the entity constituting a government, 
do not act in any uniform way on their own, i.e. beyond the 
government organization.
2.4 Direct vs. organized sociality
The state, enterprises and similar forms of social organization – 
as Weber expresses it: associations and establishments40 – may 
 These great goals can be summed up in one sentence. What we are looking 
for is the rule of law founded on the consent of the governed and support-
ed by the organized view of humanity.” (The original text can be viewed 
online	 at:	 https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson’s_Four-
teen_Points)
40 In Weber	[1972],	p.	28,	it	says	in	the	preliminary	definitions:
 “§ 15. Enterprise should be a continuous instrumental activity of a spec-
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take on many forms (Weber calls them “bureaucratic”). They 
are more or less independent, organized detachments of the 
people who support the association or enterprise. There have 
long been other forms of more streamlined collective organi-
zations before organized statehood, as we know today: early 
kingdoms and chiefdoms that clearly held their subjects to a 
certain social order in similar forms as today’s state.  Human 
sociality	invents	normative	patterns	of	order	as	soon	as	the	sym-
bolic means of communication and the practical technology are 
available.	Often	it	is	first	just	an	expression	of	specifically	influ-
ential people within a community from whom it emerges and 
is carried. This can be seen particularly clearly among religious 
founders who imprint their own individual, originally private 
intuitions onto their founding community. In the course of the 
development,	this	pattern	of	order	takes	on	a	life	of	its	own	and	
becomes	objectified	as	an	organization	with	its	own	laws	if	it	
has a social constituency. This organization then appears in-
creasingly opposite the individual members of a society in the 
sense of a social antithesis, i.e. a certain ‘general will’ and power 
that takes on a life of its own contrary to society’s particular in-
terests. Thus, social organization can play both in favor of the in-
dividual as against him, above all seen in very drastic extremes 
such as imprisonment or the death penalty.
We	will	be	considering	this	internal	differentiation	of	an	as-
sociation and its collective carrier in more detail further below. 
It is not at all limited to just the political level. Every corporate-
ly constituted economic enterprise and any corporate associa-
tion also have these features in one way or the other.
If we consider Tönnies’ and von Gierkes’  basic ideas again 
without all of the idealization to reach an understanding of the 
concept of ‘collective’, then it would be recommendable to not 
take Tönnies’	division	of	normal	types	as	some	kind	of	fixed	
ified	kind,	a	formal	organization	is	socialization	with	continuous	instru-
mentally	acting	administrative	staff.”	(From	The	Max	Weber Dictionary: 
Key Words and Central Concepts, Second Edition) (italics author’s)
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condition	of	sociality	but	as	signs	of	a	much	broader	and	fluid	
scale of possible sociality. I called this the continuum of form 
above.	Such	a	scale	is	then	rather	a	fluid	measurement	of	 in-
creasing	social	differentiation,	i.e.,	development, and not a suc-
cession	of	fixed	types.	The	idea	of	such	a	developmental	scale	
is in general the prevailing understanding in anthropology and 
ethnology41, however, it is only undisputed as long as ‘develop-
ment’ is not confused with ‘improvement’, i.e., progress.
The state in turn has a special status in such a value-neutral 
development continuum because it is not just any development 
of society but rather, – particularly in the form of the statehood 
taking shape in Europe since the Middle Ages42 – also some-
thing that continues to take on more of a life of its own in rela-
tion to its43 society. This independence of the state towards ‘its’ 
society44 can ensure the inner satisfaction of otherwise chaotic 
41 Two of the outstanding contributions to this very extensive research topic 
are Bellah [2011] for a more anthropological history of ideas approach and 
Boix [2015] for a strictly material approach to the development of human 
society. Francis Fukuyama is among the more prominent representatives 
of this approach, see especially Fukuyama [2011]. Of course, this approach 
has its opposition as well, in particular, the French Structuralism of the 
1040’s through to the 1960’s. However, it only has a few remaining follow-
ers	today,	mostly	among	the	so-called	non-interventionists	in	the	field	of	
international relations.
42 Fukuyama	[2011]	presents	a	comparable	and	highly	qualified	newer	over-
view here.  On the antagonism between the state and society, which also 
occurs in this process, see Böckenförde	[1972],	S.	396ff.
43 The expression ‘its’ here must be understood as relational not possessive-
ly. The relationship of ownership	is	a	qualified	relationship	of	dominion,	
namely, as described in the unsurpassed, clear formulation of the German 
Civil Code § 854 as the “factual power” over a thing – which in law then 
is generalized to ‘factual material ownership’. Note that ownership itself 
does not have to be legal in anyway, and that is not just in German law. 
Even a thief owns the things he stole.
44 Such an expression needs to be used with care in another way as well. 
Many states, as an organization, have power over many ethnic groups that 
in	no	way	need	to	form	a	unified	society.	The	expression	‘a	state	and	its	
society’ here has nothing to do with a relationship of ownership but rather 
also doesn’t say anything about whether a state is even in a position to 
create or maintain the unity of the society/societies for which it is formally 
responsible. Its relationship is often precarious historically.
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individual	 interests,	 as	 a	benefit,	 but,	 as	 a	negative,	 can	also	
lead to the suppression of the society through state bureaucra-
cy and rampant individual interests. This basic idea is not just 
the tenor of long stretches of Max Weber’s Economy and Soci-
ety; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, too, clearly referred to this in 
1972.45 Societies without organized structures of dominion are 
not uncommon in anthropology46, however, states without so-
ciety are impossible. This indisputable fact alone makes it clear 
what has the greater weight both from an anthropological and 
political point of view.
The concept of ‘collective’ represented here, when positively 
formulated, approaches Hegel’s understanding as presented 
by Robert B. Brandom in Wiedererinnerter Idealismus (Recol-
lected Idealism).47 In regards to Hegel’s relationship of ‘selves’ 
(literally: individual people) and their community (here: collec-
tive), it states that community is the synthetic result of mutual 
recognition by the individuals constituting it. This recognition, 
however,  is explicitly a normative one, i.e., a recognition that 
goes beyond the biological existence of others because the lat-
ter doesn’t require any particular recognition. For Hegel, the 
mutual ‘recognition’ of individuals (according to Brandom, 
completely in harmony with the preceding development of 
political theory in Europe) means much more the creation of a 
normative order between them which is no longer easily avail-
able to the individuals and thus is granted a certain indepen-
45 See Böckenförde	[1972],	p.	411ff.	There	Böckenförde expressly refers to the 
constitutionally anchored dependence of all state decision-making power 
in	Germany	–	or,	better	said:	power	of	dominion	–	on	‘the	people’	under	
Art. 20 para. 2 sentence 1 of the German constitution, i.e., on the primate 
of social will before the state, which consequently must be sharply distin-
guished from each other.
46 To read about the mostly very violent life conditions of egalitarian hun-
ger and gatherer societies see Boix	[2015],	p.	22ff.		(Chapter	1).	For	details	
about the research on African societies without chiefs or similar leader-
ship	figures,	so-called	acephalous societies, see Middleton’s Tribes without 
Rulers (Middleton [1958]).
47 Brandom	[2015],	p.	282ff.	There,	however,	he	doesn’t	speak	of	‘collective’	
but rather ‘community’.
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dence from the outset. In a positive sense, thus, a collective is 
distinguished by the recognition of the normative order grant-
ed by its members who, to a certain degree, ultimately can even 
stand in opposite to it as a true bureaucracy. The fact of mu-
tual, norm-based acknowledgment means that the individuals 
collectively subject themselves to such norms; however, they 
do not become a uniform actor because of that fact alone. For 
this	they	first	become	as	organized association, e.g., rather than 
state or enterprise. 
With	 that	we	now	return	 in	a	completely	different	way	 to	
Tönnies’ duality, in the form of a general, two-part structural 
framework in practically all larger social groupings. On the one 
side, there is the generally spatially connected and temporal-
ly continuous living communities. Parallel to and in addition 
to these living communities, however, hierarchically modeled 
structures of command develop which have normative legit-
imation and more or less independent (rule based) executive 
power.	The	difference	between	 these	 two	 social	 forms	 is	 the	
difference	between	sociality	that	is	directly	practical	and	that	
which is symbolically organized.
No	matter	what	their	specific	distinctiveness	might	be,	both	
structural	areas	form	a	unity	in	the	difference,	e.g.,	as	external	
unit	of	society	and	state,	or	of	staff	and	the	shareholders in a 
company.	The	distance	between	 the	different	poles	 stretches	
from a barely perceptible minimal organization all the way to 
totalitarianism	over	the	individuals.	An	example	of	the	latter	
is the way the Athenians saw their Spartan neighbors at the 
time.48	The	difference	in	the	unity	of	a	collective	and	its	own	
48 Both the fascism of Nazi Germany as well as the many types of communist 
regimes in the world gaze longingly at such extreme forms of social total-
itarian organization. As far as I can judge from my own life experience, 
however, there has never been an individual who approved of having his 
own individuality overpowered. And it has also not prevented leaders 
motivated in such a way from repeatedly making mass demonstrations, 
marches and even war seem as if it is ‘their’ people or ‘their’ society that 
wants to be overpowered.
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organizational apparatus is a very general developmental fea-
ture. This applies for states and large economic enterprises just 
as much as for some ideologically based communities. The 
Catholic Church stands out among the religious communities 
to the extent that it was the only one that developed a central 
bureaucracy spanning the world.
Both extremes, from the completely unorganized to the to-
tally organized communities, however, are only theoretical and 
somewhat asymptotic end values. In reality they don’t exist: 
A collective without any symbolic organization is no longer a 
human-social collective but rather a purely biologically deter-
mined herd or swarm formation, and a collective where the in-
dividual is only a completely obligated party within a seamless 
hierarchy of commands and duties is also not a collective in the 
proper sense of the word. This is based on the fact that a group 
of people who are completely instrumentalized in such a way 
can	no	longer	be	the	beneficiaries	of	this	submission.	However,	
if	there	are	no	beneficiaries	from	such	a	development,	such	a	
structure will hardly last. It is a historic fact that, for instance, a 
fully instrumentalized collective can drop down to a collection 
of slaves under its conqueror as a result of a violent defeat. It 
then also loses its status as a self-organized collective.
As already has been said, social organization needs to al-
ways be distinguished from the collective that supports it.  It 
has a material side; for example, in today’s states, it is the au-
thorities	and	offices	that	stand	–	at	least,	ideally	–	in	a	hierarchi-
cal relation to each other and whose head is the government of 
the	specific	corporate	body.	Such	a	hierarchy	does	not	apply	to	
the relationship between a state and its society. And social or-
ganization also has an intangible, i.e. quite abstract side in the 
form of a generally applicable base of norms which is usually 
created through certain procedures in modern large societies 
that have superordinate applicability, e.g., constitutionally.49 
49 This applies indirectly for countries that have no constitution as well, such 
as Great Britain and Israel. In Israel, there are founding documents which 
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This norm base has to be manifested almost mandatorily every-
where	in	the	world	in	written,	i.e.	objective,	publicly	accessible	
form.50 The individual norms comprised therein unfold their 
validity through the way it which they came into being as well 
as	their	public	quality.	This	validity,	in	turn,	justifies	the	inte-
gral relationship between the social primary collective –  be-
cause it generates norms – and its organizational apparatus.51
2.5 Conflicts of application in assigning collective responsibility
The content of a norm must be distinguished from the reasons 
for its establishment. Thus a norm is, in itself, value-free. How-
ever, people will undoubtedly submit to social norms rather 
if they correspond to their values. Moreover, the normative 
judgment of moral responsibility can refer to a future as well 
as to a past action. It can be thus both a priory or posteriori.52 
In	the	question	here	of	collective	responsibility,	it	is	first	con-
cerning the retrospective judgment, i.e., the retroactive assign-
ment of responsibility for events that occurred before. If some-
one assigns the responsibility for damage to someone, that is 
unavoidably linked to a condemnation. This negativity in the 
form of an evaluation that rejects a behavior is problematic in 
itself. It can only disappear when the function of moral respon-
sibility to control future behavior is emphasized which then 
gives it a means to separate it from guilt which is exclusively 
oriented to the past and a great emotional burden. By under-
are quasi-constitutional while in Great Britain, it is the institutionalized, 
stable traditions	and	offices	which	watch	over	it	and	play	this	role.
50 The astounding stele with the Codex Hamurabi (circa 1800 BC) shows 
how old this form is to establish social norms.
51 The relationship of abstract norms and their factual validity is the object 
of the second major work by Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. 
See especially Chapter VIII: On the role of civil society and political public 
(Habermas	[1998],	p.	399ff.).
52 Daniela Kroslak and Toni Erskine refer to this distinction in the context of 
collective responsibility, see Erskine [2004] p. 8 (Erskine) and p. 162 (Kro-
slak).
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standing a ‘forward-looking’ understanding of moral responsi-
bility, the opportunity arises to eliminate the otherwise endless 
demands for retribution which unavoidably follow an accusa-
tion of guilt.  It means more than just the obligation to avoid 
future damaging behavior through continuous change of the 
condition that brought forth the past misconduct. It allows a 
sober acknowledgment of the misconduct of its predecessors 
for later generations without having to be answerable for a new 
imputation of blame. This is very important.
But	first	the	nexus	between	actual	misconduct and the result-
ing damage is decisive for the question of whether – in our case 
–	a	collective	moral	responsibility	has	emerged.	As	a	matter	of	
principle, subsequent enforcement of sanctions against the par-
ty	identified	as	responsible	give	rise	to	the	question	of	fairness 
and justice. This touches on the socio-psychological level: the 
most	sensitive	area	of	peaceful	coexistence,	codified	in	expres-
sions such as ‘honor’, ‘pride’, and’ self-concept’. In other words, 
it concerns the social identity of the individual in his collective. 
In reverse, accusations against more or less informal collectives 
frequently have a shadow of discriminatory, ethnically or ideo-
logically based terror which can go as far as aggressive barba-
rism, seeking to vent on victims that are exactly the ones who 
accuse them of inadequacies. There are many historic examples 
that	confirm	this	suspicion.	Turning	away	from	informal	collec-
tives	as	carriers	of	responsibility	should	therefore	first	be	under-
stood as a great achievement of civilization for this reason.
Every	affirmation	of	collective	responsibility	must	therefore	
be undertaken with the greatest precautions possible against 
threatening abuse. Of course, those cases where a collective is 
assigned responsibility by third parties are problematic; and 
vice versa for the members of the collective who reject the as-
signment. This case should be the rule. When responsibility is 
retrospectively applied as an accusation, whatever its form, it 
usually is based on one-sided assignment, not mutuality. And 
it	is	the	one-sidedness	that	then	makes	justification	necessary.	
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The	 justification	 should	 be	 plausible	 enough	 that	 the	 conse-
quences of the responsibility to the recipients of the assignment 
may be expected, maybe even against their explicit will. The 
clarification	of	the	concept	of	collective	responsibility,	in	other	
words, presupposes that the intended collective sees itself as 
such. However, such assignment against the will of a recipient 
can	and	should	have	future	social	influence	on	their	behavior	
pattern.	When	similar	cases	arise,	the	possible	recipient	of	the	
assignment himself should anticipate being assigned such re-
sponsibility as an acknowledgment of history and consequent-
ly	not	enter	into	conflict	again.
In	large	conflicts,	such	as	revolutions	or	war-type	events,	a	
new consensus arises in the event of  retroactive acknowledg-
ment of self-responsibility by the collective concerned: the be-
havior	 in	question	becomes	defined	as	socially	 intolerable	or	
as	justified.	With	that,	the	original	conflict	is	downgraded	to	a	
question of reparation by mutual agreement. This can lead to 
further discussions about the extent of the reparations in spe-
cific	cases.	But,	once	the	reasons	for	 the	consensus	are	estab-
lished, the problem disappears from the horizon of the prob-
lematic under consideration here.
3   Individual and Collective Actions
The question of whether a majority of actors can be said to act 
uniformly and thus also carry uniform responsibility is initially 
not a practical one but a socio-ontological one: What conditions 
justify assuming the unity of an action when it clearly has to 
do with the contributions of many more elemental actors, - i.e., 
individual people - and thus many individual actions?
Individual and collective actions are not mutually exclusive. 
There might be collective actions which can be completely at-
tributed	 to	 the	 actions	 of	 individuals,	 or	 partially	 attributed,	
or	there	may	be	those	which	cannot	be	reduced	at	all.	The	first	
type	is	always	the	case	when	there	 is	a	clearly	defined	group	
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of participants that agree to a common, planned and coordinat-
ed action after having come to agreement individually without 
acting in the name of a corporate body. Such cases are usually 
restricted to very small groups, in which the members know 
themselves personally. The other type, which can’t be reduced 
to individual contributions, tends to occur in extended contexts 
with heterogeneous participant relationships that are unclear 
and not centrally coordinated, preferably at events with many 
participants	which	are	difficult	 to	delineate	causally	 from	the	
total overall situation, especially in socially historical contexts. 
The discussion between methodical individualists and collectiv-
ists regarding the existence of independently acting collectives 
started at the inception of modern sociology and still continues 
to this day. It is similar to the more general discussion regarding 
the meaning and substantiality of the concept of emergence.53 
However, we won’t discuss this further.
Of course, all sociological schools have some theory of col-
lective action; it is one of the central objects of inquiry for so-
ciology in general. Usually the action of a corporate body is 
subsumed under this concept, which is something I explicitly 
exclude, and with good reason. Even though the uniform mor-
al responsibility of a formally constituted corporate body is 
controversial, it is increasingly accepted because the growing 
influence	of	large	international	corporations	factually	demands	
it. The number of articles regarding the responsibility of infor-
mal	collectives	is	significantly	lower.54
53 The question of social emergence has also been discussed in detail.  Jens 
Greve	and	Andrea	Schnabel	(Greve/Schnabel	[2011]),	offer	a	current	over-
view and Andersen/Emmeche/Finnemann/Christiansen [2000] provide a 
broad look at the central question of downward causation.
54 Some thorough analyses include reference to this possibility, see French 
[1984], Erskine [2004] and Neuhäuser [2011], but only assert an uncon-
troversial collective responsibility when the corporate body is formally 
constituted. A very few articles already see collective responsibility in 
the	informal	collective	(specifically,	for	example,	the	Germans	during	the	
Nazi period) such as Van	den	Beld,	[2002]	who	even	affirms	an	inter-gen-
erational responsibility. I agree with him, as it will be shown later.
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This is due to the attitude	of	western	(i.e.	initially	European)	
culture towards the relationship between individual and social 
community. Originating in the European cultural region, it has 
changed greatly over the centuries and has meanwhile expand-
ed to cover large parts of the American and the entire Australian 
continent and includes New Zealand. Even the concept of collec-
tive responsibility makes quite a few sociologists in this cultural 
provenance pull their hair; the closest they could get would be to 
recognize a formally constituted corporate body. The rise of the 
individual as an elemental carrier of responsibility over the last 
thousand years of European cultural history has been the result 
of a moral separation between the individual and his direct fam-
ily and kinship group. The emancipation of the individual from 
the context of his blood relations is one of the most important 
factors	in	the	specifically	European	cultural	development.	The	
beginning of this was already evident in the ancient world, es-
pecially through the monumental intellectual personage of Soc-
rates. However, it wasn’t until the end of the Middle Ages that it 
found broad acceptance in the dawn of an empirical, objectifying 
new period.55 In the beginning, this only meant that morally in-
formal rights and obligations, as well as legally formalized ones, 
could be essentially applied to and against human individuals. 
The conceptual expansion of a uniformly acting actor from in-
dividual humans to free cities or states, as in the Middle Ages, 
and on to corporate bodies such as businesses is relatively new. 
It is a European invention, the origin of which only became ur-
gent due to medieval commerce within Europe, especially with 
the advent of colonies outside of Europe. However, it remained 
mostly disputed, even in the industrial world, until the 20th cen-
tury.56 Now, uniform actors, whether as individual persons or 
55 Concerning the genesis of the so-called corporate actors, see Coleman 
[1994],	p.	531ff	which	includes	numerous	other	references	to	the	literature.
56	 A	very	flexible	description	of	the	problems	with	recognizing	corporate	re-
sponsibility in the USA in the late 20th century can be found in Coleman 
[1994]	 p.	 554ff.	 Before	 establishing	 an	 abstract	 corporate	 responsibility	
that cannot be traced to individual persons – regardless of independent 
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corporate bodies, are given priority over assigning more infor-
mal forms of social community throughout the world, mostly for 
practicality. It is simply easier to assign responsibility when it 
is clear to whom exactly this assignment refers. With informal 
collectives,	it	is	often	difficult	and	that	leads	to	eternal	dispute.	
Nevertheless, there is still a strong inclination to reduce the en-
tire area more informally, i.e., not explicitly through statutorily 
stipulated responsibility, for instance, and proximal to the hu-
man individual as the bearer.57
3.1 A better form of social reductionism
The tendency to reduce collective events to the interaction of 
individual human contributions is methodologically parallel to 
physical reductionism in science. Such reductionism, as useful 
as it is for certain types of questions, is linked to a loss of infor-
mation because the aggregation of the interaction of individual 
participants is abandoned leaving only the components of the 
totality in view. This prevents us from certain statements that 
can be revealed only from the level of the aggregate. Statements 
political relationships between regional corporate bodies which are al-
ready	significantly	older	–	the	conduct	of	one	person	was	always	consid-
ered for or against his entire family or even clan. The direct reverse of this 
relationship between blood relations and moral responsibility is that of 
blood relations and trust; see Coleman	[1994],	S.	185ff.	on	this.
57 For instance, H. D. Lewis [1948] says at the very beginning: “If I were 
asked to put forward an ethical principle which I considered to be espe-
cially certain, it would be that no one can be responsible, in the properly 
ethical sense, for the conduct of another. Responsibility belongs essential-
ly to the individual.” Jan Narveson similarly says: “The basic bearer of 
responsibility is individuals, because that is all there is - nothing else can 
literally be the bearer of full responsibility.” (Narveson [2002], Abstract) 
Lewis recognizes situations in which collective responsibility is assigned 
and the consequences enforced; however, these are only more or less ran-
dom in form and not clearly chosen examples which are based on some 
conceptual analysis. That way he also comes to the conclusion that, on the 
other side of practical political necessity, the concept of collective respon-
sibility is based on philosophical uncertainty or just plain misunderstand-
ing (ibid. p. 17).
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such as,  ‘club X is playing club Y’, ‘the annual income of com-
pany	X	is...’,	‘country	X	submitted	a	request	to	the	UN	Security	
Council’, etc., would be abbreviations for a gigantic sum of oth-
er, supposedly lone, actual issues at the end.
The dispute between social reductionists and collectivists is 
based on the unquestioned assumption that the reduction in 
question is exclusively plausible as a reduction of all actions to 
the action of a single person. But what is behind this thought? 
Obviously, all participants in this discussion only consider the 
individual person as an indisputable unit of that which we are 
properly treating as one actor. As I determined at the begin-
ning, in order to even be able to speak of one action and one ac-
tor, it is necessary to have the mutually conditional unit of actor 
and action. From that it follows that the argumentative core of 
social reductionism isn’t the individual person but the unit of 
actor. If a robot were to meet this requirement58, the events of 
a robot colony could also be reduced to the individual actions 
of the robots present. If a behavioral scientist observes a pri-
mate horde, she presents us with a description of the events 
of the horde based on the individual contributions of the indi-
vidual horde members. Why should it then be implausible, for 
instance, to describe political events as action contributions of 
individual states or certain major economic events as the action 
contributions	of	the	financial	corporate	bodies	involved?
Some social reductionists, who recognize only the human in-
dividual as actor, object to such a reduction by saying that such 
an analysis has only a practical value but is incomplete in and of 
itself. This objection of incompleteness, however, only applies 
if solely the action contributions of individual people as actors 
are allowed. But there is no reason for such a restriction. Not 
only can robots or animals be considered as individual actors. 
58 List and Pettit	 for	 some	 strange,	 dubious	 reason,	 	 presuppose	 this	
in their derivation of the actor concept, see  List/Pettit	 [2011],	 p.	 19ff.	
Schulz-Schaeffer	treats	the	question	of	the	mechanical	actor	in	a	signifi-
cantly	more	differentiated	way,	see	Schulz-Schaeffer	[2007],	p.	433ff.
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All entities which can be treated as individual actors can as well 
for the same reason as for human individuals. This includes all 
corporately constituted actors, simply because they were con-
stitute formally as independent and uniform actors and con-
tinue to exist as such after their founding. The continued exis-
tence is the outcome of any founding act from the beginning of 
the fusion of egg and sperm cell to the biologically and socially 
fully developed animal or human life form. Only robot actors 
are an exception here because the origin of emergence can’t be 
defined	so	distinctly	as	with	corporate	bodies	or	life	forms.	This	
doesn’t need to concern us further. What’s more important is 
that social reductionism loses all of its potential to be disputed 
as	soon	as	we	agree	that	social	events,	in	fact,	may	only	first	be	
understood as such when they are traced back to the individual 
contributions of individual actors – without, however, identify-
ing the concept of individual actor with that of the individual 
person. This is the position taken here.
From this it follows that it’s logically incorrect to speak of ‘col-
lective actors’ as a concept. There is no such thing as collective 
actors; the expression ‘collective actor’ is a contradictio in adiecto.59 
There are only individual actors. Such individual actors, how-
ever, can take many forms, such as people, animals, corporate 
bodies, even robots.60 Their separateness as an actor must be fur-
ther	justified.	In	the	case	of	corporate	bodies,	the	justification	is	
similar to that for humans and animals: There is one event of 
creation. If this argument is not allowed, the objection of human 
59 Colin Wight deserves recognition in this context as one of very few who 
studied ontological questions of political corporate bodies using logical 
thoroughness.  But he also got lost in indecisiveness at the end and was not 
able	to	prevail	with	a	unified	criterion	for	acknowledging	a	uniform	actor	
of	a	corporate	body.	He	did	not	see	and	thus	could	not	decide	on	a	specific	
event as the one that unequivocally gave rise to the unity of the actor. His 
indecisiveness is facilitated by the direct communicative embedding of 
each one of us in the great social contexts that complicates upholding such 
limits in a  practical way.
60	 See	Schulz-	Schaeffer	[2007],	p.	433ff.	on	the	conditions	of	the	actor	quality	
of machines.
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individuals as actors must also be consequentially raised. Which 
is exactly what Sigmund Freud did: His psychoanalytical theory 
removed the possibility of construing people as  a unit of actor 
for everyone who followed his assertion of an unconscious mind 
in each human. According to Feud, the individual is actually a 
psychosocial and rather unstable collective of the id, ego and su-
perego. A social reductionist who only allows individual people 
as actors should be careful when discussing with a psychoana-
lyst. At the end of the discussion, he would no longer be able to 
maintain his assertion of humans as units of actor.
Luckily, however, Freud’s view of humans doesn’t apply to 
the version of social reductionism developed here. Certainly, 
for some individual actors, whether person, animal, corporate 
body or robot, there are internal	events	which	can	be	identified	
as controlling the external unit. These are not only the psycho-
logical contributions from the id, ego and superego in individ-
ual people but the contributions of bodily organs to the action 
as well – for corporate bodies, it would be the actions of its em-
ployees, board members, shareholders, etc. By considering the 
internal processes, the unity of action in relation to the external 
environment is not lost. The unity of the actor is ontological-
ly speaking the boundary between the external events and its 
interior events. In other words, it is not only the plausibility 
of this boundary that makes the unity of the actor. As I have 
shown, such a boundary is plausible in many cases and not 
only in the individual person. It can be asserted for corporate 
bodies with the same rights as human individuals.
3.2 Corporate bodies as a bundle of agency relationships
A popular form of disregarding this boundary when consider-
ing corporate bodies is to view their acts as the result of bun-
dled agency relationships. This follows a historical line of ar-
gumentation beginning with Thomas Hobbes, continuing with 
John Locke and even taken on by Jean Jacques Rousseau. Such 
a case may clearly occur in small, non-corporately organized 
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groups. These groups then act in a collectively homogeneous 
way through a majority decision. As Pettit	shows,	however,	this	
idea	suffers	a	fundamental	logical	error:	When	the	agents	in	a	
decision-making chain act, it is always possible, and actually fre-
quently happens, that a situation results at the end of the chain 
which none of the agents wanted. The so-called agency relation-
ships then cease to exist in an action theory sense.61 This objec-
tion	is	correct	and	important,	however,	it	does	not	affect	the	core	
of	the	conceptual	difficulties	in	determining	collective	actors.
The whole idea of group action as a bundle of agency rela-
tionships	suffers	from	two	other	and	much	more	basic	errors:
a) Modern mass agency relationships are usually not at all 
based on the idea of direct wish fulfillment	by	the	represen-
tatives. Usually people are chosen as representatives through 
political elections or at annual shareholder meetings of large 
companies and only very indirectly and vaguely as powers 
of	attorney	for	individual	shareholders or electorate bodies. 
How	should	such	a	representative	even	fulfill	an	individual	
voter wish when he necessarily has been authorized by more 
than one voter and thus is probably confronted with inconsis-
tent mandates? Agents frequently need to be elected by thou-
sands or even millions of voters in order to become a repre-
sentatives of the corporate body in question. How should he 
directly represent one voter’s wish without acting contrary to 
another, theoretically equal wish at the same time? 
b) In fact, agency relationships often don’t even concern the 
individuals represented but rather represent the corporate 
body	of	which	they	are	a	part.	There	is	a	categorical	differ-
ence between some actors each personally agreeing to autho-
rize a third party to be their agent and a third party being 
chosen to represent the corporate body through a majority 
vote. Just the 1:1 relationship of the personal authorization 
compared to the election of a corporate agent by majority 
61 See Pettit’s	article	“The	Reality	of	Group	Agents”	in	Mantzavinos	[2009],	p.	
67ff.,	and	also	List/Pettit	[2011],	p.	43ff.	with	the	same	results.
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decision	reveals	how	big	the	difference	is	between	these	two	
variants. The last variant is the rule today in both political as 
well	as	financial	practices.	It	results	in	the	elected	represen-
tatives not representing the individual voters or sharehold-
ers at all but rather the corporate body to which they all be-
long	in	different	roles.	In	these	cases,	the	direct	agency	rela-
tionship of which the eliminativists speak doesn’t even exist. 
Thus, we need to clearly distinguish between those cases of 
agency relationships where individual people are represent-
ed by other individual people and those where the agents 
of a corporate body are legitimized as the representatives of 
the corporate body through a vote by other participants in 
the	 same	 corporate	 body.	These	 are	 two	 entirely	different	
matters.	If	this	difference	is	overlooked,	one	succumbs	to	an	
error such as, for example, happened to David Runciman.62 
Philip	Pettit	attempted	to	resolve	 the	relationship	between	
the individual and the collective based on an example of an 
assembly of political representatives who were facing the risk 
of creating inconsistent decisions by proposing a succession of 
test votes (he called them “straw votes”).63 
This could have worked out well except it is then no longer 
an analysis of existing social relationships but rather an ad hoc 
proposal	for	a	solution	to	very	specific	practical	problems.	But	
with	this,	Pettit	fumbles his own topic, namely the determina-
tion of factual group action.
Christian List	and	Philip	Pettit	present a new version of the jus-
tification	for	genuine	group	action	in	their	most	recent	and	quite	
well known book. It is neither eliminativist nor does it prerequi-
62 See his article “The Problem of Representing the State” in Erskine [2004], 
p.	41	ff.	Pettit’s	article	has	a	unique	position	in	that	he	basically	presents	no	
arguments that permit the tangible multiplicity of jointly acting persons 
to one uniform collective actor but rather describes a very special case of 
where a group or collective	actor	is	constructed	that	fulfills	this	condition	
in his opinion. I personally don’t see what that has to do with the general 
“Reality of Group Agents”, as announced in his title.
63 Pettit	in	Mantzavino	[2009].,	p.	76ff.
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site a metaphysically questionable group spirit.64 Unfortunately, 
their train of thought and argumentation is so inconsistent that 
almost nothing practical remains of the author’s high expecta-
tions. It already starts when they assert the physical integrity of 
an actor as a necessary condition65, even though this is no longer 
the case for all collectives and particularly all corporate bodies. 
The decisive error in their overall approach, however, is to con-
fuse the assignment of group status as seen by outsiders with 
that of the group as seen by insiders. This confusion becomes the 
basis of their claim that groups ‘exist’.66 Such circular or, at best, 
normative,	justification	for	the	existence	of	collective	actors	does	
not contribute to the central issues of this topic.
What I am pursuing here is ultimately a consequence of the 
fruitless	attempts	of	many	other	authors	to	present	the	action	of	
a majority of individual actors as a uniform collective action.  It 
64 See List/Pettit	[2011],	p.	7ff.	Even	the	title	of	the	book	predicts	confusion:	
group agency and corporate agents are spoken of in one breath even though 
these	are	two	very	different	things.	This	lack	of	distinction	goes	through	
the entire book. I will return to this point below.
65	 Ibid.,	 p.	 21.	At	 this	 point	 another	 and	 even	more	 serious	 flaw	 appears	
in the entire approach: List and Pettit	create	a	concept	based	on	unusu-
al	examples	instead	of	conceptual	analysis.	For	instance,	they	attempt	to	
explain the central concept of actor based on a primitive robot without 
saying even one word about how such a peripheral example is suitable 
for such an important concept as that of actor. But even this ‘logical’ de-
duction	of	the	concept	of	actor	is	completely	forgotten	in	the	next	chapter	
on the nature of the collective actor. There, it is suddenly the well-known 
joint intention – in other words, the common intention to action – in the 
literature that should produce the unit of the collective (ibid. p. 35). Such 
an assumption, which they see as unproblematical, however, can hardly 
serve as a basis for a ‘third way’ which List and Pettit	are	aiming	for	in	
contrast to eliminativism and group spirit.
66 At the end of a long section titled “The Structure of Group Agents” they 
say simply: “We may even have grounds for giving credence to some of 
the [hitherto rejected, WS] emergentists’ claim, though – and this is cru-
cial – reinterpreting them in our terms. […] The arguments for our claim 
about the autonomy of group agency are epistemological, bearing on the 
difficulty	of	deriving	a	group	agent’s	attitudes	 from	 the	attitudes	of	 its	
members.” With this, there is not much left of their derivation of the exis-
tence of collective actors in the end other than an admission that collective 
actors are precisely those that are seen as such by their social environment.
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is another approach to the assertion of collective moral respon-
sibility which explicitly does not build on the assertion of the 
existence of collective actors. As I have already shown above, 
there is no unit of actor on the continuum between the two ex-
tremes of individual human and corporate actor but rather a 
large transitional area between the two.
3.3 The horizon of view for collective social phenomena
A third and very important point in dealing with collective re-
sponsibility is the horizon from which one views it. Unfortu-
nately, this is only implicit with almost all authors on the topic, 
in other words, they depict it as the simple sum of their exam-
ples to demonstrate or reject collective responsibility. The es-
says by Larry May and Peter French on the one hand and Colin 
Wight on the other can be instructive here. May’s and French’s 
horizon of view stretches from the completely informal, spon-
taneous groups (mobs and crowds) to the formally constitut-
ed bodies, especially financial	enterprises.	With	that,	however,	
they exclude the presumably most important areas of phenom-
ena - or at least the broadest - from the very beginning: namely 
all	major	conflicts	based	on	ethnic	backgrounds.	By	far	the	most	
important events of the century which come under the issue of 
collective responsibility all belong in this group. Such phenom-
ena, whose emergence and expiration are described with great 
analytical perspicuity and broad empirical horizon by Donald 
Horowitz67, must absolutely be included in any examination 
of the question of collective responsibility. Disregarding them 
substantially devalues the corresponding contribution. Certain 
aspects of collective responsibility only become evident in rel-
atively	small	groups,	or,	in	other	words,	their	significance	only	
becomes apparent in large groups or collectives. This concerns, 
in	particular,	the	almost	always	intermediate	influence	of	the	
individual on the event’s result which has existed as a system-
67 See Horowitz	[2001].
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atic problem of the relationship between individual and group 
from the beginning. In small groups, it is much easier to under-
play	this	problem	and	make	it	thus	appear	more	insignificant	
than it actually is. Another similar aspect which is easily over-
looked is the persistence of intense group identity over long 
periods of time so that individual participation in the events 
gradually fades into the background and, instead, this identity 
becomes a candidate for assigning responsibility.68
The actual problem with the content of the narrowed  hori-
zon,	however,	is	that	a	superficially	justified	assignment	of	col-
lective	responsibility	can	easily	be	misused	as	a	justification	for	
extreme group discrimination and this is overlooked.
 Such misuse can only be prevented at the theoretical level 
when the horizon of observation is made as broad as possible 
so that such risks suddenly appear as if from thin air and then 
also can be properly treated. That’s why this approach explic-
itly considers the critical relationship of political institutions, 
above all of the state, to its collective bearer in depth.
Even including major political events like that of the French 
Revolution (which plays a central role in the argumentation of 
Larry May69, for instance) is not a guarantee that the horizon 
will have the necessary breadth. As long as the risk of assigning 
collective	responsibility	in	the	form	of	unjustified	discrimina-
tion is not treated, any such analysis is essentially incomplete. 
We should never forget that the rise of the individual, particu-
larly in European culture, is an enormously valuable and hard-
won development of civilization, the fruits of which should 
in no way be put on the line simply because one wants to tie 
collective responsibility to marauding hoards and persistent-
68 Speakers of political revolutions base their arguments on these group 
identities. The French revolution of 1789 is a preeminent example, where 
at the end, any noble person or member of the clergy within reach were 
hung.  Even revolutionary-minded Communism kept trying to name any 
exploiting capitalist group in order to assign responsibility for social ills.
69 See May [1989]; a plate of the storming of the Bastille on July 8, 1789 even 
decorates the cover of his book.
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ly asocial commercial enterprises. The practical risk of such an 
individualism is certainly that the individual will always try to 
escape his responsibilities by pointing to his neighbors. Avoid-
ing this may be understandable, but it harbors the danger of 
great	injustice	and	further	conflicts.
Colin Wight’s contribution70, in the reverse direction, is ini-
tially much more correct in terms of methodology. Wight ad-
mits to only being concerned with the ontology of international 
relationships from the outset. But, ultimately he does not come 
to a decision that clearly determines whether we are really deal-
ing with a uniform actor or not when it concerns major political 
actors.	That	leaves	him	sitting	between	two	main	sociological	
perspectives, that of the structuralist universal context on the 
one hand and methodological individualism on the other. In 
other words, his horizon of view is not too narrow but rather 
unlimited. For a plausible answer to the question of whether 
there are collective actors or not, it is just as questionable as the 
narrow horizon of authors such as May and French.
4   The Corporate Entity as a Moral Subject
Thus far it should be clear that the question of collective moral re-
sponsibility under consideration here only deals with the area be-
tween the two extremes of acts by individual persons, at one end, 
and those by corporate entities at the other. It does not deal with 
acts by individual people or corporate entities themselves because 
both of these are individual actors. Even the interactive action of 
individual people or corporate bodies can be seen as collective ac-
tion in the sense that it is a sum of elemental actions which, when 
taken together do not result in an independent unit of actor or 
action. There is no collective actor, only an actor collective.
Which does not resolve the question of collective responsi-
bility for an actor majority. Independently of whether such a 
majority of actors can only produce a majority of actions, it is 
possible that this actor majority can also be assigned moral col-
70 See Wight [2006]
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lective responsibility even without the ontological status of a 
uniform actor. However, it would only be in the form of the 
individual’s responsibility for his own action and the action of 
all other members of the collective.71 This would require that 
the two extremes on the form continuum between a human in-
dividual and a corporate body can unambiguously bear moral 
responsibility. Because if this wasn’t the case, moral responsi-
bility would gradually be lost in the transition from human in-
dividual to corporate body. The fact that this doesn’t happen is 
at the core of this work.
It follows that of all the intermediary forms under consider-
ation, only the last area, just before a uniformly acting corpo-
rate body – i.e., only the area of the organized collective – is un-
der consideration for assigning collective responsibility.  This 
has one condition, however, which is why corporate bodies 
and not individual people are the unambiguous addressees of 
moral responsibility. The collective itself has no socio-ontologi-
cal object status on its own. Which is why, as I will show, it can 
only be morally addressed through the corporate organization 
which exists parallel to it.
4.1 Are corporate actors also morally responsible?
No one can doubt that corporate entities, in other words, finan-
cial enterprises, registered associations and entire states can act, 
because that is exactly the purpose of recognizing their inde-
pendence as a legal person. They are, as I already determined 
above, uniformly acting individual actors exactly the same as 
individual people.
71	 This	figure	of	thought	also	underlies	joint	ownership in continental Euro-
pean civil law, even though it only governs members’ pecuniary interests. 
It is also directly applied to communities of heirs, conjugal community 
property and copyright collecting societies in addition to the so called 
Company	of	civil	law,	which	in	Germany	is	codified	in	the	German Civil 
Code	§§	705ff.
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Now it becomes possible to question the moral status of a 
corporate	body	by	reflecting	on	what	distinguishes	a	natural	
person from a legal person. Then we will be able to make a 
statement about whether this distinction also impacts moral re-
sponsibility.	There	have	been	recurring	reflections	on	this	over	
past decades, especially by American philosophers, recently re-
viewed by Christian Neuhäuser and weighed against each oth-
er.72	As	part	of	 this	discussion,	difficult	metaphysical	prereq-
uisites, such as intentionality	of	the	first	through	third	levels73 
and human dignity, were applied. These are things that are not 
easy to state about corporate bodies, if they can be applied at 
all. However, I don’t see a reason to look at such thinking fur-
ther because, for me, it really seems quite misplaced when con-
sidering a social reality and these types of argumentation have 
been	left	behind	long	ago.	Whoever	attempts	to	understand	the	
personhood status of a corporate body (and, at the end even the 
personhood of an individual human), as Daniel Dennet does74, 
in metaphysical terms, seems to be overlooking the fact that 
these	relationships	have	long	been	reclassified	as	socially	nor-
mative. Of course, normatively based facts don’t emerge from 
social nothingness. They themselves are the result of, usually, 
long	historical	developments	and	conflicts.	Nevertheless,	peo-
ple	arrive	at	normative	definitions	based	on	actual	living	con-
ditions which are constantly changing and also progressing, 
which are in turn relevant in a socio-ontological sense: Valid 
norms generate social reality, both as a structural type and as 
normatively grounded individual events and objects. A par-
liamentary democracy can only be understood as a structural 
element; however, it requires corresponding objects and events 
such as voters, parties, parliamentary sessions and elections. 
All	of	this	 is	normatively	 justified	within	the	environment	of	
our current life as far as possible.
72 See Neuhäuser	[2011],	p.	98ff.	73
73 Ibid., p. 99
74	 See	Dennett	[1976].
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Which is why, in the following, I align with the deon-
tological, pragmatic argumentation of, for example, Ingo 
Schulz-Schaeffer75, which is primarily based on the actor status 
and other qualifying conditions, not, in contrast, on the per-
sonhood status. With this, it is possible to make a distinction 
between moral responsibility and formal-legal responsibility 
that	is	significantly	closer	to	real	life,	as	I	will	show.
The status of corporate bodies as legal persons, and thus as 
direct legal subjects under private and civil law as well as inter-
national law, exists indisputably and independently of the ac-
tual assets of its shareholders, employees, association members, 
citizens, etc., which is exactly the essence of its independence 
as an actor. In extreme cases, it’s not even necessary that indi-
vidual actor members belong to this corporate body, whether 
these members, shareholders, etc. are people or other corporate 
entities. A foundation is an example of this. Once a foundation 
is started, it is no longer dependent on its donors or other ac-
tors that support it but rather is represented by its foundation 
board. The individual board members do not even need to be 
human actors but can also be corporate bodies themselves.76 
Furthermore, it is not necessary in any legal system known to 
me that natural persons - i.e,. individual humans - need to ap-
pear as founding members for the founding of a legal person. 
Legal and natural persons, as such, are handled completely the 
same everywhere. Not even a share exchange or various forms 
of multiple share holding is excluded: All jurisdictions known 
to me allow, for example, companies A and B to reciprocally 
hold each other shares (share exchange) or partners A, B ... n to 
75 See Schulz-Schaeffer	[2007].
76 Seen this way, a foundation is the most abstract legal form of a legal per-
son. In German law, it is an independent amount of assets that becomes 
a legal person through the act of creating a foundation followed by its 
recognition	as	such	by	government	officials.	Then	it	is	no	longer	subject	to	
any outside intention. However, see § 85 BGB of the German Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (The German Civil Code) under reservation of § 87 BGB, which 
provides for a change in the foundation purpose if the original purpose is 
no longer achievable or the foundation endangers the common good.
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mutually hold 100% of all of their shares multiply under cer-
tain conditions. In all of these cases, any type of ‘more funda-
mental’ i.e., individual human participation, disappears. This 
also fully demonstrates the independence of a legal person in 
theory of action.
The members or shareholders are not an essential part of its 
corporate body. This is easy to illustrate: If I say that I am a 
member	of	a	sports	club,	 then	I	mean	something	different	as	
when I say that I am a human. I can dispense with my member-
ship in a club but not my ‘humanness’ without also losing my 
entire status as an actor and ultimately as a person at the same 
time. Speaking in terms of substance ontology, my member-
ship in a club is simply a coincidental property of myself as an 
actor. My being human, however, is essential.77 The same thing 
applies to all corporate bodies. A corporate entity keeps its sta-
tus as a legal person and, with that, as an actor even though it 
can	only	act	intermediately	through	its	agents	such	as	officers,	
executive boards and governments. In the case of an act against 
a third party, even one of its own employees, but not against 
the entirety, such as the shareholders,	such	executives	or	offi-
cers are the representatives of the corporate body.
4.2 Corporate bodies as norm subjects
For	all	of	these	reasons,	what	affects	the	corporate	body	does	
not	usually	affect	its	members,	shareholders, etc. For example, 
they are not liable for its debts but rather lose claim to reim-
bursement of their investment because the money has already 
been claimed in bankruptcy.78 This principle is not broken even 
77 In somewhat more modern, but not necessarily simpler conceptual terms, 
one	can	separate	all	attributes	of	a	concept,	e.g.,	the	concept	‘person’,	into	
those that must be present so that a tangible case of something falls under 
a certain conceptual genus, and on the other, such that are irrelevant for 
this purpose.	The	first	are	called	categorematic	attributes.	My	being	a	hu-
man	is	a	categorematic	attribute,	my	membership in a club not.
78 In fact, recognizing the complete independence of a legal person is the 
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by piercing of the corporate veil in order to target individual 
members of a corporate body in the case of wrongdoing.79 Such 
a claim, however, usually requires a corresponding primary 
claim against the corporate entity, even though it is indepen-
dent	of	the	former,	i.e.,	only	occurs	in	addition	to	the	first.
All of this, however, still could not eliminate all doubt regard-
ing	corporate	bodies	as	recipients	of	attributions,	i.e.,	subjects	of	
moral responsibility, in socio-philosophical circles. After what 
has just been said, there can only be doubts about handling cor-
porate bodies as morally not responsible, in so far as a reason can 
be given, even though they are treated the same as individual 
human	actors	in	practically	all	affairs,	and	increasingly	even	in	
such	specific	things	as	constitutional	law	or	human rights.80
 Here one could take recourse to biological, physiological 
and ultimately metaphysical criteria – such as the ability to 
result of a long historical development. A clear distinction only started 
evolving with the rise of the great British and Dutch colonial trading com-
panies and the correspondingly necessary capital group structures in 17th 
and 18th century Europe because, up until that point, i.e., since the Middle 
Ages, only free city states and other regional corporate bodies could man-
date as autonomous political actors independently of their membership. 
Even the legitimate reign of royal houses was not at all independent of its 
dependence	on	specific	members	of	the	royal	families.
79	 This	is	simply	about	the	legal	specifics	of	the	criminal	and	civil	liability 
of	the	executives	or	officers	of	a	corporate	body.	Regarding	the	key	term	
executive,	or	officer,	liability: There is a broad range of international lit-
erature; in Germany, this can be found primarily in the important com-
mentary on incorporated and limited liability corporate law. Basically, the 
conceivable, imputed liability to individual agents of a corporate body, 
if at all, exists only in addition to the claim against the corporation itself, 
even	it	if	is	independent	of	the	existence	of	the	latter.
80 The legal dogmatic question of whether corporate bodies are legal is very 
current and far from being decided in the EU and USA. The German con-
stitution already states in Art. 19 para. 3: “The basic rights shall also apply 
to	domestic	artificial	persons	to	the	extent	that	the	nature	of	such	rights	
permits.” (“Die Grundrechte gelten auch für inländische juristische Personen, 
soweit sie ihrem Wesen nach auf diese anwendbar sind.”) What’s decisive un-
der the existing case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, in addition 
to the basic compatibility required between the respective constitutional 
right	and	the	entity	of	a	legal	person,	is	a	sufficient	degree	of	organization	
of a group of people, i.e. their ability for creating a uniform will. This also 
applies to partially legally liable partnerships (general partnerships, lim-
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perceive – that the average person has but the corporate entity 
does	not.	But	it	is	exactly	this	class	of	justifications	–	i.e.,	based	
on the particularities of a biological entity of a human – that 
don’t hold because then the corporate body as a unit of actor 
would have to be disputed, which is normatively and factu-
ally impossible. There would no longer be any reason to dis-
tinguish between the moral responsibility of a corporate body 
and that of a human individual in regards to the entity of actor. 
The moral responsibility of corporate bodies could then be dis-
puted in terms of an external entity, e.g., with the argument 
that humans can only assign moral responsibility to other hu-
mans but not to corporate bodies. Such an argument is no lon-
ger based on the entity of the recipient of the assignment but 
on the social practice of who gets assigned responsibility and 
who doesn’t. I do not see the slightest empirical basis for such 
an assertion, however. Wherever we look, whether it is war 
crimes, responsibility for environmental damage or ongoing 
corruption	 in	a	 large	financial	enterprise,	 the	corporate	body	
is treated as the subject of moral responsibility. The portion of 
the internal agents of a corporate body is only investigated in a 
second step. Just the fact that the decision-making agents very 
frequently are hiding behind the organization of their compa-
ny, with success and without redressing the moral accusation, 
shows that the moral accusation is primarily against the corpo-
rate body in question, not against the authorized agent. Even 
structural or other arguments which are not backed up by the 
entity of the corporate actor are not suited to contest the moral 
responsibility of corporate bodies.
ited commercial partnership) as well as to the company constituted under 
civil law and private foundations. Whether this condition is also met by 
citizen initiatives is still disputed. The protection of constitutional rights, 
on the other hand, may not be linked to properties, organization forms 
or relationships which can only be realized by natural persons, see, for 
example, the rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court in BVer-
fGE 95, 220 [242], 42, 212 [219], 21, 362 [369] and 31, 314 [322] with further 
verification.
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If we turn these arguments around, however, there are com-
pelling reasons to assign full moral responsibility to corporate 
entities. Everywhere in the world, corporate entities are seen as 
independent actors not only as normative addressees but also 
potentially as co-creators of all of the norms in their sphere of 
action. This is a crucial point. It means that they are subjected 
to	the	legal	norms	as	well	as	have	causal	affect	in	their	creation,	
continuation and change. That makes them not only norm ad-
dressees but also norm subjects. The addressees of norms and 
the subjects of norms are ontologically distinct: The addressees 
of norms are elements of abstract classes of actors, for example, 
‘taxable entities’, ‘truck drivers’, ‘consumers’, etc. The norm 
subjects	are,	in	contrast,	the	specific	action-theory	individuals	
– people or corporate entities – that are usually involved in a 
norm as both passive and active addressees. The norm subject 
creates norms and subjects individuals and their entire ex-
istence to norms while the addressee of norms is only a pas-
sive recipient because it is an abstract element of a class rela-
tionship. To be the addressee of a norm doesn’t say anything 
directly about who set the norm. To be the subject of norms 
means being a part of that sphere or level of social existence 
that produces norms.
The subjects of norms are, for this reason, eo ipso also moral 
instances of judgment. This necessarily has to logically apply 
equally to human and corporate actors.  Today’s social reali-
ty corresponds to this: We complain about large financial	en-
terprises	that	flagrantly	act	 in	illegal	and	even	criminal	ways	
simply because the corresponding norms have been violated 
without	evident	justification.	One	such	an	assessment	is	clearly	
beyond just the unemotional, sober determination of unlawful 
behavior. And with that, it is already an assignment of moral 
responsibility.
There never were any doubts about this in regards to indi-
vidual natural persons in full possession of their mental pow-
ers. I hope that I have shown in the above explanation that this 
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also applies to corporate bodies because, as actors, they are 
norm subjects and cannot object to their accountability based on 
biological limitations.81 Such an objection in terms of animals, 
would be wrong anyway: I can complain about a pet when it 
behaves against my expectations. But the animal will only re-
act to such recriminations or training practices in the sense of 
being submissive to authority and hopefully learn to obey this 
authority in future anticipation. Which is why animals are only 
norm addressees and never norm subjects. They simply don’t 
understand what a norm is and thus cannot argue its validity. 
They can only refuse to obey. In this sense, they are not fully 
qualified	actors	even	if	they	are	capable	of	acting	intentionally.	
We can make them norm addressees when we are angry with 
them or want to try to teach them something. But that is a long 
ways from making them norm subjects. Corporate entities, in 
contrast, are both indirectly norm addressees as well as norm 
subjects and thus emotional subjects of evaluation: Compared 
to an accusation against an animal, a moral accusation against a 
corporate	body	is	justified	because	the	corporate	entity	resides	
structurally ‘above’ the individual human actors. The corpo-
rate entity ‘inherits’ ontological status as a formal evaluating 
subject of norms and morality from individual persons who 
precede them socio-ontologically.
Moral accusations	 against	 corporate	 bodies	 are	 so	 specific	
and socially-relevant that it would be contrary to our everyday 
lives if they weren’t allowed and, instead, were reduced to an 
accusation against its agents, employees or other involved per-
sons.82 Such a reduction would contradict not only the distinct 
81 Of course, a corporate entity could argue its temporary capacity to act and 
thus also its capacity for moral responsibility through an inability to act 
organizationally. This objection, however, is only plausible under special 
conditions, for instance, after a government collapse during a war or a 
civil war.
82 For instance, Daniela Kroslak	 attempts	 this	 in	Erskine [2004], p. 159. It 
concerns the possibility of the French government bearing moral respon-
sibility for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Kroslak’s approach that the 
French government is only the executive body of the French state which 
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wording and purpose of the laws in question, in many cases, 
but would frequently lead to no sentencing at all because ev-
ery other sanctioned responsibility would get lost in the inside 
nexus of the organization and, in fact, be continually re-lost in 
many cases, e.g., the latest criminal doings of major interna-
tional banks. It doesn’t have the slightest impact on the factual 
moral accusation being made against the entity.
However, it applies in reverse: If, as a result of the moral re-
sponsibility of a corporate body, it is possible to make a moral 
imputation to their acting agents, it follows that the behavior 
of a corporate entity resulting from the behavior of its agents 
would not only result in responsibility for the entity itself un-
der certain conditions but also, in a form of imputation, to all 
those people that somehow participated in the corporate enti-
ty’s action. This doesn’t only apply to the executive board and 
supervisory	board	in	the	case	of	financial	companies,	but	also	
to other persons who are organically linked to the corporate en-
tity through some kind of formalized interests, in other words, 
specially paid employees, shareholders or employee organiza-
tions as well as subsidiaries, in so far as the parent company 
had	a	decisive	influence	on	their	behavior.	They	are	all	directly	
organic parts of the corporate body, at least if they participate 
actively in the organization of the corporation, however small. 
That means that they are not only functionally linked with it, 
such	as	an	auditor	under	contract	or	a	commissioned	law	firm,	
but also a direct part of that which constitutes the process-log-
ical entity itself and thus the essence of the corporate body.83 
is in turn the organizational expression of the French people, is implausi-
ble from the beginning. It seems to me that, among all the responsibility 
relationships that could be considered in such a case, those of a democrat-
ically elected government which was not guilty of any abuse of power in 
the event in question, was that which had the least prospect of a positive 
answer to their own moral responsibility. David Runciman	(ibid.,	p.	41ff.)	
seems	to	suffer	a	similar	confusion	to	me	in	so	far	as	he	attempts	to	clarify	
the fundamental responsibility of the agents of a corporate entity. I will 
return to his argumentation in more detail below.
83 The idea of the corporate body as a living organism analog to animals 
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It is exactly the possibility of imputation that allows it to be 
systematically expanded to moral responsibility on the part of 
the participants in the collective action.   This is the topic of the 
following segment.
5   Possible Criteria for the Moral 
Qualification of Acting Collectively
Now that we have positioned the term ‘collective’ as a continu-
um between two single actors –  human individuals at one end 
and formally constituted corporate bodies at the other – we can 
better	investigate	the	question	of	what	could	generally	qualify	
participation in collective acts. Because responsibility for an ac-
tion is always assigned to the actively acting party, I will only 
investigate those properties which could come into question for 
an actively acting actor majority. A whole range of possible crite-
ria come to mind, the most important of which I’ll discuss now.
An important note should be made: The criteria investigat-
ed	below	are	normally	 looked	at	under	the	specific	aspect	of	
whether	they	are	sufficient	to	qualify	an	actor	majority	as	a	uni-
form collective actor. Not so here. As I’ve already said, accord-
ing to the argument set out here, there is no such thing as a col-
lective actor; the term is contradictory. But that doesn’t mean 
that the question of the conditions under which one actor has to 
stand up for the actions of others (which is frequently confused 
with the question of the assumed emergence of a collective ac-
tor)	needs	to	be	forgotten.	Some	of	the	criteria	frequently	cited	
will be investigated from this perspective only.
or plants emerged in the 19th century, subsequent to the already older 
historical development of ideas. It is found in Germany, e.g., in Schelling’s 
early philosophy of nature, as well as in France with a movement that cre-
ated the expression ‘organicisme’ (organism). See the very profound arti-
cles in the “Historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie” under the German 
term “Organ”, “Organismus” and “Organizismus”	(Ritter/Gründer/	Gabriel	
et	al.	[1971ff.]).
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5.1 Membership in a group
Obviously membership in a temporally stable social formation 
can be viewed as one such criterion. A natural idea, mentioned 
in the literature everywhere, is that a person becomes responsi-
ble for the actions of a collective by being responsible for mem-
bership in this collective. In joining a collective, this person 
must have known that the collective would be capable of any 
acts which later actually took place.
Jan Narveson investigated this criterion more thoroughly. 
First, he distinguishes the type of such membership:84
1. Completely voluntary membership – in terms of joining as 
well as the option of leaving at any time.
2. Involuntary membership – e.g., by being born into a group 
(family, nation, etc.) but with the option of leaving at any 
time (e.g., formally impossible to leave a family).
3. The reverse of the previous option: Voluntary membership 
– from which point on, membership is forced without the 
option of leaving.
4. Involuntary membership – both in terms of joining as well as 
leaving.
In addition, it should be mentioned here that all four of these 
variations cannot be implemented alone by the respective mem-
ber. A change of group status, whether joining or leaving, always 
needs	some	kind	of	confirmation	by	the	organization	of	the	corpo-
rate entity. It is only through such a mutual recognition of joining 
or leaving a collective that one can speak of an objective, social 
fact. What’s interesting here is that the objectivity of such a fact 
is	not	dependent	on	any	other	condition	besides	the	affirmation	
on both sides, in other words, from the (future or former) mem-
ber and the collective itself. Other external circumstances have no 
qualifying	effect.	This	applies	equally	when	the	concerned	group	
is not normatively recognized by its social environment, e.g., in 
84 Narveson [2002], p. 181.
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the case of a legal ban on the group. A group is always a group in 
terms of social fact, even a normatively unrecognized group.
Such group membership seems like a quick and handy cri-
terion	 for	 assigning	 collective	 responsibility	 at	 first	 glance.	
However, upon closer look, it can only be applied with great 
restrictions and uncertainties, as Narveson himself admits. 
People	have	very	different	 ideas	 about	 their	 group	member-
ship, especially when someone is born into a group. Not only 
does he not have the option to leave it, but his membership can 
even become an accusation. For instance, citizenship is a basic 
form of this type of membership. And while it theoretically can 
be	waived	in	many	countries,	it	is	quite	difficult.	Waiving	citi-
zenship all together, i.e., a voluntary change to having no citi-
zenship, is extremely rare because of the lack of protection that 
goes with it. The theoretically possible waiver of citizenship is 
therefore rarely seen as a form of freedom from membership.
Apart from this, even in the area of collective action exam-
ined here, i.e. that of non-corporate collectives, the criterion 
of membership	is	sufficient	only	to	a	very	limited	degree.	For	
them, even the term ‘member’ is questionable. Perhaps ‘partic-
ipant’	would	be	a	better	term.	Thus,	the	more	distant	a	collec-
tive is from the form of a corporate entity, the less Narveson’s 
criteria	would	fit.	But	let’s	consider	the	area	of	such	collectives	
where the term ‘membership’ seems appropriate in spite of not 
being constituted as a corporate entity. This would apply for 
instance to informal cultural associations, youth gangs and in-
formal political associations.
The criterion of voluntary membership and/or possible 
exit from such a group is only of interest for the existentially 
least	significant	memberships,	i.e.,	joining	a	permanent	bridge	
group, an informal amateur orchestra or similar entity. All sit-
uations of fundamental import, including collective responsi-
bility	 for	 such	huge	events	as	a	military	attacks,	genocide	or	
similarly serious macro-social crimes, cannot be decided with 
this criterion. Narveson subsequently follows the argument by 
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Lewis85 and discards the membership criteria. Instead, he pos-
tulates that a human individual carries responsibility for his ac-
tions only when it can be assigned to him and to the extent that 
the	specific	participation	in	a	collective	event	can	be	verified.86
Difficulties	from	the	perspective	of	membership result thus 
not only in regards to determining the membership of indi-
viduals in such a collective but also in regards to the import-
ant question of the temporal duration of the collective itself; 
in other words, its existence over time. While legal persons 
under public or private law emerge and disappear through 
formal founding and dissolution acts almost everywhere in 
the world87, this is not the case for informal collectives. Their 
85 See note 19 above.
86 See Narveson [2002], p. 196 above. He even makes his judgment on a belief 
in collective responsibility more radical in the subsequent section “Two 
kinds of politics” where he calls it a myth that is inevitably evil when tak-
en seriously (ibid.).  And the historical vista, that leads almost inevitably 
to assigning collective action, doesn’t change that: “Depending heavily on 
collective historical actions will accordingly be almost certain to lead to 
nothing but further dissension.“ (ibid., p. 198). That might frequently well 
be	the	case.	But	then	one	would	have	to	forego	essential	effects	of	 	cor-
recting collective behavior if Narveson were to be strictly followed. One 
of the successful examples in recent times for such corrective behavior is 
German society after Hitler. Would reminding Germany of its collective 
responsibility over decades have succeeded even beyond the perpetuating 
generation?	I	am	firmly	convinced	that	 it	wouldn’t	have.	This	 is	a	very	
strong argument against Narveson’s, I think.
87 The formal act of dissolution does not necessarily have to be legal annul-
ment but can factually take place after formal recognition. This is particu-
larly the case under international law when a country is created or is de-
stroyed through war or other events. The downfall of Prussia is an example 
from the recent past. The Federal Republic of Germany did not take on the 
identity of its predecessor even though it was the successor under interna-
tional law. It entered into the rights and obligations of its predecessor as a 
new	and	different	international	legal entity through universal succession 
(borrowed from inheritance law). – There are multiple examples which 
illustrate how uncertain the relationship between factual statehood and 
formal recognition by the world community is, such as the GDR, which no 
longer exists, and more recent examples such as East Timor, Southern Su-
dan, the Palestinian (proto-)state and the particularly precarious “Islamic 
State” in parts of today’s Syria and Iraq. The founding of Israel through a 
formal decree of the Jewish National Council on May 14, 1948 (i.e., on the 
day the British mandate for Palestine expired) is rather an exception.
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limited existence in terms of both time and membership is a 
very normatively characterized question that can rarely be an-
swered alone through reference to non-normative factualness.
But there are much more basic objections to group member-
ship as a criterion for assigning moral responsibility in group 
acts. In order to be made responsible for the actions of a group, 
even if one is not directly participating in the act, the person 
concerned would have to know at the moment of joining what 
the group would do later. However, this is not at all obvious, 
even	if	one	falls	under	the	relatively	most	qualified	first	group	
of Narveson’s membership. Such an obligation to know, when 
taken precisely, can only be reasonable if the group in question 
knew from the beginning that it would later commit morally 
despicable acts, i.e., based on its program, or it could be seen 
through	 the	actions	 it	 focused	on	with	 sufficient	 clarity	over	
time	that	 it	would	commit	morally	despicable	acts.	This	first	
condition,	the	a	priori,	defined	program	of	the	group,	tends	to	
occur particularly with criminal organizations as well as po-
litically extreme parties or groups such as the Hells Angels or 
Scientology. But, how should the second case be judged if I am 
a member of a high performance sport club that uses systemat-
ic doping to ruin people without its members knowing? What 
about the faithful Muslim who routinely transfers money to an 
Islamic social institution without noticing that this money is 
used	to	finance	terrorism?	In	such	cases,	there	is	no	official	pro-
gram that the member adheres to with his membership. And 
even if the morally despicable act could have been predicted 
without dispute, there is still the big question of whether it was 
predicable in the crass form that it actually took on.
An exemplary case of such a constellation is early member-
ship in the German NSDAP. Certainly, the early members of 
this party were outspoken racists. That was evident from the 
first	party	platform	as	well	as	the	widely	read	book	Mein Kampf 
by the, at the time, charismatic founder of the party, Adolf Hit-
ler. There an early member is morally responsible for the gen-
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erally racist actions of this party without a doubt, up until the 
later pogroms and Nuremburg Laws. But was it already fore-
seeable at the end of the 1920’s that Hitler would put the whole 
world to war ten years later and his racism would lead to the 
mass murder of Jews, Slavs, Romas and Sintis?
And even if that wasn’t foreseeable, one could still accuse early 
party members of not having left the party as soon as the extreme 
political programs became evident. That is certainly correct. But 
then, it is no longer just the conditions of membership that are de-
cisive for judging moral responsibility. Instead, we move on to the 
uncertain territory where every member has a constant obligation 
to review the content of the group. Only when he fails to do so 
is there a corresponding responsibility.	And	even	more	difficult:	
Let’s assume that, at the outbreak of the World War 2, an early 
party member realizes that the NSDAP is a monstrous, murder-
ous association. At the same time, this member also sees that leav-
ing the party in the current situation cannot change anything in 
the	least,	and	that	it	would	definitely	carry	great	disadvantages	for	
him. For instance, he would lose his job which could have person-
al and even family consequences. So he remains a member, even 
though	his	thinking	is	completely	different	from	the	party.	What	
effect	does	this	have	on	his	moral	responsibility?
These considerations show that the situation of participa-
tion or membership	in	a	collective	is	not	sufficient	to	justify	a	
possible part in its collective responsibility. However, a factual 
participation or membership is an important indication in an-
swering the question. This illustrates once again how the as-
sumption of  collective responsibility even comes about: Start-
ing with the individual, it comes into existence when a gener-
al, moral collective responsibility is found through inductive 
thinking. Even if many participants or members were person-
ally not involved in the despicable act, the overall results are 
viewed as a morally uniform action for evaluation.
From what has been said above, it is clear that all of the pos-
sibilities for justifying collective moral responsibility that will 
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be discussed below require the membership of individuals in 
a collective. Which means that we cannot forego this criterion. 
Jan Narveson’s	characteristics	are	definitely	usable	as	positive	
criteria of membership.	But	they	are	not	sufficient	alone	to	jus-
tify collective moral responsibility.
5.2 Success of an action
Another obvious criterion for the assignment of collective re-
sponsibility is the factual success of an action. Here too, howev-
er, upon closer inspection, it seems like it might be more point-
less than useful.
Requiring that the action is successful is not a trivial thing 
when deducing actor responsibility for the actors. In distinc-
tion to the accusation of immoral intentionality, however, the 
success of an action only depends on what actually happened, 
independently of what one was intending to have happen. The 
success of an action, thus, is not the same as the result of the 
action.	This	difference	is	recognized	in	the	civil law area of so-
called absolute liability, known in Germany and elsewhere: 
The person whose car causes damage when the brakes fail is 
liable for the damage even if he could not have predicted the 
damage and consequently could not avoid it. The thinking be-
hind this is that someone who keeps a source of danger or risk 
must also be liable for the damages that result, independently 
of	the	notion	of	fault.	This	example	illustrates	the	difference	be-
tween legal and moral responsibility. Even when a car owner 
must pay for the damages caused by his car under civil law, no 
one would make an accusation of moral responsibility if there 
was evidence that he had no knowledge of the circumstances 
which triggered the damage.
I think that this applies in general to moral allegations. 
Moral responsibility is based on the felt worthlessness of an 
attitude,	peremptorily	an	executed	action.	Such	an	individual	
feeling of judging, in turn, is based on a corresponding sub-
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jective consensus within a collective, whereby a certain – even 
if only informal – normative validity is achieved. If someone 
who has made moral allegations about another observes, af-
ter the fact, that no one in the surroundings shares the same 
judgment	of	the	matter,	usually	they	will	no	longer	be	able	to	
uphold their accusation, at least publicly. The public consen-
sus necessary for a moral accusation,	no	matter	how	informal	
and unclear it may be, is never only based on the success of 
the action. The focus is much more on the supposed attitude be-
hind the action, not on the concrete act. While the public may 
frequently be overly quick about tracing certain acts expressed 
by particular, successful acts to a certain reprehensible attitude,	
if this presumption cannot be plausibly ruled out, usually the 
entire moral accusation is thrown out. For instance, if a teach-
er has been accused of intentionally blackballing a child from 
an immigrant family, he can devalue the moral accusation of 
discrimination by showing that he evaluated the child’s perfor-
mance completely without bias and that, in fact, by being held 
back, the child even has certain social advantages because his 
true friends are really in the new class and his group-dynamic 
situation	will	thus	be	significantly	improved.
However,	if	there	is	only	a	necessary	but	not	sufficient	condi-
tion for assigning responsibility at the moral level of the success 
of an action, this criterion can only play a secondary role in deter-
mining the circumstances that must exist for claiming collective 
responsibility. There is no other standard applicable here other 
than what is already available for individual responsibility.
5.3 Shared intentionality or purpose, common interests and 
common consciousness
Another frequently represented perspective used to deter-
mine collectivity is that of shared intentionality.88 As I already 
88	 One	of	the	most	thorough	researchers	in	the	field	of	shared intentionality 
is Michael Tomasello; see his Tomasello [2000] and [2014]. His research fo-
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mentioned above, German academic language distinguishes 
between intentionality and purposefulness but this distinction 
doesn’t exist in English unless an author explicitly refers to 
the corresponding German philosophical traditions: intention, 
in English, usually covers both ‘intention’ and ‘purpose’. The 
philosophical concept of intentionality was adopted by Franz 
Brentano in the year 1874. Edmund Husserl contributed to its 
philosophical continuation and appeal to all European schools 
of philosophy and sociology oriented towards phenomenolo-
gy,	the	latter	known	mainly	through	the	works	of	Alfred	Schütz	
as well as George H. Mead.89 As a result of this specialist ap-
propriation of the term ‘intention’, the intentional had to be 
clearly distinguished from just the purposeful. Both can occur 
in an individual person but don’t need to. The term ‘intention’ 
is much broader than that of ‘purpose’ and is necessarily based 
on purposefulness. If, for example, I see a tool as a tool, I am not 
only making a distinction in terms but also a practical one: I see 
this object in terms of its future use as a certain tool. With that I 
am already in an intentional relationship according to phenom-
enological analysis, but not in a purposeful one. The purpose 
does not necessarily follow; it is the concrete and continued 
intention that does. That makes purpose more abstract and 
potentially more independent of its intentional origin. When 
cus is on the development of shared intentionality in toddlers. Moreover, 
recently appeared the Schmid/Schweikard [2009] collected volume with 
contributions from various other research approaches. A more natural sci-
ence approach of collective intentionality in connection with swarming 
phenomena can be found in Horn/Gisi [2009]. When the natural science 
focus of self-organizing systems is applied, the scope of the literature im-
mediately increases exponentially. This issue has been treated for centu-
ries	with	different	public	interest	and	in	the	meantime	is	an	independent	
academic research discipline. The Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana 
was one of the founders who had already been discussing the important 
notion of autopoiesis in systems theory in the 1979’s as well as his contem-
porary research colleague Francisco Varela.
89 The so-called Symbolic Interactionism founded by George H. Mead de-
rives not only from the European phenomenology but from the ethnolog-
ical studies of Mead. These schools are close to the sociological phenome-
nology because of their focus on individual behavior.
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founding a partnership, for example, the purpose	is	defined	in	
the articles of association. This has to do with the intentional 
relationship, as phenomenologists see it, between individual 
people and the objects of the world, just very removed or in a 
derived sense.90
 Even when a phenomenologically intentional relation to the 
world does not need to mean a purposeful one, it is, in a certain 
sense, a prospective one, i.e., related to future action and the 
‘pre’-forming relationship of this action in the sense of Brenta-
no. It is therefore reasonable to generally ask people, and thus 
also	 a	majority	 of	people	with	 common	 intentions,	 to	 reflect	
on the spectrum of possible actions or directions of an action 
which	 follow	a	 specific	 intention	and	 their	possible	practical	
outcomes. This is why moral responsibility, independently 
of whether it is localized with the individual or the collective, 
surely also depends on whether the accused behavior was pre-
dictable or even desired in consideration of the intentionality 
which preceded it. It is exactly this question that has forced 
a	clarification	of	terms	for	legal	responsibility	in	all	of	the	le-
gal cultures known to me: Legally incriminating behavior re-
quires intention, or at minimum negligence, with regard to 
bringing about the success of an action, which in turn requires 
some form of intentionality. This basic principle is rooted in 
the informal conditions of moral – in other words, pre-legal – 
responsibility. For example, whoever unintentionally does not 
respond to a greeting because they simply did not notice the 
person doing the greeting, will not be held morally responsible. 
The same should apply to a collective: If an announced political 
demonstration leads to spontaneous and unintended violence 
with people of other political ideas, the group of demonstrators 
does not need to be held collectively morally responsible, and 
90 I conceptually assign intentionality as a middle point between the more 
general, totally subjective attitude	of	a	single	person	towards	the	world,	
on the one hand, and the manifest, objective purpose that tends to exist on 
its own, on the other.
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a legal collective responsibility doesn’t come into consideration 
at all.
This argument, however, even though it is correct at its core, 
is	enormously	difficult	in	all	of	the	cases	of	a	large	collective.	
They are usually organized so very complexly that hardly any 
relationship can be traced between the individual intension 
and the actually realized collective action, especially over lon-
ger periods of development. Hardly any work about collective 
moral responsibility on the basis of common intentionality 
looks at this problem. Even Peter French, whose book, Collective 
and Corporate Responsibility, is one of the most cited works on 
the topic, not only falls prey to this error in thinking, he styliz-
es it into a conceptual thinking formula.91 Unfortunately, that 
does nothing to alter the fact that common intentionality is ulti-
mately	very	difficult	to	apply	as	a	criterion	for	assigning	collec-
tive moral responsibility, not only for large collectives, but also 
basically for even the smallest collective.
The	concerns	of	Schulz-Schaeffers	are	basic	here.	He	shows	
that the assignment of acts on the basis of suspected intention-
ality can practically never be proven with certainty as long as 
the addressee of the assignment does not voluntarily or invol-
untarily admit she or he acted intentionally.92 This argument 
91 See French	[1984],	p.	134ff.	He	calls	this	the	formula	of	the	Extended Princi-
ple of Accountability, or EPA for short. With that, he means: “A person […] 
may be held morally responsible for his intentional actions and for those 
actions	that	he	was	willing	to	perform	under	different	descriptions	of	his	
intentional actions. Also he may be held accountable for those non-orig-
inal	 or	 second	 effects	 that	 involve	 the	 actions	 of	 other	 persons	 that	 he	
obliquely or collaterally intended or was willing to have occur as the result 
or	under	different	descriptions	of	his	actions.	Let	us	call	this	the	‘Extended	
Principle of Accountability’ (EPA).” This alleged principle contains such 
confusion, especially in regards to the responsibility for one’s own actions, 
that it is practically useless: What should we understand, for instance, un-
der “obliquely or collaterally intended” or “was willing to have occur ... 
under	different	descriptions	of	his	actions”?	Corresponding	attributions	
run the risk of becoming completely arbitrary.
92 Schulz-Schaeffer	delves	into	the	attribution	of	intention	to	action,	not	only	
from a phenomenological point of view, but also from a legal and com-
mon sense psychological perspective. In so far as his argumentation is es-
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points	to	a	fundamental	flaw	of	any	assignment	of	action	based	
on intentionality,	and	even	more	so	if	we	look	at	the	difficult	
terrain of collective action. Collective action is characterized 
precisely through the individual participants being in very dif-
ferent	roles	and	subsequently	also	differing	levels	of	engage-
ment. If one were to demand direct intentionality by the indi-
vidual actor for every single event that can causally be assigned 
to a collective, it would virtually lead to a denial of the existence 
of collective action at all.  The acts of the German SS during 
Hitler’s reign were blamed on every single member of this or-
ganization through the force of his formal membership. This 
membership	justifies	a	factual	type	of	general	intentionality for 
every act even imaginable for such an organization. However, 
at	least	in	the	eyes	of	the	public,	this	can	be	seen	differently	–	for	
example, membership in the American CIA, which was respon-
sible for the broadly undisputed deaths of many political oppo-
sition members through systematic torture and other heinous 
legal crimes around the entire world. The intentional	difference	
between the two organizations is  the racist and inhuman pro-
grams of the SS compared to the basically neutral governmen-
tal protection task of the CIA. In both cases, the boundaries of 
what is usually considered direct intentional action was clearly 
overstepped in regards to these crimes. I therefore agree with 
Schulz	Schaeffer	that	the	assertion	of	common	intentionality as 
a prerequisite for assigning responsibility is mainly normative 
and not factual. In contrast to the internal organizational norms 
of a collective, which are an essential criterion for determining 
collective moral responsibility from the perspective represent-
ed	here,	externally	imposed	norms	are	basically	not	sufficient	
as	a	primary	justification.	Imposed	norms	require	justification	
to	be	attributed	and,	as	such,	cannot	be	made	responsible	for	
making a majority of persons in toto collectively responsible 
for	something.	We	need	a	much	more	intrinsic	justification	as	a	
pecially	plausible,	see	Schulz	Schaeffer	[2007],	Chapter	1.3,	2	and	3.
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necessary condition for collective responsibility. If an intrinsic 
justification	 is	not	possible,	 the	purely	 extrinsic,	normatively	
justified	assignment	is	not	yet	sufficient.
Steven Sverdlik also tried  to solve the question of collective 
responsibility a few years ago by applying the success of the 
the intended action result (not the actual success of the action; 
see previous section), i.e. not only the necessary individual ac-
tion	itself.	The	latter	excludes	collective	responsibility	from	the	
outset.93 On the other hand, he thinks that responsibility may 
definitely	be	claimed	provided	that	the	intention	of	the	directly	
executing individuals and other supporters is counted and not 
just the executing, direct act.94	Such	an	approach	suffers	from	
the	deficiency	 that	 Schulz	Schaeffer	has	 already	been	 shown	
to have, but also makes the problem into an extreme cases of 
actual ideological	 terror	based	on	 the	 supposed	attitude	and	
thinking of people. If one allowed his argument to apply inde-
pendently of the political motivation of those using it, it would 
ultimately	offer	despots	of	all	colors	cheap	justification	for	cut-
ting	off	any	peer	group	political	antagonists	as	well	as	the	an-
tagonists themselves.
The so-called ‘common interests’, partly made valid in the lit-
erature, assert a criterion of collective responsibility and also fall 
completely under the same arguments as those for and against 
shared intentionality. The terms ‘intention’ and ‘interest’ are 
difficult	to	separate.	Actually	they	originate	from	different	sci-
entific	disciplines	and	should	not	be	mixed.	‘Intention’	is	a	gen-
93 Sverdlik	[1987],	p.	65ff.
94 He writes: ‘[W]e can further assert that it is only when more than one per-
son intends the result that responsibility for it is collective.” (ibid., p. 67) 
Sverdlik even goes as far as raising the intention of the act to the essential 
moral criterion of judgment in his subsequent example. Such approaches 
lag far behind the current state of the German criminal theory of action; 
see	again	the	very	instructive	overview	in	Schulz	Schaeffer	[2007],	Chapter	
3,	p.	333ff.	I	am	not	well	informed	about	the	American	criminal	theory of 
action, but I have no reason to believe that it is less developed than the 
German on this point. Therefore I won’t pursue Sverdlik’s position any 
further.
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uinely philosophical technical term, if used in a philosophical 
context. ‘Interests’, in contrast, is a core concept of sociology. If 
both are projected to the thematic level of collective responsibil-
ity, they mean virtually the same thing. Separately considering 
so-called	‘common	interests’	is	therefore	superfluous.
A	slightly	different	and	more	difficult	variant	of	shared in-
tentionality, namely ‘common consciousness’, is discussed by 
Larry May with reference to other American authors.95 But 
even just the expression ‘common consciousness’ should give 
rise to increased mistrust when it comes to assigning collec-
tive responsibility. Larry May and the other authors he cites 
clearly realize that, strictly speaking, there can be no common 
consciousness in the sense of an ontologically uniform object 
because consciousness is now irrevocably a characteristic of 
an individual human person. The authors push the question 
of the nature of the alleged common consciousness onto a suit-
able substitute that can act ‘for all’, explicitly when perceiving 
their collective consciousness. The members of the executive 
personnel in corporate bodies are naturally under consider-
ation here. However, May rightly maintains that one can never 
know whether the substitute is really a representatives of the 
collective consciousness in the cases of such powers of repre-
sentation or is acting much more, or mainly, out of self-inter-
est. The same objection applies as those against shared inten-
tionality here: It is empirically impossible to examine whether 
a natural person is representing the collective consciousness, 
and even more so, to determine what such consciousness even 
comprises. So here too, there is a wide gap for arbitrariness. 
However, considering the management of a corporate entity as 
a representative of the independent corporate interests is fully 
unproblematic. The term of collective consciousness becomes 
superfluous	from	this	perspective.	If	a	representative	of	a	cor-
porate entity acts in compliance with the statutory purposes of 
95 See May	[1989],	p.	203ff	with	further	evidence	to	authors,	this	aspect	of	
collective responsibility is accepted.
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this body, it cannot be understood in any other way than as 
an act of the corporate entity itself. This is indisputable from a 
legal perspective as well as, in my opinion, also from the more 
informal moral perspective.
It also becomes clear how risky such arguments of shared 
intention, common interest or even common consciousness can 
be for collective responsibility when abused by ideological or 
despotic perpetrators of violence. Generally, an intentionally 
justified	moral	accusation and a corresponding accusation of 
attitudes	are	proximate.	They	are	different	in	that	an	accusation 
of intention is based on a material condemnation of the respec-
tive intention, while the accusation of attitude	ultimately	rests	
on the accusation of having deviated from prevailing collective 
opinions	or	a	consensus.	In		many	cases,	both	of	these	are	diffi-
cult to keep apart. Which is why it is all the more important that 
anyone who makes a moral judgment carefully separate them. 
A meta-rule of moral responsibility in social history should be 
that individual deviation from the collective attitude	cannot jus-
tify a moral accusation. Only the material, substantive nature 
of the attitude	in	question	can	suffice	here	for	additional	and	
necessary intentionality. This, in turn, weakens the criterion of 
intentionality as the basis of assigning collective responsibility. 
This is because, as mentioned above, the crude self-interests of 
human or corporative individual actors frequently hide behind 
collective moral accusations  in political power struggles.
5.4 Social relationships between actors as a 
condition of collective action
Larry May proposes that we can only speak of collective re-
sponsibility when the parties in an event have a suitably quali-
fied	relational	structure	to	one	another.96 Not all kinds of  imag-
96 See May [1989], p. 17: “The capacities of individuals change when they are 
mixed together with other individuals. This change is best captured […] 
by reference to the structure of the group so formed […].
83
5   Possible Criteria for the Moral Qualification of Collective Action
inable	 relationships	between	people	 suffice	 for	making	 them	
collectively morally responsible for any event. I am already in 
a relationship to the random person who is also waiting for the 
bus next to me at the bus stop. But May owes us an explana-
tion for when such relationships create a structure, or, in other 
words, what exactly he means by “structure of a group”. His 
explanations on this point oscillate between examples of com-
pletely informal relations and very stable, formally based social 
relations. This gives the impression that for him, the ‘structure 
of a group’ means basically the same thing as a ‘social relation-
ship’. May’s reference to the structure of a group, which is very 
necessary for him at the end, remains vague. All the more so 
because he also explicitly rejects the idea of making the con-
crete organization of human action a condition for collective 
responsibility. His fear is that, by doing so, he would only be 
able to assign responsibility to formally constituted bodies.97 
But, because he ultimately needs to decide on certain criteria 
in order to be able to draw a line between non-responsible and 
responsible collective forms, he retreats to the “common inter-
est” discussed above and the idea of a “fusion” or merging of 
individual actions in an event complex which is a phenomena 
strongly reminiscent of Durkheim subsequent to Sartre’s rep-
resentation of the events of July 8, 1789 which peaked in the 
storming of the Bastille in Paris.98 Such a fusion leads to the for-
mation of collective solidarity which in turn is the key to as-
signing actions to such groups.99
97 Ibid, p. 23. There he says: “[…] Teams and Mobs can to be shown to have 
sufficient	 structure	 to	 require	a	non-individualistic	analysis	of	 their	be-
haviors, even though they have no formal organizational structure.” In 
other parts of his book May treats the term ‘[social] structure’ as a feature 
of groups that is independent from the organization of this group. Struc-
ture is clearly the superordinate term of organizational structure. See also 
his explicit rejection of restricting collective responsibility to organized 
groups, ibid, p.32.
98 Ibid, p. 34f. The expression ‘fusion’ is also used by Kondylis to describe 
the relationship of an individual to the world view of his biography, see 
Kondylis [1984], Chp. 1.
99 Ibid, p. 37. It says there: „Solidarity is the key to the explanation of how 
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The criterion of the so-called fusion of individuals to a sin-
gle actor is, however, unsuitable for conceptual reasons. The 
term ‘fusion’ suggests something that can barely be discerned 
beyond metaphorically perceived phenomena. Processes of fu-
sion	are	usually	material	matters.	But	May	of	course	does	not	
mean	a	material	fusion	of	humans.	We	also	speak	in	a	figura-
tive sense of a merger when two businesses unite, for exam-
ple. Here the expression describes an ontological change: Two 
objects become one. But the phenomena described by May, in 
continuation of Sartre’s thinking, can only be plausibly claimed 
if we detach certain psychic features of the individual actors 
– e.g., their wills – from those of the individual actors and asso-
ciate them in a special union, even though their carrier, name-
ly individual humans, continue to be separate and unfused. I 
can’t imagine how something like that is supposed to happen. 
Although we could claim a sort of psychologically mutual ad-
justment similar to the corresponding physical phenomena 
where	different	elements	in	a	physical	system	independently	
coordinate into a common oscillation (a ‘joint oscillation’ in 
the sense of a resonance). This ‘joint’ oscillation, however, is 
nothing	other	than	the	coordination	of	many	different	elements	
so that the combination of their individual contributions are 
greater	in	effect	than	would	be	otherwise	possible	with	unco-
ordinated oscillations. In such cases there is not as single, but 
rather many coordinated oscillations. The same appears to be 
necessarily true for me for the alleged fusion of intentions to act 
or the force of will among a multitude of people.
Here we can see a frequent problem that goes way beyond 
Larry May in dealing with group behavior. May’s two-sided rea-
soning error is that he does not make a categorical distinction 
between a human individual actor, a majority of individual ac-
a collection of individuals, such as the Paris mob [in the storming of the 
Bastille, (WS)] can be ascribed action predicates […].” And he continues, 
ibid., p. 38: “Nonetheless, in both cases (the jazz quartet and the mob), the 
activities of each of the members are brought together so that it appears 
that the members have fused together into a single individual.”
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tors	and	a	corporate	entity	as	a	unified	actor.	In	doing	this,	he	is	
following the well-known schema by Peter French100 and that of 
List and	Pettit101 discussed above. The same applies to List and 
Pettit	who	speak of ‘joint intention’ rather than ‘common interest’, 
which ultimately ends up being the same thing.102 Furthermore, 
French and May (being prototypical for many other authors on 
the topic) do not make a clear distinction between direct social 
relationships and a symbolically coded one, i.e., a social order 
that	is	independent	of	the	specific	individual.	In	some	obscure	
way, they use the expression ‘social structure’ to refer to both. 
And with that, an important ontological criterion is lost not only 
for distinguishing a corporate entity from other social forms, but 
also for distinguishing the criterion for drawing the line between 
these other social forms to distinguish the point from which col-
lective responsibility can be assigned.
Only a generally symbolically coded, and thus indepen-
dent and lasting, relationship between actors is what I refer to 
as	a	 specifically	human	 social organization below. This is also 
the one that ultimately makes the corporate entity possible as 
a unit of actor. May does not take this into account with due 
analytical clarity. He says: “Social relationships have reality in 
that they structure or unify a group of individual human per-
sons	so	that	these	persons	can	act	and	have	interests	in	differ-
ent ways than they could on their own.“103	His	undifferentiated	
expression: “… structure or unify…” shows that he doesn’t see 
the	fundamental,	ontological	difference	that	separates	just	any	
structure from one that endows a unity to the actor. This is how 
he ends up wanting to assign collective responsibility to mobs 
and crowds simply based on the spontaneous, joint intentions 
they form, such as in a revolution, or their actions which are 
coordinated without much thought. This approach blurs the 
100 See French	[1984],	p.	48ff.
101 See List/Pettit	[2011]
102	 Ibid.,	p.	42	ff.
103 See May [1989], p.23
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ontological boundary of formally constituted corporate enti-
ties	because	 it	asserts	 that	 they	are	only	different	 from	mobs 
and crowds through their organized decision making process-
es.104 But May overlooks	a	very	important	categorical	difference	
here. The only clear criterion is the ontological separation of  in-
dividual actors–whether persons or entities–from a majority of 
such actors, not some kind of spontaneous coordination among 
a majority of actors. The corporate entity is an individual actor 
without a doubt. It cannot result simply from an organized de-
cision-making process. It arises from a formal act of founding, 
and even more importantly, its continued existence as a legal 
entity is assured through its organization. 
Social relationships and social structures thus can never be 
sufficient	for	determining	when	a	collective	(in	the	sense	of	a	
majority of individual actors) can also be morally responsible 
without further determination.
5.5 Subjective and factual feelings of collective responsibility
Ton Van	den	Beld	takes	a	completely	different	position	in	his	
essay titled Can Collective  Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil 
Persist over Generations? The essay is a reference to the inter-
nationally popular novel The Reader by Bernhard Schlink. Van 
den Beld cites the novel’s protagonist, Michael, who recognizes 
that his generation has directly experienced the reality of Ger-
many’s collective guilt for the crimes of World War 2 and the 
holocaust when he sees a woman named Hanna, who is be-
ing accused of war crimes as a former KZ guard in a trial. She 
was the one who had befriended him as a youth (although he 
was unaware of who she was at the time).105  I completely agree 
with this. However, Van den Beld’s conclusion is ambiguous. 
He is of the opinion that accusations by victims or third par-
ties against the generation following the original perpetrators 
104	 So-called	‘decision	procedures’,	ibid.	p.	65ff.
105 See Van den Beld [2002], p. 181.
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cannot be possible as such. However, the generation following 
the perpetrators would have good reason to admit to their own 
corresponding responsibility. His so called ‘good’ reasons are 
only of a psychological nature because, for Van den Beld, there 
is no formal, more precise criteria available.
Such	psychological	effects	are	certainly	very	desirable	from	
a societal-political viewpoint in order to prevent extreme col-
lective developments of misconduct. However, they are clearly 
insufficient	in	view	of	the	actual	problems	that	are	exposed	by	
extensive collective misconduct. They ultimately are a subjec-
tive convenience, they cannot be made objective. It would be 
very useful to be able to clarify the pre-normative requirements 
under which collective responsibility can be generally asserted. 
The voluntary admission of wrongdoing by perpetrator col-
lectives which are frequently large is not reliable, especially if 
no normative pressure is being put on such a collective sim-
ply because it hasn’t been developed. Even the guilt feelings of 
the following generations of Germans would have been prob-
ably	significantly	less	if	Germany	had	not	unconditionally	ca-
pitulated at the end of Hitler; not only militarily, but also and 
particularly morally, which was done through the exemplary 
importance of the Nuremberg Processes before the eyes of the 
entire world and international criminal law.
In	 contrast:	A	 psychologically	 diffuse	 collective	 feeling	 of	
guilt can turn into extremely uncomfortable defensive reac-
tions by the collective. A collective insult to honor, as is fre-
quently the interpretation of the assignment of collective re-
sponsibility by the receivers, has particular potential to turn 
into angry and very irrational aggression. A recent example is 
Turkey’s response to accusations of Armenian genocide. Here, 
the irrational defense in response to what was perceived as a 
national insult went so far as to simply deny the historically in-
disputable facts. Turkey even threatens to retaliate foreign gov-
ernments and parliaments who formally paraphrase the afore-
mentioned historical events as genocide. Psychology cannot 
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help	against	such	exaggeration;	only	a	factual	clarification	of	
collective morally-normative evaluation can. In Germany, this 
position	has	even	been	legalized	so	that	it	is	a	criminal	offense	
to deny the holocaust. While this is not a determination of col-
lective responsibility, it is nevertheless a formalized obligation 
to at least accept the factual foundation of the moral judgment 
which, under circumstances, can no longer be disputed.
5.6 The community of shared values
An older criterion for possible collective responsibility in terms 
of	historical	ideas	is	viewing	collectives	as	communities	unified	
by values.  This would be, for example, the basis for  Gustav 
Radbruch’s philosophy of law who refers to the teachings of 
Windelband, Rickert and Lask.106	The	objectification	of	values	in	
philosophy,	as	reflected	by	Max	Scheler, for example, peaked in 
Germany during the years between the two world wars. Since 
then, however, almost no one follows this approach in either so-
ciology or philosophy because concerns about an ‘ontological-
ization’ of values were too great. This development contrasts in 
a strange way with the constant reoccurring political discussion 
of	whether	our	modern	societies,	no	matter	how	heterogeneous	
and diverse, gather internal cohesion through existence as a 
community of values. And this discussion is not only in Germa-
ny. Such a discourse has very strong relevance for constitutional 
law in Germany in that its constitution, the ‘Grundgesetz’, repeat-
edly refers to core terms of so-called basic values – for example, 
human respect (Art. 1), basic freedom of action (Art. 2) and fun-
damental equality among individuals in the eyes of the law (Art. 
3)	–	in	its	catalog	of	rights	as	defined	in	Art.	1	through	19.
As meaningful as such a discussion of values might be, it 
contributes	little	to	the	analysis	of	the	question	of	collective	re-
sponsibility.	Values	may	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 the	 inner	
106 See Radbruch [1956], footnote 1 on p. 91.
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cohesion of a community, whether in the form of mutual as-
surance for acceptable or unacceptable daily behaviors or in the 
form of a general legal judgment.  But even the concept of value 
is	problematic	when	it	is	objectified	too	strongly	because	that	
then ignores the practical side of our social life from which all 
values ultimately are derived. In other words, the enormous 
binding	effect	of	 simple,	 constantly	 repeated	 social	 life	prac-
tices. Values usually emerge simply through the inertia of con-
stantly repeated acts that, with time, become a collective habit 
and	then,	ultimately	a	 tradition	and	reflect	no	kind	of	philo-
sophical thinking at all. That isn’t a bad thing because only 
those practical habits which have been socially proven also 
have permanence. So from this perspective, values are nothing 
more than generalized and conceptually abstracted, collective-
ly recognized behavioral habits which have been ultimately 
raised to normative maxims. But to make such habits the basis 
for a moral accusation could end up in fruitless discussions of 
justification	in	very	many	cases.
Furthermore, the expression ‘value’ in a moral context con-
notes a sort of emotional, slightly celebratory devotion that is 
not a particularly central moment of experience in not only in 
the German-speaking regions but the English and Spanish as 
well. The pervasive, formal and practical necessities of every-
day life are too strong for such celebratory value considerations 
to play a dominant role. A value discussion may perhaps have 
a certain meaning in connection to social identity research, but 
even	there	I	find	it	somewhat	aloof	and	old-fashioned.	Practi-
cally	all	sociological	schools	offer	models	of	identity	that	func-
tion without the concept of value.  Instead they appeal to roles 
(Erving Goffman),	structural	functions	(Talcott	Parsons, Niklas 
Luhmann)	 and	 socio-economic	 benefits	 (James	Coleman), to 
name just a few. Ultimately, the value-theory discourse seems 
to me to only become  substantive after it becomes normative. 
Otherwise	it	threatens	to	go	off	track	into	a	covert	discourse	on	
attitudes.	And	then	there	is	no	more	reason	to	make	the	assign-
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ment of collective responsibility dependent on the criterion of 
shared values.
5.7 Social identity
In addition to all the material criteria of value, intention, etc., 
there is another socio-psychological fact that plays an import-
ant role in asserting collective responsibility. This is the condi-
tion that membership in a collective is often not just a rational 
decision to pursue some objective but also a psycho-social form 
of	definition	for	the	individual.	A	person	is	more	than	a	biolog-
ical individual; he has a social identity, and, to some extent, he 
can control its form. His identity since birth has developed in 
a certain cultural environment and social class. As a child, he 
accepts many circumstances in his situation without question-
ing, which is how his social identity is formed. With intellectual 
maturity, however, he becomes aware of this social develop-
ment process to varying degrees and then has the possibility of 
correcting existing elements of his social identity and adding 
new aspects. The result of this is never a consistent body of con-
victions and practice.  In fact, we can assume that most peo-
ple are usually not in the position to realize a truly consistent 
picture	of	 themselves	since	most	people	play	many	different	
roles, both in parallel and in sequence, in their lives. The basis 
of	situationally	dependent	judgment	of	one’s	self	fluctuates	too	
much, statements by others about one’s self are too subjectively 
colored, and the totality of one’s own existence is simply too 
complex and confusing for anyone to be able to say that he has 
a clear picture of a complete and consistent social identity.
If	such	a	reflection	is	not	even	possible	to	the	extent	needed	
here,	then	it	is	also	difficult	to	derive	moral	responsibility	for	
the	actions	of	a	collective	based	on	social	identification	which	is	
part of the reward of membership in a collective. It has a similar 
position as all the other candidates presented for such a conclu-
sion: They all certainly play an important role, but their own 
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factuality is hard to determine indisputably and, in addition, 
their part in the entire decision about moral responsibility can-
not be exactly determined. But that doesn’t mean that we need 
to	 let	go	of	 the	criteria	of	 social	 identity	as	a	 justification	 for	
collective responsibility because it certainly plays some part. 
It’s just that on its own it is not very useful for furthering our 
analysis.
Another, and very incisive approach  which needs to be men-
tioned here is from Panajotis Kondylis. He already emphasized 
in his book Macht und Entscheidung107 the unavoidable link be-
tween personal-social identity and ideological organization in 
the	world.	Later,	 in	 the	first	volume	of	his	book	about	social	
ontology, published posthumously, he explains that distin-
guishing peers into friends or enemies is one of the most funda-
mental functions of orientation even though it is always under 
the condition that society precedes the individual in a social 
ontological sense.108 He defuses the obvious suspicion that he is 
edging close to the political	theory	of	Carl	Schmitt	by	explicitly	
setting	himself	apart	from	the	latter’s	definition	of	the	political	
and accuses him of conceptual confusion.109
For Kondylis, social identity is a consequence of an orien-
tation decision (not always explicit or even conscious),  the re-
sult of which is to arrange oneself with a partially subjective, 
particular world within which the individual ‘melts’ with his 
world.110 This allows the person to experience a more or less 
uniform orientation at all moments of life whereby the primary 
interest is always on maximizing the orientation he is constant-
ly working on.
Such a scheme is intuitively plausible, but nevertheless con-
tradictory to my previous determination that a person’s  identi-
107 See Kondylis	[1984],	summarized:	p.	117ff.
108 See Kondylis	[1999],	p.	208ff.	and	276ff.	on	the	fundamental	difference	be-
tween friends and enemies.
109 Ibid., footnote 242.
110 Kondylis [1984], Chapter 1: Entscheidung als Machtanspruch [Decision as 
power	claim]	(p.	14ff),	his	entire	position	summarized	again	ibid.	p.	117ff.
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fication	with	a	collective	is	usually	not	a	comprehensive	feature	
of his entire personality but rather only a strand that doesn’t 
even	need	to	fit	in	with	his	other	life	situations	in	a	consistent	
way. My experience is that people are easier than Kondylis 
suggests. In fact, they can often tolerate blatant contradictions 
in	their	attitudes	if	it	happens	to	fit	at	the	moment.	They	actu-
ally	spend	very	little	time	on	their	identities	that	are	practical-
ly independent of certain world views in their banality when, 
for example, there is a material advantage involved. Then they 
bring up issues of morality and social identity, frequently with-
out raising an eyebrow, as superior and irrelevant since no one 
pays	attention	to	it	anyway	and	‘in	reality’	everyone	is	‘anyway’	
egotistical: Who hasn’t heard this miserable pseudo argument?
I only want to say with this that Kondylis’s genetic analysis 
of	social	identification	can	be	well	observed	with	a	correspond-
ing world view but is not exhaustive. Social reality is more 
complex. Kondylis’s basic position is very sober, i.e., anti-nor-
matively arranged, but it seems to me that social reality is ac-
tually	quite	different.	Tightening	the	link	to	collective	respon-
sibility	based	on	the	feature	of	identification	with	a	collective	is	
also not expedient from the perspective of his arguments.
5.8 Origin and ethnic belonging
In conjunction with national events, being related by blood is 
factually a very frequent criterion for assigning collective re-
sponsibility. Historically seen, it is the oldest criterion for as-
signing rights and obligations. The consanguine obligation of 
solidarity is superordinate even today, coming before any oth-
er possibly competing relationships such as non-family based 
friendships or those based on common social interests, in all 
of the societies of the world known to me. This priority has 
been substantially reduced in today’s large societies, however. 
Consanguine obligations (e.g., support obligations) need to be 
legally formulated in order to be able to compete with other 
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legal obligations, such as those under contractual law. I don’t 
know of any modern legal system in which the informal obliga-
tions of consanguine solidarity can outweigh legal obligations. 
There is also no criminal guilt by association anymore in the 
world (North Korea being a disreputable exception here). 
Nevertheless,	one’s	own	identification	as	well	as	the	outside	
identification	of	one	due	to	consanguinity	is	still	a	very	strong	
argument for classifying and judging social events. Consan-
guinity	 is	historically	a	valid	 justification	for	political	power,	
although this is still true in many countries today. Monarchic 
systems of ruling assume that consanguinity is a legitimate 
base	for	power,	completely	as	a	matter	of	course.	Such	tradi-
tions	cannot	be	simply	written	out	of	the	world.	Such	purport-
ed implicitness, however, hides how such dynasties originally 
seized	power	for	the	benefit	of	their	families.		Carl	Boix pres-
ents a very comprehensive ethnological and historical study 
showing that such political acquisition of power is based on 
violence almost everywhere in the world, and thus is clearly 
against the will of those subjected to it from the beginning and 
that it is established by nothing other than pure violence.111 For 
this reason, the legitimization of power through consanguinity 
is no longer recognized in many parts of the world.
Even the most informal political power has the shadow of 
moral responsibility for its exercise. This also applies to the 
somewhat	more	harmless	level	of	 justification	and	obligation	
alone through consanguinity. To the extent that a social system 
establishes rights and obligations among the relatives solely 
based on consanguinity, there is a moral responsibility. This 
can be clearly seen, for example, in accusations such as when 
the father of an illegitimate child legally doesn’t support his 
child. In this case, the indignation, e.g., about refusing to pay 
support,	is	generally	justified	by	referring	to	the	legal	obliga-
tions	of	a	biological	father.	But	this	only	intensifies	and	objecti-
111 See Boix	[2015],	Chapter	I:	Tabula	rasa	(p.	22ff.).	Boix	identifies	monarchic	
dynasties summarily also as “looters turned monarchs”.
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fies	the	moral	accusation to a certain extent. Such laws are based 
on their completely uncontested validity primarily because the 
application of consanguine loyalties is equally uncontested. 
Although consanguinity plays an important role in all of the 
world’s	 cultures	even	 today,	 it	 is	no	 longer	used	as	a	 justifi-
cation to assign criminal guilt to relatives based on the crimi-
nal act of one of its members. This follows a fundamental and 
well	justified	doctrine	of	understanding	action,	as	I	already	de-
scribed above. Following this approach requires a uniform ac-
tor in order to assign an action. Such uniform actors exist on the 
continuum of possible actors only at its two extremes, namely, 
the individual person and the corporate entity actor. The only 
exceptions to this are in civil law, i.e., non-criminal proceed-
ings. Forms of action can be interpreted as community actions 
on the continuum between the two extremes from which col-
lective liability can follow, but only if there is a corresponding, 
explicit agreement of solidarity present, such as in the form of a 
partnership or contractual business partnership. The exclusion 
of criminal collective liability goes so far as to even treat corpo-
rate bodies as uniform actors only in very special cases.
The strongest objection to collective liability is based on eth-
nic	affiliation.	This	has	multiple	reasons.	For	one	 thing,	such	
liability requires a type of genetic disposition, in other words, 
a	 biological	 determination	 for	 committing	 the	 alleged	 acts.	
Following this logic, stealing would be the consequence of a 
person’s biological predisposition to steal. If this were the case, 
the environment would have to protect itself even from the 
relatives	of	the	thief,	as	if	there	was	a	genetic	disease	affecting	
an entire family. An even broader version of this view – in the 
case of ‘infection’ among  ethnic members – would not distin-
guish between biological disposition and cultural tradition or 
collective habits of behaving. This would mean that in the end, 
the collective would be made responsible for biological rea-
sons, cultural reasons, or both, whether or not the behavior of 
the	individual	was	responsible.	In	ethnic	conflicts,	this	is	even	
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the primary point of departure.112 The core of such accusations 
is	always	ancestry,	 i.e.,	an	assertion	of	a	biologically	 justified	
co-accountability. Such an accusation is fundamentally and 
substantially unfounded, especially if it is based on a single act 
by a single person in the collective being accused. For example, 
in 2012 a terribly violent ethnic cleansing began against the Ro-
hingya in Myanmar after some male Rohingya were accused of 
raping women in the non-Muslim surroundings.113 In such cas-
es,	the	specific	incident	that	triggered	the	ethnically	motivated	
violence was obviously only a trigger for releasing pent-up so-
cial tensions which had existed for much longer. Otherwise, the 
persecutors would have had to provide evidence that all other 
members of the accused collective were causally participating 
in	the	specific	action	of	the	accusation or that they tend to the 
same act of violence for genetic reasons. That is practically nev-
er claimed by discriminating persecutors. Instead, they always 
use the concrete act as just an example of an alleged ‘general 
tendency’ of the collective that is being discriminated against, 
without giving any plausible reason.
This also shows that such cases cannot be dealt with under 
the keyword ‘collective responsibility’ because the heart of it 
is	no	 longer	about	 specific	 individual	acts,	 even	 in	 the	 sense	
of a sum of such acts. The accusation of collective accountabil-
ity based on joint ancestry – in other words, consanguinity 
– is nothing more than an accusation of essence, not an accu-
sation based on action. But for decades now nowhere has the 
simple and biological nature of humans been a publicly rec-
ognized reason for the moral persecution of these people. The 
112 A very accurate look at real uprisings and ethnically motivated excess of 
murder and their process can be found in Donald Horowitz	in	Horowitz	
[2001].
113 On the situation of the Rohingya, see the corresponding Wikipedia entry 
under:	https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohingya.	A	current	overview	of	the	
background and the continuous ethnically grounded violence can be read 
in	“The	Economist”,	No.	24,	from	June	13-19	2015,	p.	46ff.	(online	at:	http://
www.economist.com/ news/asia/21654124-myanmars-muslim-minority-
have-been-attacked-	impunity-stripped-vote-and-driven).
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most important component in talking about responsibility for 
something is missing simply due to the essence of humans, i.e., 
without	specific	actions.	Such	an	accusation is therefore just as 
groundless as the pure accusation of attitude	without	an	act:	
Where no act is present, there can also be no responsibility as-
signed.114
All of this is completely recognized almost everywhere in 
the world. The result is that collective moral responsibility can 
no longer be assigned solely on the basis of consanguinity or 
other ethnic group characteristics. This is, without a doubt, 
great cultural progress because for earlier societies around the 
world it was the general rule (whereby responsibility was not 
distinguished as moral or legal).
But what have we actually overcome in the social dynam-
ic?  From the lowest family level, the situation looks relatively 
good. No one thinks anymore about making a whole family 
responsible - either criminally or civilly - for the acts of one of 
its members. Although we do think about making a secondary 
moral accusation at the family level. Families are small enough 
to be able to deal with every act contributed by each member. 
That’s why the tendency to make a broad collective accusation 
is less. At the national level and that of ethnic	affiliation	things	
look	quite	different.	Ethnically	motivated	violence	flares	up	ev-
erywhere in the world and looms as a constant tension, even if 
no current violence is being exercised.115 However, that doesn’t 
change anything about the world-wide consensus of non-rec-
114	 Of	 course,	 it	 can	 be	 asked,	 what	 qualifies	 action.	 The	 laissez fair cases 
of neglect and negligence	 are	 notoriously	 difficult	 here.	 See	 details	 in	
Schulz-Schaeffer	[20027].	He	plausibly	shows	the	assignment	of	an	act	to	
an actor can be shown as purely normatively-based for a great part, i.e., 
not independently of norms. However, by itself, it in no way discredits 
the	specific	assignment	of	action.	The	necessity	of	an	explanation,	rather,	
becomes	the	justification	of	the	norm.	Generally,	the	justification	of	a	norm	
has to be dealt with completely independent of the assignment of an ac-
tion to an actor.
115	 See	the	article	by	Andreas	Wimmer	and	Conrad	Schetter	 in	Heitmeyer/
Hagan	[2002],	p.	312ff,	and	on	the	emergence	of	specific,	very	aggressive	
uprisings with ethnic backgrounds in Horowitz	[2001]
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ognition of collective responsibility based only on ethnic	affil-
iation.
5.9 No equality in injustice
In addition to the preceding arguments that are meant to justify 
collective	 responsibility	 but	 insufficiently	 so,	 a	 reverse	 argu-
ment deserves mention for the sake of completeness. This con-
cerns	the	frequent	attempt	by	the	attacked	to	invalidate	moral	
accusations with evidence that other participants (whether in-
dividuals, groups, ethnic groups, nations or states) would also 
have acted in morally reprehensible ways. The accusation lev-
ied against them is ‘unfair’ or ‘hypocritical’ for this reason and 
therefore	not	justified.	I	mention	this	objection	only	for	system-
atic reasons, not in relation to certain customs or moral content. 
It	is	not	about	specific	moral	values	or	norms,	but	only	about	
the type and means, and whether these are applicable in the 
form of a general accusation of a majority of people because of 
their	(apparent	or	real)	defiance	or	violation. It is also import-
ant to know whether any moral accusation can be invalidat-
ed	by	other	parties	who	have	not	been	attacked	but	have	been	
guilty of the object of the accusation against the other party, or 
even the accuser itself has been guilty of it. 
Such an invalidation of an accusation is basically not possi-
ble.  However, this only applies to the method of defense itself. 
Of course, a practical weakening of the actor in the respective 
dispute is also possible with logically unsuitable means.116 Even 
though in these cases the objection is not valid in principle – as 
I will show shortly – it is still not only possible but in fact fre-
quently happens that the accusing party completely disregards 
the accusation, or at least considerably retracts its intensity, 
116 One could call all the participants in the discourse unfair if they purpose-
ly argue in absurd, illogical, misleading etc. ways to weaken their oppo-
nents. Such considerations at a discursive ethical level, however, are not 
treated here.
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when it appears inopportune and could possibly also be used 
against them. But then it is only a consequence of the practical 
dynamics of social dispute and not based on the discursive core 
of the argument.
The	reason	for	such	principle	invalidity	of	efforts	at	deflec-
tion which violate the well-known principle of ‘no equality in 
injustice’ (or unfairness), is the general construction of the ac-
cusation of violating rules. It is also independent of whether 
the accusation is a formal legal one, a moral individual one or 
a collective one. If the rule of conduct in question applies at 
all between accuser and opponent, a logical relationship aris-
es that generally excludes a comparison with other behaviors 
within the statement of value. The accusation that a norm has 
been violated is exclusively in regards to the behaviors sub-
sumed under the norm and not in regards to the comparison of 
certain behaviors with other behaviors. If the subsumption of 
the behavior challenged results in a violation of a norm, this is 
a social fact that only results from the concept of the norm. One 
cannot simply eliminate this fact by referring to another norm 
violation.
This applies in an even greater degree when the validity of 
the violated norm is contested and its validity for the accuser 
is still upheld. The case may sound absurd but it’s not all that 
seldom.117 Nevertheless, the same thing applies here as above: 
The validity of a norm is always determined at the cost of the 
concrete,	specific	contents.	If	the	contents	justifies	a	moral	accu-
sation, that principally does not change the behavior of other 
parties.
These considerations conclude the overview of the usual jus-
tifications	for	collective	moral	responsibility	as	well	as	a	useless	
attempt	to	deflect	it.
117	 In	such	cases,	the	party	under	attack	may	invoke	conditions	which	apply	
to	them	but	not	to	the	attacker	for	apparent	wrongdoings,	such	as	self-de-
fense or similar.
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I’ve	 already	 briefly	 discussed	 the	 difference	 between	 inten-
tion and purpose above.118 Sociology views the purpose of a 
behavior as the decisive characteristic for qualifying behavior 
as an act. But the expression of purpose has another and very 
important consequence beyond that. Organizations emerge to 
the extent that purposes become collectively agreed upon and 
concrete beyond the individual intentions of individual people. 
But, in turn, a strict separation must be made between an orga-
nization as the continuous pursuit of an objective independent-
ly of the many individuals executing it and the individual 
people themselves who ‘carry’ the organization, i.e., who con-
tinuously realize its purpose. Corporate bodies are the formal 
objectification	of	an	organization	as	a	uniformly	acting	actor	be-
cause they necessarily must have a purpose, even if this is only 
unspecific	and	general.	The	means	for	setting	up	and	maintain-
ing organizations are commitments to certain purpose-guided 
behaviors. This applies for all actors to the extent that they are 
active in an organized framework. A commitment to certain be-
haviors is a type of norm. But, distinct from informal/practical 
or moral norms outside of organized activities, they are explicit-
ly for fulfilling the purpose of an organized group: The member of 
the organization is obligated to contribute to the achievement 
of the organization’s purpose through appropriate, supportive 
behavior.	 ‘Explicitly’	 here	means	 that	 they	 are	defined	 in	 an	
authorized and verbal form, whether through a directing au-
thority or the power of an agreement. One of the most common 
types of commitment to this kind of behavior is the typical em-
ployment contract. Even membership in groups or associations 
where the commercial aspect is subordinate, almost always en-
tails	such	commitments	to	behavior,	although	at	different	levels	
of intensity. Membership in a religious community is a partic-
118 See p. 15f. above.
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ular	type	of	commitment.	Usually	members	aren’t	committed	
to	performing	an	activity	as	much	as	committing	to	a	way	of	
thinking	(if	the	financial	contribution	part	is	disregarded).	This,	
of	course,	is	difficult	to	control.	Since	the	members	of	such	com-
munities usually share common religious beliefs, the behavior-
al commitment (in this case, an inner one) is actually prior to 
the external commitment which occurs through joining. Things 
are similar for membership in a political party or trade union, 
even if it is in a form mixed with more practical expectations for 
action.
It is these collectively communicated and constantly updat-
ed world views and the informal behavioral commitments that 
emerge from them that give rise to, and subsequently support, 
the explicit norms that are the core layer of objective social 
structure and ultimately all types of organizations.  They are 
formed at the lowest, practical level of daily living and are con-
stantly under revision, often imperceptibly, for individuals. An 
organization of actors, however, does not immediately imply 
a corporate entity. An organized association of actors only be-
comes a corporate entity in its most autonomous form. Simple 
organizations starts already, for example, at the inter-familial 
level, far below that of the corporate body.
6.1 No collective responsibility without inner organization
The	group	qualifies	as	a	collective	through	its	inner	organiza-
tion (see Fig. 4 above (p. 31). Every preceding social form here 
provides a general wealth of practically applicable, informal 
norms upon which any organization can build. Even informal 
moral	norms	are	only	effective	 to	 the	extent	 that	 their	valid-
ity is collectively recognized and informal, socially coercive 
means of enforcement exist.119 For example, one could imagine 
119 For example, in certain social circles it is still seen as awkward when an 
unmarried woman becomes pregnant. During Theodor Fontane’s time, in 
his famous novel Effi Briest, it meant complete isolation for such a ‘fallen’ 
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a	group	of	people	with	a	well-	defined	identity	acting	quasi	as	
membership but without any inner organization, such as a reli-
gious community	with	fixed	beliefs,	rituals,	etc.	with	no	central	
leadership and administrative structure. In a certain way, both 
the Islamic and Buddhist religions (in contrast to the Catholic 
Church) are such collectives. Their members usually maintain 
a clear and often strong identity, i.e., their concept of belong-
ing to the community in question. But no one would consider 
collectively accusing Buddhists worldwide of something such 
as the racist propaganda that certain Buddhist monks in Myan-
mar made against the Islamic Rohingya living there. A similar 
plea is currently being made for the world’s Islamic communi-
ty in that they should not be made liable for the atrocities com-
mitted	by	 Islamic	 terrorists.	 In	both	cases,	 the	 justified	argu-
ment is this: Of course, the religious community has a strong 
(religious) identity, but: the central organization which it cre-
ated,  which is a prerequisite for the wrongdoings to be labeled 
as actions by members of this collective, is lacking. Identity and 
the	organization	of	a	collective	are	two	different	prerequisites,	
both of which must exist in order to assign responsibility to a 
collective.
The	 latter	 case	 of	 the	 Islamic	 faith	 community brings out 
the lack of clarity and sensitivity in which we are operating. 
Because, in fact, many accusations have been made against 
this community of faith which do not contain an assignment 
of guilt	for	specific	acts	of	terror	but	do	have	an	accusation of 
ignorance towards their generic normative culture. This could 
be the primal ground for the obvious growth of such offender	
profiles	and	groups	produced	among	them.	Since	the	Islamic	
community in our example is lacking a central organization, it 
woman. Today, such cases may still not be viewed with particular enthu-
siasm, but there are no longer the moral repercussions which appear to 
be generally accepted in the late 19th Century. This means that the moral 
norm has become ‘toothless’. It then gives way to more sober arguments, 
such	those	about	economic/financial	disadvantages	for	the	single	mothers,	
etc.
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can only follow that the responsibility assigned through such 
an accusation is not more – nor less – than an urgent call to each 
individual member of the faith community to review its own 
convictions and life practices, now and in future, for the possi-
bility of legitimizing the emergence of such wrongdoings (acts 
of terror, in this case) and thus, at least indirectly, supporting 
them. However, such an accusation is clearly beyond the range 
of the issue in question here. It is not based on any plausible, 
justifiable	collective	responsibility	of	all	Muslims	for	the	terror-
ist behavior of some Muslims.
6.2 Collective shame as an indication of collective responsibility
Incidentally, it also follows from this that just because individ-
ual members subjectively feel shame for collective wrongdoing 
or, in reverse, hate from members of the opposite side without 
reviewing the conditions for collectively uniform action, there 
is still no certain indication that, in fact, collective responsibil-
ity exists. However, the existence of such a feeling of shame or 
hate is a certain indication that the collective of actors involved 
– even if they did not act uniformly – are already close to the 
limit where, if it is exceeded, simply rejecting any collective re-
sponsibility could no longer be credible or conceptually tenable.
For shame is felt only when one thinks that one should have 
behaved	differently	than	one	actually	did.	However	shame,	for	
example, as a German felt for the crimes of the German mili-
tary in World War II or as an American felt for the torture of 
prisoners by the American government and the CIA after the 
events of September 11, 2001, was not directly based on an in-
dividual’s own behavior but rather primarily on the behavior 
of	the	collective	with	which	the	individual	identifies.	This	may	
imply that there is indeed an organizational structure that in-
duces the feeling of shame in the individual. The converse here 
could also be a reason why, for example, the Islamic communi-
ty has not felt collective shame for the limitless terror repeated-
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ly	committed	by	its	members.	The	organizational	‘transmission	
belt’ that could enable such a transfer of organized, and thus 
collectively	uniform,	action	to	the	shameful	identification	of	in-
dividual members of the faith community is simply lacking. So, 
while shame is not evidence for the existence of the condition 
mentioned, it is an important indication.
The norm-based and collectively purposeful organization of 
a majority of actors is only suitable as a criterion for assigning 
moral responsibility if the organization has already taken on 
a corporate life of its own. In this case, however, the ‘carrier’ 
collective – i.e., all of those human actors that carry a corporate 
entity	in	any	way	–	are	qualified	as	morally	responsible	for	the	
actions of its corporate superstructure.
6.3 Individual responsibility for collective norms
We are now faced with the question of how a behavioral norm 
can even take on general validity on a level or to an extent that is 
crucial for the maintenance of an organization. The widespread 
distribution and change of a behavioral norm, for instance, 
across the entire society, is a complex and frequently very slow 
process. The origin of such processes, however, can be found 
in certain basic functions at a microsocial level that is directly 
understandable by each one of us. James S. Coleman offers	one	
of the strongest explanations in his theory of the emergence of 
norms as part of the unidirectional transfer of a person’s be-
havioral controls to one or more other people, such as other 
corporate actors.120 Coleman describes typical groups121 – from 
his point of view –  as informal, i.e., not uniform actors whose 
coordinated	behavior	is	simply	the	result	of	behavior	patterns	
that can be analyzed using elementary game theory.  As part of 
the negotiation or informal consensus regarding authorization 
120 Coleman	 [1994],	 especially	 p.	 65	 ff.	 (“Authority	 relations”)	 and	 145ff.	
(“Fom Authority Relations to Authority Systems“)
121 Coleman’s terminology and mine do not completely match here. He does 
not clearly distinguish between groups and collectives. The distinctions I 
use for this can be seen in Fig. 4 (p. 31).
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for the control of the behavior of one person by another person, 
stable behavioral norms ultimately emerge.122
However, it’s important to distinguish between two types of 
groups in regards to the effectiveness	of	the	norm:	that	which	
complies with the norm and that which does not. Comply-
ing with norms normally does not result in either a legal or a 
moral responsibility for the norm addressee. Everything else 
would be absurd because norms demand compliance by the 
addressees. Responsibility regularly occurs only when there 
is noncompliance with a norm. But here too, social reality is 
more complicated. Responsibility arising from (primarily) 
norm compliance rarely occurs where the norms themselves 
are morally unacceptable.  In such cases, those who have set 
the norms and prevailed over their addressees by way of an 
organizational path are regularly made responsible.123 Starting 
with the Nuremberg Trials up until the many later war crime 
tribunals, including the well-known case against Adolf Eich-
mann in Jerusalem in 1961, the accused always try to justify 
their actions in such situations by referring to the orders they 
were given and the applicable norms under which their actions 
were simply compliance. This was also exactly the question in 
the so-called Mauerschützenprozesse (Berlin wall trials) which 
dealt	with	the	fatal	shootings	of	persons	fleeing	the	GDR	for	
West Germany by GDR soldiers posted at the east-west border.
122 Coleman	says:	“[A]	norm	concerning	a	specific	action	exists	when	the	so-
cially	defined	right	to	control	the	action	is	held	not	by	the	actor	but	by	oth-
ers.	By	the	definition	of	authority,	this	means	that	others	have	authority	
over the action, authority that is not voluntarily vested in them, either uni-
laterally or as a part of an exchange, but is created by the social consensus 
that placed the right in their hand.” (Ibid, p. 243)
123 The legal issue of this trial was about the applicability of the so-called Rad-
bruch Formula whereby even formally valid legal standards are no longer 
a right in the end and consequently may also not be followed if they are 
“unbearably unfair” or do not even pursue the aim of establishing justice 
(Radbruch [1946]). The Radbruch Formula, however, led to a reproach 
against the primary, norm-compliant actor in the end because he ought to 
have known – just as those who set up the disputed norms ought to have 
known – that they should not have been complied with.
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This is a short legal philosophical digression on a still ongo-
ing discussion as to whether it should be possible to ultimately 
surpass positive law by natural law arguments. Natural law 
argumentations	 suffer	 from	 the	 aftertaste	 of	 a	 pseudo-meta-
physical arbitrariness that ends up calling upon world view ax-
ioms. It’s not that I am opposed to such axioms, especially not 
because they are the prerequisite for any orientation in the so-
cial world; otherwise even such a fundamental term as ‘human 
rights’ would no longer have any core. However, we should re-
alize that such axioms are ultimately dependent on culture and 
therefore	should	be	historically	and	sociologically	justified.
 Moral ideas developed and established over centuries can, 
in fact, not be repealed with just a signature by legislators. Even 
today’s democratic collective legislator is not in the position to 
change a moral consensus that has been built up over a long pe-
riod of time simply by making a legislative decision. In addition, 
as a consequence of Kant’s concept of reason, legislators are also 
required to eliminate possible inconsistencies in the entire body 
of norms contained in a legal system. This is a purely formal 
categorical imperative, not at all an appeal to natural law.
Taken together, these meta-arguments, i.e.,
a) the respect for long-term fundamental moral ideas continu-
ing through many generations of a cultural group and
b) the imperative of consistency between individual norms, 
were	sufficient	to	solve	the	criminal	problems	in	the	Nurem-
berg trials, such as the Nazi crimes and similar so-called state 
system crimes, in spite of the lack of concrete international le-
gal prohibitions; in other words, as a foundation for the spe-
cific	point	of	prosecution.124 The Swiss legal philosopher Hans 
Reichel	had	already	formulated	this	better	in	1915	than	Gustav	
Radbruch in regards to social loyalty: “The judge is obligat-
124	 The	specific	point	of	prosecution	against	the	24	main	defendants	was:	(1)	
Conspiracy, (2) Crimes against peace, (3) War crimes, (4) Crimes against 
humanity,	 see:	 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_trials#Over-
view_of_the_trial
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ed,	by	virtue	of	his	office,	to	deliberately	deviate	from	a	legal	
provision,	if	that	provision	conflicts	with	the	moral	feeling	of	
the community in such a way that by its compliance the au-
thority of justice and law would be considerably more endan-
gered than by its abolition.“ [“Der Richter ist kraft seines Amtes 
verpflichtet, von einer gesetzlichen Vorschrift bewusst abzuweichen 
dann, wenn jene Vorschrift mit dem sittlichen Empfinden der Allge-
meinheit dergestalt in Widerspruch steht, dass durch die Einhaltung 
derselben die Autorität von Recht und Gesetz erheblich ärger gefähr-
det sein würde als durch deren Außerkraftsetzung.”]125
Equally valid: if one wants to assign moral responsibility to an 
actor for establishing or complying with a norm, it is necessary to 
show that another, unavoidably higher ranking norm was violat-
ed. Such higher ranking norms can, however, exceed the limits of 
norm levels, especially if one invokes a practically unsurpassable 
social consensus such as human respect. That means that even 
positive legal norms can be surpassed by informal, moral norms 
and	not	only	in	extreme	cases	of	basic	social	significance.	Such	cas-
es are more frequent in everyday life than might seem apparent 
at	first	glance.	This	includes	so-called	vexatious behavior which 
is behavior that is formally correct but, under the existing circum-
stances, perceived as arbitrary or privately aggressive. In such 
cases, hierarchies of moral norms are applied which go beyond 
formal levels of validity. While the bullied citizen may not always 
formally persevere in the face of positive law, nothing changes in 
regards to the reasonable perception of injustice. And usually, this 
is	only	accepted	if	it	is	relatively	insignificant.	If	one	is	the	target,	
one sighs and then somehow tries to get beyond the humiliation.
The	most	fundamental	norm-setting	group	that	elicits	moral	
responsibility for the community through compliance should 
be the people existing within the same social sphere of friends 
and enemies, not some group that commands or prohibits indi-
vidual or group behavior.126
125 Reichel [1915], p. 142.
126 Practically all governmental criminal provisions are ultimately based on 
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I’ve already discussed this above in reference to the so-
cio-ontological	 findings	 of	 Panajotis	 Kondylis.127 So we are 
now	facing	a	significant	dilemma:	Namely,	if	classifying	peo-
ple on the ‘friend-enemy’ scale is a fundamental function of 
all human social orientation (whereby this scale is naturally 
to be seen as a continuum with ‘absolute friend’ at one end 
and ‘absolute enemy’ at the other), then we cannot turn the 
fact	that	humans	undertake	such	classifications	and	then	place	
binding norms on others into an accusation. At the same time 
it is exactly this normative decision – at least when it turns into 
a negative extreme such as “you’re my (absolute) enemy!” – 
that is a central moral pivot point for the accusation against 
any collective that promotes, or even realizes, such normative 
patterns	of	judgment.
Such	a	distinction	between	people	and	their	objectification	as	
social	norm	is	at	the	bottom	of	the	idea	(which	has	been	wide-
spread in modern times ever since Thomas Hobbes and Nicco-
lò Machiavelli) that this is the primary orientation	pattern	for	
this division. Naturally, a paragraph in the penal code that makes a penal-
ty for stealing, for example, does not refer to a friend or enemy but simply 
to	the	thief.	But	the	justification	for	the	legal	disapproval	is	ultimately	that	
the	person	who	committed	the	wrongdoing is – at least at the time when 
the	act	was	committed	–	a	violator	of	legal	order	and	thus	was	in	oppo-
sition to the legally bound community and deserving of a penalty. This 
applies	very	explicitly	to	those	offenders	that	are	defined	as	an	enemy	of	
the state and prosecuted.
127 See section 5.7 above, footnotes 107 and 108. Kondylis’s very provocative 
position could be called ‘radical stoicism’ or even outright moral nihil-
ism. He himself calls it ‘descriptive decisionism’. Of course, one has to 
separate the question of whether or not people are primarily oriented to a 
friend-enemy scale from the further question of the ethical and moral con-
sequences.	This	latter	question	won’t	be	discussed	here.	I	would	simply	
like to argue with Kondylis that his approach, as presented in Macht und 
Entscheidung, completely misappropriates the human capacity for empa-
thy. This doesn’t disprove his thesis that humans are fundamentally ori-
entated to the friend-enemy scale, but it does at least relativize his very ap-
odictically presented statement that all assertions of value and all ‘ought’s 
(his so-called ‘normativistic thinking’) are ultimately only derived from 
the scale and a drive for self-preservation and power (which is practically 
the same for him). That seems to me to really shortchange the conditio hu-
mana.
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all humans among their equals. It may sound crude or arbitrary 
to suggest elevating such a ‘friend-enemy’ scale to the level of 
a fundamental tool of social orientation. But one should not 
take exception to the words ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ too quickly. It 
harbors not only the widespread, ultimately materialistic view 
that	humans	are	first	and	foremost	always	trying	to	reach	their	
anticipated	benefits.	Even	more,	it	includes	those	areas	where	
humans act in a value oriented way and tend to shove those 
people who go against their (supposed) values to the negative 
side of the ‘friend-enemy’ spectrum. In other words, we are 
dealing with a socio-ontological axiom that is in no way sim-
ply	some	specific	ideological	pre-attitude	but	rather	something	
that can be applied to almost all imaginable socio-ontological 
perspectives we can think of. It is, however, suitable ad hoc as a 
signpost for justifying a collective accusation (and subsequent 
moral responsibility), such as the propagandized division of 
people to the extreme end of the scale. In other words, certain 
people become stamped as objects of hatred or serious deval-
uation. That fact that enemies are practically exclusively the 
‘others’ (whoever they might be) in such cases is trivial. No one 
can designate himself as his own absolute enemy in everyday 
life unless he wants to be thought of as crazy.
So here we have added a single, and not particularly clear, 
ethical material criterion for establishing a collective norm as 
incriminating: The intuitive plausibility of such a judgment in-
creases	to	the	extent	that	the	normative	classification	of	other	
people tends towards the extreme end of enemy on the scale.  Of 
course,	such	a	justification	of	imputability	for	collective	norms	
naturally has objections. We must exclude all cases where the 
people who are marginalized as extreme or even absolute ene-
mies provide the irrefutable grounds themselves. The standard 
case	here	is,	again,	a	state	that	makes	an	offensive	attack,	in	par-
ticular, when this happens as an explicit sign of a ‘total’ war, 
such as, for example, the Nazi propaganda. A state (and the 
partner[s] behind it) that could do something like this would 
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find	it	difficult	to	deflect	the	accusation of collective guilt for 
the wrongdoing simply because they feel like they have been 
‘immorally’ labeled as extreme enemies: They were the ones 
who provoked the reaction. But: Here, too, the lines are very 
unclear	and	fluid.	During	the	decades	of	conflict	between	the	
Israelis and the Palestinians, each has continued to accuse the 
other of collective responsibility for the continued existence of 
the	conflict	with	cries	of	great	indignation. How can it be un-
ambiguously decided whether one of the sides alone, or simply 
primarily,	actually	provoked	the	conflict?	
Because: In spite of all ambiguity and empirical indecisive-
ness, the criterion of normative accountability is usable. There-
fore,	we	can	refine	this	idea	by	encumbering	the	collective	that	
nurtures such an extreme enemy image with the burden of 
proof for justifying such a bogeyman. If a group cannot con-
vincingly	present	a	justification	for	its	judgment	of	a	necessar-
ily	large	forum,	it	creates	a	significant	indication	of	incriminat-
ing	and	accountable	collective	patterns	of	judgment	in	terms	of	
each one of its members.
6.4 The collective organization as an independent 
unit of purpose for the collective
When	social	patterns	of	judgment	become	normatively	objec-
tified	(no	matter	how	extreme	they	are	from	the	beginning	or 
how they develop over time), they are regularly furnished with 
suitable organization for implementation by the collective. 
What interests us here is only those organizational consequenc-
es that can lead to collective responsibility. It is important that 
a	normatively	based	 justification	 for	collective	 responsibility,	
according to Coleman, requires a standing organization. I ba-
sically agree with this approach. But it must be emphasized 
that	 moral	 patterns	 of	 judgment,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	
organizational provisions for their enforcement on the other, 
always emerge interactively, i.e., jointly, or uno actu. That is 
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the	only	way	that	the	usual	objection	of	what	came	first	can	be	
sidestepped.	According	to	the	classification	upon	which	this	is	
based128,	such	an	organization	first	emerges	at	the	level	of	the	
human collective. Non-symbolically based social structures 
can already be found among many types of animals, even if 
just as a purely biological type. Human sociability, on the other 
hand, continues the structure and practice of all of its symbolic 
behavioral norms by adapting the norms to real life, explicitly 
eliminating	superfluous	ones	or	simply	forgetting	them	and	in-
venting new norms when needed. Thus it follows that the so-
cial structure of humans is not identical with its abstract, i.e., 
norm-based, social organization.
Coleman’s definition	of	a	norm129, mentioned above, is ge-
neric: It describes the existential conditions for norms. How-
ever, because of their stable existence, we tend to interpret 
norms as autonomous entities which can be called upon as 
needed.	Norms,	in	the	sense	used	here,	are	primarily	written	
or at least conventional, unambiguous rules of conduct which 
we are generally required to comply with beginning as chil-
dren and their validity is rarely contested. Thus they include 
not merely statutory law. A normative pool of collective re-
sponsibility is, incidentally, always limited to a homogeneous 
cultural circle. Social norms have existed as cultural indexes 
from the very beginning.130 The old issue of natural law re-
garding the existence of universal codes of conduct, which 
was revived after World War 2 under the special term ‘human 
rights’, is also not an obstacle in this regard. (As a digression, 
128 See Fig. 4 on p. 31
129 See footnote 121.
130 This brings up the question of the application of western concepts of hu-
man rights to other cultures, for example, as part of the judgment of Japa-
nese war crimes against the Asian neighbors they invaded. Such questions 
frequently can be explained by referring to the inconsistencies in the norm 
structure within the perpetrating collective. A society that sees itself as 
fundamentally obliged to equality among all people cannot invoke a cor-
responding law that is contrary to such a traditionally evolved and thus 
legally	inaccessible	social	consensus	in	the	event	of	specific	atrocities.
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it also completely dismisses the possibility of universal hu-
man obligations or, at most, indirectly permits via argumen-
tum ex contarario.) I am not claiming any kind of culturally 
dependent universal validity for my theses in what follows. 
Apart from the fact that the question of collective responsibil-
ity is always concentrated on obligations rather than entitle-
ments,	I	first	make	the	arguments	developed	here	applicable	
only to those cultural circles whose social traditions obligate 
them to these arguments.
Groups	are	qualified	as	organized,	purpose-oriented collec-
tives	by	setting	additional	norms.	In	real	life,	this	happens	in	
a	fluid	development	process.	The	following	illustration	shows	
roughly how the general pool of social norms ultimately cre-
ates	differentiated	specific	appropriations	of	an	organized as-
sociation (the ‘collective’) and, at the end, by adding to it (see 
Fig. 5).
Fig. 5: The Norm Pyramid: Specialization and transformation 
into an organization.
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It is well noted that not every form of organization possible 
in a collective is part of its uniform corporate organization. We 
will	see	that	it	is	first	the	added	creation	of	the	unity	of	the	cor-
porate carrier for a collective that makes it possible to analyze 
it from the perspective of the individual’s participation in that 
collective	organization.	The	prototypical	unified	corporate	car-
rier of action for a whole society is the modern state.
To the extent that active participation in such an organiza-
tion already can plausibly justify the moral responsibility for 
the actions of this organization, it replaces the rarely met con-
dition of direct participation by the individual for collectively 
effected	actions	with	responsibility	for	its	indirect participation. 
All of the criteria mentioned for such indirect participation 
(membership, shared intentionality, common values, etc.) until 
now should basically provide exactly this according to the will 
of those who carry them out: An assignment of responsibility to 
the collective in general and, with that, to all individuals who 
identify with this collective or formally belong, regardless of 
whether they personally participated in the acts for which it is 
being accused. But, these criteria provide, at best, only addi-
tional conditions, not the decisive ones needed. This is because 
the	necessary	and	–	under	additional	conditions	–	sufficient	ar-
gument depends on the validity of the moral assignment, as I 
showed in section 5 above. All of the aforementioned criteria 
contribute references, indications or even evidence for build-
ing the bridge between individual and collective responsibility. 
But they do not provide the decisive argument that can be used 
to ultimately decide separately or together whether collective 
moral responsibility even exists.
The fundamental idea of this essay is that the corporate or-
ganization of a collective is basically the acting entity of a col-
lective but that the individual members of this collective have 
to stand for such corporate actors because they are its support-
ive bearers. The expression ‘collective responsibility’ would, 
accordingly, be to clarify that it does not refer to the respon-
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sibility of the collective as an autonomous actor because such 
actors do not even exist, as discussed earlier. The expression 
‘collective responsibility’ means much more than the shared 
responsibility of all of the individual members of a collective, 
analogously to what is called ‘joint tenancy’ or ownership (as 
already mentioned above in footnote 71) in the European civ-
il law terminology. Such a possibility, however, only becomes 
available under the proper conditions, conditions that are in 
fact frequently met.
The	first	trivial	condition	would	be	simply	speaking	of	a	so-
cial organization and that it actually exists in some form. As I 
mentioned above when discussing James P. Coleman’s repre-
sentation of the generic connection of organization in the cre-
ation and maintenance of social norms, we can speak of a social 
organization as a growing structure that emerges in the course 
of its development from being a carrier collective composed of 
individuals as supportive bearers to being a purposeful entity 
on its own whereby its carrier collective becomes subjected to it 
as vicarious agents. Both the state as a political corporate entity 
as well as the corporately organized economic enterprise are 
standard examples of such autonomization. In terms of state 
law, one does not speak of the purpose of a state but rather of 
the	objectives	of	a	state.	The	terminological	difference	between	
these two terms, however, is inconsequential to our context. 
The maximum possible autonomy for such an organization is 
achieved	when	it	becomes	recognized	as	a	unified	acting	entity	
and	thus	as	separate	from	the	specific	groups	of	people	who	en-
able the achievement of its goals or purposes. These are the cit-
izens,	politicians	and	officials	or	public	employees,	in	the	case	
of political corporate bodies, and the owners, management and 
employees in the case of commercial corporate entities.
The carrier relationship between the collective of individ-
uals and its corporate superstructure must continue to exist 
throughout its existence. Even foundations, as autonomous 
collections of assets, require at the least a foundation board to 
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be the persons who enable the continuous fulfillment	 of	 the	
foundation purpose. The carrier relationship between an or-
ganization and  concrete implementation becomes only more 
abstract when it is no longer bound to a biological individual 
but	rather	to	an	office	that,	in	extreme	cases,	only	exists	in	the	
corporate entity for the normatively structured entitlement and 
obligation relationship.
This has a structural consequence that we may intuitively 
know but which is – as far as I know –  never taken into con-
sideration when we speak of the moral responsibility of col-
lectives. It results on its own through the continuation of the 
organized collective when the collective has already spawned 
a corporately created, autonomous actor. This is exactly the 
phenomena that brings us to the idea, for example, that peo-
ple can be made responsible for the damages or war crimes of 
their state even beyond the state’s existence in the form that 
produced	the	damages.	Officially,	this	idea	may	be	presented	
as monetary war debt in the form of war reparations. The moral 
responsibility of a collective actor, however, goes far beyond 
the obligation of economic damages, as many historical events 
of collective violence show. The moral responsibility of Germa-
ny, which continues until today, is the ultimate example, and 
is clearly still understood as the responsibility of the Germans 
for the war atrocities and the Holocaust under Nazi rule. An-
other current and very contentious example of this is the mor-
al responsibility of Turkish society represented by the current 
Turkish government being held responsible for the Armenian 
genocide. 
With this I want to say that the decisive common feature 
of all of these situations is the corporate autonomization of a 
collective’s organization and the continued existence of this 
collective. Collective moral responsibility would therefore be 
borne not only by the corporate entity as a directly responsible 
actor but beyond that to the collective that carries the organiza-
tion (in formally extreme cases, a corporate entity) to an extent 
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to	be	more	exactly	determined.	This	qualifies	formal	situations	
such as those shown in Fig. 6:
Fig. 6: Continuation of the collective and autonomization 
of the organization (EO = emergence of norm-based organi-
zation, EK = emergence of corporate entity as autonomized 
organization purpose)
This illustration should clarify that the collective already 
emerges with the expression of an inner organization of a 
group.  However, collective moral responsibility can only 
emerge when there is also a corporate actor and actions for 
which the collective must vouch because it is the carrier of that 
corporate actor.
This assumes that a collective whose organization has be-
come corporately autonomous cannot cease to exist. This as-
sumption, however, should always be true because corporate 
entities without some kind of collective social carrier simply 
cannot be imagined. As the organization becomes ever more 
autonomous in the direction of corporate entity, a functional 
layer of connection is created that, in spite of a decrease in the 
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physiological connection between the corporate entity and its 
supportive individuals, ensures that the purpose of the orga-
nization will continue to be implemented. While the level of 
symbolic organization is a purely normative one, where the in-
teraction of the functions are independently regulated by the 
physiological functional carrier – i.e., below the corporate orga-
nization – the joint collective life continues. Both levels are me-
diated by classifying persons to functions; this is the so-called 
connection layer. The completely blackened areas in the illus-
tration at the left for the group and at the right for the corporate 
entity show the extremes of the sphere of uniformly acting indi-
vidual	actors	whereby	it	is	first	a	majority	in	the	group	or	a	sol-
itary entity as a corporate entity. However, multiple corporate 
bodies or natural persons and corporate entities often group to-
gether	in	social	practice.	Seen	this	way,	the	upper	stratification	
in the model can be continued by multiple corporate entities 
(and, if applicable, other natural persons) to form a sort of su-
per-unit of actor. This actually occurs very often, for example, 
in employer and business associations, internationally recog-
nized state federations and similar. But since such super-units 
of actors are also only corporate entities, such structural exten-
sions do not mean increased complexity because typologically 
no new units are being added.
What is important in the previous representation is the con-
tinued parallel existence of the original collective beyond the 
formation of a unit of corporate entity. If such a situation exists, 
the central prerequisite for the assignment of indirect moral re-
sponsibility to the carrier collective has been met. The impor-
tance of this relationship, which is clearly palpable for those 
involved,	can	first	be	seen	when	it	leads	to	conflict.	This	occurs,	
for example, when the employees of a company or the share-
holders of a large company suddenly join together in protest 
over a development of ‘their’ company. This occurs even more 
frequently with political parties and trade unions which are 
historically sui generis recognized as corporate bodies very late 
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in their development – and not accidentally. Here, corporate 
autonomy is still so weak that the carrier layer of the individu-
al members can ‘boil over’ at any time and protests can easily 
dominate the otherwise  autonomous purpose of the party or 
corporate entity.
6.4.1 The actualistic perspective
As illustrated in Fig. 6 above, we now have the analytic tools to 
justify why members who have only indirectly been involved 
in a collective can bear moral responsibility and not just the in-
dividual person or a corporate entity.
Collective responsibility is based on the corporate organiza-
tion of the collective, on the one hand, and the responsibility 
of the individuals for its creation and the enforcement of such 
organizational norms, on the other. As I already said in connec-
tion with James P. Coleman’s analysis of the concept of norms, 
every symbolic organization is dependent on norms. It is the 
only way to maintain the steady and stable fulfillment	of	the	or-
ganization’s purpose. And those actors who create and enforce 
the norms of the organization have an interest in this, otherwise 
they would not do it. In political reality, however, norms in the 
form of laws are no longer jointly created with the individual 
citizens but rather by their elected representatives. The situation 
is similar with large, international, publicly traded companies 
whose largest shareholders are usually huge fund companies 
and	whose	investors	have	no	direct	influence	on	the	actual	com-
pany. A large portion of the ‘real’ shareholders are represented 
with the proxy voting rights given to large banks.  At the time 
of casting their vote, the voting citizens and the shareholders 
represented by a bank do not know exactly which law will actu-
ally be enacted by the coming government or which corporate 
policy will actually be followed by the company in the future. 
In politics, the voter votes based on his trust in the proclaimed 
government	program	and	his	confidence	in	a	party	and	that	it	
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will also actually follow through on its program. In contrast, at 
the company level, it is primarily based on the highest probabil-
ity that assets will increase. This very indirect relationship be-
tween individual persons and a corporate entity naturally also 
significantly	weakens	a	possible	moral	responsibility.
However, it doesn’t completely disappear. It seems to be 
more of a gradually increasing or decreasing relationship, i.e., 
a long-term development of collectives that make it morally ac-
countable at the end in its manifest results. When a development 
occurs in a country that ultimately puts a government in power, 
which, in turn, follows a program that is in clear contradiction 
to the fundamental, long-term social traditions of a country, 
this	is	a	development	that	triggers	a	different	type	of	responsi-
bility	than	that	for	specific	laws	that	are	enacted	by	such	a	gov-
ernment. In a certain way, it’s as if everything would be wrong 
that made up such a government because its value system, its 
intentions,	its	thinking	and	finally,	whatever	ultimately	becomes	
concrete would be negatively colored. Each one of these points 
– the values, the intentions, the thinking – in interaction with the 
other	material,	qualifies	the	negative	value	of	the	actions	that	re-
sult therefrom. But they do not qualify the responsibility of the 
members of the collective for this action individually or jointly. 
Nor does the membership which is based on a rational decision 
or an evolved social identity (as I showed above) form a suitable 
criteria to formally justify such responsibility, even if some type 
of membership	and	identification	is	certainly	necessary	in	order	
to delimit the collective from the outside. But even if we have 
a distinct member, such as the employee of a company or the 
citizen	of	a	state	with	voting	rights	who	also	identifies	with	his	
company or government, it in no way follows that the value of 
that	company’s	or	state’s	action	would	be	morally	attributable	
the totality of its members. A formal bracket is missing here, or 
-	better	stated	-	 the	symbolic,	causal	connection	between	indi-
vidual and collective that is necessary to fuse all of the material 
criteria mentioned to such a conclusion.
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This symbolic-causal connection, even if only in a  substan-
tially weaker form than in the case of a direct actor, represents 
the formal participation of the individual in the whole of the 
norm apparatus. Every organization requires this for its exis-
tence to be maintained and continued. In particular, the active 
endorsement of this organization is required through contin-
uous membership or even active participation. No one can 
demand that a participant in a large organization knows all 
of	the	separate	norms	and	the	effect	they	will	have.	But	every	
participant can be required to have an integral picture of its to-
tality	and,	based	on	examples,	reflect	on	whether	the	manifes-
tation of the totality of ‘his’ collective is in congruence with his 
membership,	identification	and	participation.	In	other	words,	
an obligation on the part of such participating persons to con-
stantly address the Hobbesian problem: Would I still join this 
collective today, would I still freely identify with it, if I had the 
option? In order to answer this question, each individual must 
ideally go through the criteria mentioned above to review the 
state of his collective and determine whether at least the min-
imum has been met. If he arrives at a positive conclusion, for 
whatever	 reasons,	 he	 justifies	 the	moral	 responsibility	 of	 his	
person for the organized actions of the entire collective.131
This is an actualistic view of our original question. It does 
not	imply	that	a	human	individual	can	individually	influence	
the pool of norms adhered to by his collective. It only requires 
that he is capable of having a perspective on the norm-based, 
purpose-oriented organization of his collective and to integrate 
this into an overall picture which he can then mostly reject or 
accept. However, this general rejection or acceptance is what 
morally gives rise to a yes-no decision: The degree to which a 
person	decides	to	accept	his	specific	collective	leads	to	his	co-re-
sponsibility for what his collective jointly does as a result of its 
131	 For	an	ontological	justification	of	this	perspective	see	section	2.1	above	on	
the	explanation	of	the	two	different	meanings	of	the	expression	‘collective	
responsibility’.
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being organized. This requires a cognitively capable human. 
Children and mentally disabled people are therefore excluded. 
It is a technical and ultimately itself normative question on how 
to draw more precisely the boundaries between the ‘cognitive-
ly capable’ human and those who are deemed not be so.
The concept of collective responsibility presented here 
forces us therefore to a disambiguation in the sense of a yes-
no decision. That is usually self-evident and thus much more 
discreet when judging individual action. This decision is, in 
contrast, a clearly constructed – i.e., normative – one because 
it cannot rely on empirical details, otherwise it would become 
immediately mired in a notoriously undecidable thicket of de-
tail. Here a constant problem appears, for example, in criminal 
justice	when	judging	group	offenses.	As	far	as	I	know,	all	the	
criminal-law cultural circles of today’s world sanction, in one 
way	or	another,	the	criminal	offense	committed	by	a	plurality	
of	actors,	even	though	the	difficult	question	of	the	exact	par-
ticipation of the individual may not be entirely resolvable. Di-
rect participation in the act by individual members is certainly 
sought for in particularly outstanding features of the crime; but 
not when it comes to how the overall act came about. Basically, 
a judgment of collective wrongdoing requires that it must also 
apply when one cannot rely on the minutia and unambiguous 
findings	required	from	individual	participants	when	only	one	
individual perpetrator is involved from the beginning.  The 
overall context in which the individual is a participant, espe-
cially at the moment of the decision to commit the act, is much 
more	sufficient.132
132 Terminologically, there is no collective punishment for crimes under 
today’s German criminal law. Cases of majorities of perpetrators are 
handled under the concept of complicity. According to the basic idea 
anchored in § 25 para. 2 (German) Criminal Code, a perpetrator is to be 
punished based on his contribution as part of the other’s activity and that 
of the others as a supplement to his part in the act in a community decision 
to act; this follows from the consistent judicature such as that by the Fed-
eral Court of Justice in its ruling in the Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 
1998, 2149 f. with further references, or also the FCJ ruling from 25/3/2010. 
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6.4.2 Structural persistence
The actualistic	perspective,	however,	is	not	sufficient	if	we	con-
sider cases of national war crimes such as Germany under the 
Nazis or state organized genocide. In fact, the result which I call 
the actualistic responsibility follows from the inner analysis of 
the conditions of a collective. From the perspective of a third 
party, however, such collective conditions pull in further groups 
which then leads to the collective’s responsibility being placed 
even less on the directly participating individual actors, or, in 
the case of cross-generational responsibility, not at all. I call this 
feature structural persistence: If a collective creates an organiza-
tion and maintains it, the totality of such an organized collec-
tive, from the perspective of a third party, takes on the form of a 
uniformly acting actor without, for example, distinguishing be-
tween state and society, between a company and its employees, 
its shareholders, etc. This blending of the corporate entity with 
the carrier collective is wrong, as I showed in section 2.1. How-
ever, the reason for why companies such as Siemens or Deut-
sche Bank allow their responsibility to be investigated decades 
after the end of the National Socialistic government (and, like 
Siemens, even paid high reparations to former forced laborers 
of the company in the German concentration camps) is not just 
the formal identity of the involved company at the time of the act 
and today. From a formal point of view, all claims by the victims 
against the company are long past the statute of limitations. But 
it is the moral responsibility – not only of the continuing corpo-
rate entity but also of the participants that carry the current col-
lective – that allows a subjective feeling of guilt and, in parallel, 
an objective social accusation	to	continue	having	an	effect.133
That makes every contribution to the act by an accomplice included in the 
common plan to act accountable for the rest as its own (see the FCJ ruling 
from 2/2/1972; FSC 24, 286, 288 or FCJ ruling 8/11/1989).
133 From the autumn of 1944 on, my mother was a prisoner of conscience in 
the Ravensbrück concentration camp in Northern Brandenburg. There she 
had to help under constant mortal danger as a forced laborer in the adjoin-
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The same applies to Germany in general as it is still pro-
viding monetary reparations to Nazi war crime victims. Since 
there is no formal legal foundation for such claims to  repara-
tions,	and	Germany	of	today	is	also	socially	a	completely	differ-
ent one, the only motivation for reparations is the recognition 
of moral responsibility by the entire society as well as the Ger-
man state as quasi its organ of fulfillment.	What	else?	After	all,	
most of the current citizens of today’s Germany at the time of 
the crime were not even born and, from an actualistic perspec-
tive, cannot even be made morally responsible. The actualistic 
argument, however, overlooks the structural persistence that is 
only perceived when looking at the continued development of 
a collective from a certain distance. A ‘nation’ is surely not an 
ethnically based collective, even if the Latin origin of the word 
indicates that.134 But the formal citizenship of its members is so 
sharply outlined that the scope of structural persistence with 
regard to individual persons is very clear.
The example of national socialist Germany is remarkable in 
that its unconditional capitulation made a completely new be-
ginning possible which, according to general opinion, has been 
substantially successful even if it only happened over the suc-
ceeding decades. This capitulation was not just a military-eco-
nomic one. It was also an ideological one with equal intensity. 
Unfortunately, historically, this represents a big exception. The 
ing Siemens factory in the production of war weapons. At the beginning of 
this	century,	with	more	than	fifty	years’	delay,	the	Siemens	board	of	direc-
tors commissioned a group of historians to review the role of the company 
among the Nazis. As a result of this investigation, the company published 
in all major German (and perhaps also international) newspapers the in-
vitation to all former forced laborers to report to the Executive Board. At 
first,	my	mother	did	not	believe	that	after	such	a	long	time	she	would	still	
be granted recognition of Siemens’ wrongdoing. To our surprise, howev-
er,	she	received,	after	a	few	weeks,	not	only	a	written	apology,	personally	
signed by the board, but also a check over 10,000 euros. Since she was 
almost 90 years old, she said that the money was not of much value for her. 
The apology, however, was very important to her and moved her to tears.
134 See the fundamental contribution of Benedict Anderson regarding the 
modern concept of ‘nation’ in Anderson [1986].
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mid-20th century was one of the darkest in the history of man-
kind judged by today’s standards. Never before have so many 
people been cruelly murdered across such a large geographi-
cal and cultural distance in such a short period of time. Almost 
the entire Eurasian continent was in the worst kind of turmoil. 
In Asia, especially China and its southern neighbors, it lasted 
even through the late 1970’s. If the victims of the German, So-
viet Union and Chinese terror – from the Russian revolution 
to the violence of the Nazi, Stalinist and Maoist periods – and 
victims of the Vietnam	war	(first	led	by	the	USA,	then	between	
China and Vietnam) are counted together, the number is much 
more than 100 million politically motivated deaths. Unfortu-
nately, neither Russia nor China or even Japan have developed 
insight into their collective crimes. This would have been ur-
gently necessary considering the monstrosity of their contribu-
tions to the events. Instead, persistent repression and recurring 
national pride has dominated to the extent that sometimes deaf 
furor now exists. Even Germany would certainly not have ad-
mitted	its	guilt	in	the	events	on	its	own.	After	all	the	suffering,	
it was a rare case of historical luck that it was able to legislate 
a moral example and publicly recognize the collective actor 
without opposition.
If the moral responsibility had been exhausted in the actual-
istic perspective, it would have limited not only the obligation 
for reparation but also the moral responsibility to the life span 
(or formal existence) of the individual responsible during the 
times of the incriminating acts. According to the above analy-
sis,	this	includes	both	the	specific	people	who	implemented	the	
state organization of genocide as well as the corporate entity 
of the state itself under international law as uniform carriers 
of action. There is an asymmetry here. Individual human per-
petrators eventually die, but a state rarely falls or collapses.  In 
the case of National Socialist Germany, Prussia as a state and 
the core of the Deutsches Reich perished at the end of the war, 
but not Germany. Thus (and rightly so) the German people was 
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seen as the collective initiator and culprit of the war, organized 
as the German state.135
The individuals  forming the original perpetrator collective 
has meanwhile almost completely died out. But not the German 
state. It continues to exist with explicit international continui-
ty.136 The same applies for Turkey in the case of the Armenian 
genocide and many other cases137, although only to the extent 
that state organizations were involved. The asymmetry is sig-
nificant.	If	the	entire	state	of	the	perpetrators	group	goes	under,	
an objective link for assigning collective moral responsibility is 
gone. For example, the so-called German Democratic Republic 
(GDR, colloquial ‘East Germany’), was created as a new state 
after World War 2, so no claims for reparation were ever made 
against it, even though its citizens belonged to the perpetrating 
collective just as much as their western counterparts. There was 
a lot of political demagoguery and propaganda in play here. 
Because the GDR was under control of the Soviet Union, it was 
accorded ‘victim’ status in regards to German aggression (al-
though this was only after its industry had been largely dis-
mantled by the Soviet occupation).
While material restitution to human victims is limited to their 
life time, the moral responsibility is not bound by such limits. 
Incidentally,	in	historically	significant	cases	there	is	also	a		collec-
tive moral responsibility with respect to collective moral victim 
status. The Jews, the Armenians, the Tutsi and the Rohingya are 
examples of collective victims who also see themselves as such 
135 Daniel Goldhagen emphasized this in his book Hitler’s Willing Executioners 
(Vintage, New York) in 1996. The core thesis of the book on the collective 
responsibility of Germans for World War 2 and especially for the Holo-
caust was controversial but only because  more than 50 years had passed 
between the end of World War 2 and the appearance of the book.
136	 The	GDR,	in	contrast,	saw	itself	as	a	new	state	(“first	German	worker	and	
farming nation”) and for this reason rejected any responsibility for the ac-
tions of the Nazi time.
137 An incomplete list of the genocides of the last 150 years can be found at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide.	This	list	does	not	include	cases	of	
non-state organized genocide which do not fall under the arguments de-
veloped here for collective moral responsibility.
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and are granted this status by the world community without 
much ado.  This essay is primarily concerned with moral col-
lective perpetrators because these bring up questions which are 
more controversial. Basically, all of the formal questions raised 
here apply equally to collective victims with the exception that 
one	doesn’t	only	speak	of	responsibility	but	also	of	the	suffering	
caused them and consequently their claim to restitution.
A direct result of this parallel between collectives of per-
petrators and those of victims is that it is frequently just as 
difficult	to	assign	material	damage	claims	to	specific	human	
victims	as	it	is	difficult	to	assign	the	act.	And	so	instead,	rep-
arations are collectively granted, at least in part. Clearly such 
collectively paid assignments of both material damages and 
moral responsibility cannot continue endlessly. Otherwise the 
entire world’s history would have to be reconsidered under 
the aspect of damage compensation and the entire present 
world would drown in mutual accusations.	But	no	conflicts	
would be solved. Just new ones created. No one can perma-
nently ignore this pragmatic insight.
However, the actualistic perspective is factually too lim-
ited. How can moral responsibility138	 be	 justified	 based	 on	
structural persistence? This doesn’t have to do with just the 
factual assertion of assigning such responsibility but also, in-
directly, with its limits and thus ultimately the moral redemp-
tion that is so important. This is crucially important because 
an accusation doesn’t just stop from one day to the next, as it 
does with legal statutes of limitation, but rather tends to just 
slowly fade away.139
138	 The	difficult	issues	of	international	legal	material	damage claims will not 
be discussed here. What is interesting, however, is that material damage 
claims in the event of company liability may be subject to regular legal 
statutes of limitation, but, in the case of the German multinational Sie-
mens, was not explicitly claimed. It was more about material restitution 
for	moral	responsibility	which	apparently	is	subject	to	completely	differ-
ent rules than the civil right to compensation for damages.
139 The sense of moral responsibility can even resurge as it did in the case of 
Spain: A law was recently passed in Madrid in which the descendants of 
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6.4.3 Possible counter-examples of 
structural persistence
There are also counter-examples of structural persistence. If we 
think of a family with a criminal history that collectively com-
mits serious crimes, no one would think of holding the descen-
dants of such a family who took no part in the acts responsible 
for the crimes in most parts of the world today. This can also 
be concluded from the diagram developed above. Such family 
organization does not generate any moral responsibility for de-
scendants exactly because it doesn’t create its own, norm-based 
organization which is independent from the individual family 
members who implement its plan of action. However, for ex-
ample, the Italian Mafia	bosses	are	very	close	to	being	at	 the	
limit of collective responsibility.
A further example, mentioned above, is the GDR citizens 
who were not collectively responsible for the Nazi crimes even 
though, as a society, it had its own state organization (both parts 
of	Germany	first	joined	the	UN	on	September	18,	1973,	howev-
er).	But	this	state	was	newly	founded	and	thus	did	not	offer	an	
absolutely certain possible point of departure for the (partial) 
collective perpetrators of the GDR population. The example of 
the GDR, thus, does not disproved the hypothesis of structural 
persistence presented here. A shocking number of counter-ex-
amples, however, can be found in the recent past and present: 
France is still overwhelmingly proud of Napoleon even though 
his war cost the lives of millions and ended in complete nation-
al military defeat for France. After the First World War, Ger-
many did not have the slightest insight into its guilt. The USA 
struggled with great moral self-doubt during and after the 
Vietnam War, but recovered so quickly and completely that in 
Sephardic Jews were given the right to acquire Spanish citizenship with 
explicit reference to the historical responsibility of Spain for the expul-
sion of the Jews after 1492; see the report in the Spanish newspaper “El 
País”	 from	3/24/2015:	http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/03/24/	actu-
alidad/1427228176_525163.html
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2003 it had already started another war. The war against Iraq, 
which can only be seen as a crime in terms of human rights, 
killed uncountable victims during its military conquest of Iraq 
not to mention also as a result of the political chaos that result-
ed in the aftermath. The USA still rejects any responsibility for 
the poisoning of huge areas of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos 
with defoliation toxins and land mines. The Japanese deny any 
aggression against  Korea and China before or during World 
War 2. Even today, the highest ranking Japanese government 
offices	 repudiate	 it	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 angry	 and	 completely	
justified	indignation of the victims. France and England were 
primarily responsible for  destroying the state of Libya just a 
few years ago, allegedly for humanitarian reasons. The result is 
cruel: Libya is now a failed state	involved	in	permanent	conflict	
between sects and clans. However, neither the French nor the 
British	feel	moved	to	reflect	on	their	moral	responsibility	in	the	
case. Russia not only took over the factual political power in 
the formal Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
during the so-called Caucasus war in 2008 but also annexed the 
Crimea with gross contempt for applicable international law. 
It then immediately instigated a civil war in the Ukraine under 
cover of huge lies. The list can go on and on. Where is the moral 
responsibility here? It cannot be swept away by the collective 
perpetrators and executors simply through lying about their 
responsibility. The accusation	weighs	on	the	offending	states	as	
long as people don’t forget what happened. However, the on-
slaught of subsequent events makes it unavoidably fade with 
time.
6.5 The other side of collective responsibility
From the perspective of generally unatoned and often rudely 
denied collective aggression, national moral responsibility ap-
pears as a rare and necessary good, eagerly desired and yet so 
seldom. We see again and again how the recognition of moral 
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responsibility is the most important symbolic condition for any 
change in direction towards improvement in regions in con-
flict.		While,	on	the	one	hand,	even	the	expression	‘collective	re-
sponsibility’ can cause angst because we immediately think of 
ethnic cleansing and mass political persecution and ideological 
terrorism, the uncommon positive example of Germany’s de-
velopment after World War 2 and the many negative examples 
where moral responsibility is not acknowledged show us that 
collective moral responsibility can be a very important step in 
the social development of a society. Seen in this light, this essay 
is	an	attempt	to	increase	the	chances	that	a	collective	perpetra-
tor can more easily acknowledge responsibility. With an objec-
tive	clarification	of	the	conditions	and	possible	justifications	for	
collective moral responsibility, it no longer entails a loss of the 
entire	social	identity	but	rather	the	possibility	of	finding	ways	
to live with this responsibility and even overcoming it at some 
point	 in	 the	 future.	 Socio-psychologically,	 the	most	 difficult	
step of all at the beginning of such a developmental process 
is the acknowledgment by the entire perpetrator collective of 
the moral responsibility. Without this admission, the collective 
memory will not have release or forget.
6.6 Interim result
The ethical question of collective responsibility can be summed 
up by the following characteristics:
a) It is concentrated on the middle area, i.e., the overlap or in-
terface between human individual and corporate formally 
recognized actors, in other words, on the informal area where 
joint human carriers of action lie.
b) Assigning responsibility necessarily depends on the accusa-
tion of having violated applicable behavioral norms. To the 
extent that the assignment of responsibility is based on the 
accusation	of	fulfilling	certain	norms,	e.g.,	state	laws	of	injus-
tice or company directives in formal compliance with irre-
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sponsible consequences, the moral accusation must be based 
on a higher ranking norm that makes the contested, lower 
ranking one invalid.
b) Collective responsibility can be supported by other charac-
teristics of the involved collective such as those I explained 
at the beginning of this section. Their existence, however, is 
not	sufficient	alone	or	jointly	to	plausibly	justify	assignment	
of collective moral responsibility. These characteristics in-
clude membership in a collective which participates with an 
intension to implement the alleged acts, the causal participa-
tion in the success of the act, the value community and the 
social	 identification	with	 the	 collective	 being	 assigned	 the	
responsibility.
c) The collective itself is not a socio-ontologically independent 
entity. Correctly used, the expression ‘collective responsi-
bility’ means the responsibility of all individual members of 
a collective for the indirect acts of their own and all other 
acts by members of the collective, in other words, an over-
all general responsibility for the acts of its corporate actor. 
This separates the collective as a morally neutral structure 
of self-realization from such structural and system theory 
perspectives	and	objectifies	wrongdoing that is relevant to 
responsibility clearly enough so that there is no more room 
for a moral-normative judgment of the individual actor.140
d) The assignment of collective moral responsibility emphasiz-
es the obligation side of social commitment from a norma-
tive perspective. In contrast, the claim by the others as vic-
tims of possible wrongdoing are the focus of view of human 
rights. This is not what is being examined here.
e) The	 final	 argument	 for	 justifying	 collective	moral	 respon-
sibility arises from the continued existence of a collective 
140 This is not just my personal viewpoint. It’s also the main accusation 
against the French structural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss as well 
as against Niklas Luhmann in Germany, for example, by Jürgen Haber-
mas in the well-known dispute about positivism at the beginning of the 
1970’s.
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through to the level of a formally constituted entity, wheth-
er that be a state, a businesses or whatever. The individual 
member does not have to answer for the acts of its collective 
organization through direct participation or even through 
direct participation in establishing the norms that ultimately 
led to the behavior justifying responsibility. Much more im-
portant is that the individual member carries moral respon-
sibility for his collective as a result of his generally assumed 
capability	to	reflect	on	the	compatibility	of	the	overall	col-
lective development and behavior with the applicable and 
inaccessible moral traditions in his society and culture.
f)	Moral	responsibility	first	emerges	actualistically,	i.e.,	for	the	
collective	acts	that	were	directly	committed	by	the	collective	
to which the responsible member belongs. But this alone is 
not	enough	to	start	and	maintain	a	process	of	self-reflection	
with the long-term goal of sincerity in regards to the moral 
value of a collectives’ own behavior. Many historical exam-
ples have taught us that. This is why assigning collective re-
sponsibility is necessary in terms of a collective’s structural 
persistence.
7   Moral Responsibility of the Individual from an 
International Perspective
A very important area of application of the scheme developed 
here for judging moral responsibility concerns violent clashes 
between very large collectives, particularly between peoples 
and	nations,	or	as	is	often	simplified,	between	countries.	The	
law of nations, as its subjects, does not recognize individual 
people but rather only their corporate actors, i.e., individual 
states as claimants or defendants. Today, there are also some 
international organizations that are recognized as international 
subjects, such as the International Red Cross and the Holy See. 
There are also derived subjects under international law (‘elect-
ed’ not ‘born’). This group includes, for example, the United 
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Nations and the European Union and other organizations 
founded by genuinely international subjects as their own cor-
porate entity.
The arguments I’ve been developing here, which have al-
ready made a connecting bridge between a people, nation or so-
ciety to its state now become salient from an international point 
of view. There is an interior line separating the two that can be 
seen	positively	or	negatively:	Positively,	the	state	has	qualified	
since Hobbes as that instance which combines the wild egotism 
of	individuals	into	a	whole	that	benefits	all.	Negatively	seen,	it	
can become opposed to or even an enemy of its people, as Wolf-
gang Böckenförde141	warned,	and	with	very	good	justification.	
All states controlled by despots are historically extreme exam-
ples of this. Such cancerous social developments around the 
world are also things like an out-of-control secret police that 
basically sees its people as an enemy of its own state, in spite of 
those who think there is only seeing danger for inner security 
and do not recognize the risk of totalitarianism in comprehen-
sively monitoring by the state.
It is exactly this inner boundary that is not considered by 
the law of nations – either as a reason to legitimize the unity 
of the state actor or as an obstacle to legitimization when the 
necessary features for legitimation are lacking. There are his-
torical reasons for not considering this which ultimately go 
back to the self-evident creation of states through state domin-
ion in ancient history. If we ignore the few historical exceptions 
of small republic governments, such as classical Greece, state 
dominion142 has usually been based simply on factual domina-
141 See Böckenförde [1972]
142 State dominion is a relatively late phenomenon in the development of 
human	 sociality.	 The	 assumption	 today	 is	 that	 the	first	 states	 emerged	
around 3,400 years BC, favored by surpluses of food and other environ-
mental conditions, especially in the areas of south-eastern Europe, Asia 
Minor and the Levant. The chiefdoms, tribes and hunter-and-gatherer 
groups which existed as prior social forms were becoming less and less 
familiar with central authority. The smaller the number of individuals 
bound in a social group,the weaker the expression of dominating political 
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tion by ruling elites. This power of dominion does not require 
the agreement of the subjected but also does not automatically 
mean that the subjected feel oppressed. As far as I can see, sed-
entary people based on the division of labor – i.e., unlike hunter 
-gatherer societies – all over the world generally agreed that 
community life requires central leadership and an ordering 
authority to keep it from choking on individual egotism and 
chaotic behavior. The question of legitimizing such power of 
dominion is often secondary.
All ‘foreign policy’ or ‘international’ acts as we call them 
today, especially acts of war, are historically based on a com-
pulsory, organized inner relationship of command between 
the ruling elites and their subordinates. The rulers commanded 
from their often absolute power and the people were to obey. 
These elite arrogated speaking as the representative of an indi-
vidual actor for their subordinates in external relationships. So, 
in the end, there were– from this perspective – no longer indi-
viduals but rather peoples, nations and states that encountered 
each other as uniform actors. This corporate-uniform actor, 
however, is only the state itself.  People and nations, just as ‘so-
ciety’, are only accountable as carriers of collective acts because 
they	do	not	form	a	unified	corporate	agent	on	their	own	apart	
from ‘their’ state.
The question being considered here has curiously managed to 
escape scrutiny – like a kind of blind spot running also through 
Kant’s famous 1795 essay “On Perpetual Peace” (Zum Ewigen 
Frieden143) – even though it had been around for a long time be-
fore. It concerns the legitimation of a collective’s organization by 
enforcing its purpose among the supportive collective. This does 
not only apply to states. It is especially important to the extent 
that	these	purposes	do	not	directly	benefit	those	who	bear	the	
costs and burdens of their fulfillment,	i.e.,	during	times	of	Eu-
ropean absolutism and especially the onus of war undertakings 
power was, and still is. For more details see Bellah [2011].
143 See Kant [1923]
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and the luxurious life of the nobility. Even today, it may not be 
directly clear to the individual, non-managerial employee of any 
large corporation what the constant mergers and restructurings 
of a company actually do for him personally. Explaining the le-
gitimation for providing such tasks, objectives and purposes is 
also important from the point of view of assigning collective re-
sponsibility so that members of a collective cannot simply allege 
that, for example, they were steamrolled or physically forced by 
their government or corporate organization and for this reason 
they are relieve from any responsibility.
At the political level, this is urgently required in the relation of a 
state to its people, i.e., those assigned to it. Kant naturally discuss-
es the legitimacy of political authority in many places in his phi-
losophy. But he is primarily of the opinion that political authority 
is constitutive for the commonwealth and therefore should not 
justify itself in the exercise of this authority towards the com-
monwealth because it is this that even brings it into existence.144 
With that, he is directly following the tradition of Hobbes’ po-
144 At the beginning of Appendix I in his On Perpetual Peace he says: “Now it 
is	admitted	that	the	voluntary	determination	of	all	individual	men	to	live	
under a legal constitution according to principles of liberty, when viewed 
as	a	distributive	unity	made	up	of	the	wills	of	all,	is	not	sufficient	to	attain	
to this end, but all must will the realization of this condition through the 
collective	unity	of	their	united	wills,	in	order	that	the	solution	of	so	diffi-
cult	a	problem	may	be	attained;	for	such	a	collective	unity	is	required	in	
order that civil society may take form as a whole. Further, a uniting cause 
must supervene upon this diversity in the particular wills of all, in order 
to educe such a common will from them, as they could not individually 
attain.	Hence,	in	the	realization	of	that	idea	in	practice,	no	other	beginning	
of a social state of right can be reckoned upon, than one that is brought 
about by force; and upon such compulsion, Public Right is afterwards 
founded. This condition certainly leads us from the outset to expect great 
divergences in actual experience from the idea of right as apprehended 
in theory. For the moral sentiment of the lawgiver cannot be relied upon 
in this connection to the extent of assuming that, after the chaotic mass 
has been united into a people, he will then leave it to themselves to bring 
about a legal constitution by their common will.“ Incidentally, Francis 
Fukuyama claims that state authority in the form of aggression has to pre-
cede the emergence	of	order.	He	also	provides,	fittingly,	the	example	of	
Prussia compared to failed examples of other societies, such as Greece or 
southern Italy, backed up with historical data; see, Fukuyama [2014].
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litical philosophy and tendentiously contrary to Locke who sees 
legitimation of political authority ultimately as only based on an 
agreement of those who are subject to this authority.145
Although Kant elegantly interprets the relationship of the 
state in an enlightened way as a type of contract, and duly com-
ments on the individual provisos, he forgets that one of the 
most important achievements of the Enlightenment is not only 
the initial, but the continued legitimation of a state based on 
the Hobbesian tradition of thought.  It internally represents its 
people as their own power and externally represents its citi-
zens towards other states. More generally expressed: It is not 
at all self-evident that an organizational apparatus (a bureau-
cracy in Weber’s terminology) always represents the will of the 
collective that has brought it forth and continues to maintain it. 
However, from the outside, a human collective and its organi-
zational apparatus are both perceived as a unit. And Kant takes 
exactly this outside view implicitly in the article mentioned. 
However, this unit is not self-evident. I believe that the degree 
of that unity is an important index for determining the extent of 
responsibility that can be assigned to a collective.
Kant’s	attention	to	that	which	is	called	the	law	of	nations	to-
day already had a long tradition in his time. The above men-
tioned inner relationship of people and state organization or 
authority, however, is not a topic of international concern be-
cause the political unity, as seen from outside, is assumed to 
be so self-evident that the way it came about or its legitimation 
is	a	completely	different	topic.	The	history	of	this	‘other’	top-
ic begins in the new period of Hobbes’ social contract theory 
and with the scandal of Niccolò Machiavelli’s “Il Principe”.146 
Although the legitimation of a power of dominion (exclusive-
145 See Fabienne Peter und Edward N. Zalta’s instructive article titled “Politi-
cal Legitimacy” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 
Edition)	at:	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/
146 The extent that political theory has been a slave to Machiavelli over the 
centuries is well described by Friedrich Meineke in his still very instruc-
tive book Die Idee der Staatsräson (Meineke [1929]).
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ly thought of a monarchical power in its earlier form) is very 
questionable and, at least theoretically, never absolute, it is also 
a fact, legitimate or not. It was valid from the outside as be-
ing for or against the constitutive people far beyond the time of 
the European Enlightenment. This was also useful to a certain 
extent because the virtually ubiquitous state of war in Europe 
over the past thousand years and beyond didn’t allow anything 
different	in	so	far	as	the	political	entity	(one	could	only	rarely	
speak of ‘people’ in today’s sense of nation as a somewhat ex-
tremely small political order in the early new period of Europe) 
did not want to risk its own failure.
The concept of collective responsibility is more subtle in 
comparison. It does away with an internal pressure of contin-
uous expression of power or at least a threat from ‘above’, i.e., 
by the collective’s own organization. That means it no longer 
allows this normative and practical pressure a priori as a justi-
fication	for	the	exercise	of	power	in	the	name	of	organized	pur-
poses. The concept of collective responsibility does this by re-
viving the entire chain of reference back to its integral context: 
from separate individuals to their initially loose aggregation, 
which gives rise to their internal practical division of labor and 
the associated creation of generally applicable rules of behavior 
(norms), which subsequently leads to the development of an 
autonomous	organizational	apparatus	and	finally	to	a	political	
synthesis	of	both	sides,	effective	both	internally	and	externally,	
resulting ultimately in a new unit of action. I am of the opinion 
that	it	is	the	strength	or	fragility	of	this	context	that	justifies	the	
collective responsibility in its concrete form or not.
What was previously considered by early experts in interna-
tional law, such as Jean Bodin (1529-1596), Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), as the unquestioned 
external relationship between rulers and their respective subor-
dinates, was, by the end of the 18th Century no longer common 
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sense.147 While Friedrich II was already describing his role as 
“the	first	servant	of	the	state”,148	this	was	still	different	from	be-
ing	‘the	first	servant	of	the	people’,	as	we	understand	the	role	of	
elected representatives in a democratic society today. There is 
a considerable semantic distance between the two expressions. 
A crucial change in the legitimation of political dominion was 
gathering force here and with it, the revival of the referential 
context that can also ultimately be a context for responsibility 
under some circumstances.
The inner responsibility of the collective for the acts done 
by its own – quite sizable – autonomous administrative appa-
ratus	is	more	difficult	because	the	existing	difference	is	a)	not	
even perceived from the outside but rather seen as the unity 
of its collective ‘base’ and its administrative structure, and b) 
because internally, the accusation of wrongdoing is usually 
asymmetrical: As an outsider, it is relatively easy to make ac-
cusations	towards	an	office	holder	regarding	his	execution	of	
the	office	and	to	make	the	entire	organization	co-responsible,	
as has been done over the past thousand years with the Catho-
lic church in Europe (and rightly so, in many cases). In contrast, 
the collective murder of clergy and nobility during the French 
Revolution	does	not	fit	this	pattern	because	it	was	a	society	that	
was against its own, elitist subculture, not against its overall 
state organization. However, cases where inner-governmental 
political formations were persecuted as part of clarifying state 
injustice, such as the NSDAP, the Gestapo and similar orga-
nizations	under	the	Nazi	regime,	fall	under	this	pattern:	here 
simple	membership	already	justifies	co-responsibility.
147 On the historical development of the related terms, see also Meineke 
[1929].
148 See his Antimachiavel (Œuvres. vol. 8, S. 66), as well as his Mémoires pour 
servir à l’histoire de la maison de Brandenbourg (Œuvres, vol. 1, p. 123). 
The	title	of	the	first	of	the	two	works	already	speaks	for	itself	in	showing	
how the relationship of master to subject has changed. Fredrich’s com-
plete	 works	 are	 available	 online	 in	 German	 and	 French	 under:	 http://
www.friedrich.uni-trier.de/de/static/suche_werk/
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The inner division is also asymmetrical in a second way: 
a reversal of the assignment of responsibility by any organi-
zation to its carrier collective is rarely possible. During the 
Nuremberg Trials, the argument raised by prominent prose-
cutors that the NSDAP came to power legitimately through 
free elections in 1933 and that consequently the charges should 
be against the German people and not against its executive 
organ was completely overruled. Such an argument virtually 
says that the legitimizing collective decided in favor of the al-
leged development of its organization and is like an accusation 
of political convictions. Such a charge is not at all absurd. I my-
self agree with the inner logic under the conditions described 
here. This question was also raised most recently and para-
digmatically in Daniel Goldhagen’s 1996 book Hitler‘s Willing 
Executioners. I think the title of the book is misleading, howev-
er. Goldhagen’s argument is only consistent if the relationship 
of responsibility is reversed. Then the title would be: ‘Hitler, 
the willing executioner of the German people’s will’. The very 
broad and international controversial discussion about the 
nature	and	 justification	of	such	an	accusation towards a col-
lective – in this case, ‘the Germans’ – shows the uncertainty 
and discomfort that exists when dealing with such a charge. 
It also supports an impression that can’t simply be ignored: 
namely, that there ‘must be something’ to the idea of moral re-
sponsibility of the collective for the actions of its organization 
because otherwise, how could the organizational apparatus 
that is being accused of the wrongdoing have been formed and 
maintained?
And we should not forget: Every organization always only 
acts	through	the	behavior	of	its	officers,	while	the	organization	
itself, without such access, is beyond reach once dissolved.149 
149 The public repeatedly feels this when, for example, a wrongdoing is com-
mitted	by	a	large	financial	 institution	that	remains	unpunished	because	
the original perpetrating organization dissolved without a uniform legal 
successor and no one can be made accountable any longer. In such cases, 
holding all members of a former company responsible during the period 
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Consequently, those who are actually responsible must be those 
who originally helped the accused organization to power.
Kant did not even touch on this precarious issue. For him, it 
is self-evident that states may act for ‘their’ people through their 
authorized	representing	officers	(i.e.,	kings	during	his	time,	and	
prime ministers, presidents, party chairmen, etc. today) and 
that ‘their people’ are to accept this action as their own with all 
of the consequences. I have no intention to deny this. On the 
contrary: I want to prevent a society from mitigating its own 
responsibility by invoking the misconduct of its political leaders 
and bureaucracy. This was the huge and very tedious cognitive 
process that Germany had to go through, not as a state, but as a 
society of individual citizens almost 150 years after Kant’s death 
and after the gigantic crimes of the Nazi period in order to re-
think its own international rehabilitation as a society.
8   Social Norms and Our Responsibility 
for their Fulfillment
Let us return again to the core of our topic. It is based on three 
fundamental concepts: that of the actor, the action and that 
which I have termed ‘norms’ based on James Coleman’s gener-
ic	definition	(without	closer	analysis).	Let’s	look	more	closely	
at what norms are within the context of our analysis, and what 
conditions	are	needed	to	theoretically	fulfill	them	in	individual	
cases as a basis for  justifying collective responsibility together 
with the organization that applies them for a purpose.
Actions can generally be judged as to whether they fall un-
der a social norm and, if so, whether they meet this norm or 
not. This concerns the relationship of action and social norm. 
In order to understand the conceptual elements behind this, we 
need to return to the concept of a social norm, because we gave 
it	significantly	less	attention	than	the	concept of action. I under-
of the act has never been demanded, even in part. This idea might seem 
absurd, but under other circumstances, this is not at all so, as we see at a 
state historical level.
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stand	the	concept	of	a	social	norm	in	the	sense	of	Talcott	Par-
sons150 and Niklas Luhmann to be an element of a generalized 
structure of behavioral expectations.151 This is complemented 
by James S. Coleman’s definition	of	norms	as	being	the	pow-
er (authority) of one actor over the action of another actor.152 
Such	a	definition	does	not	contradict	Weber’s	general, rather 
objectified,	definition	of	‘law’	as	“typical	opportunities,	given	
certain	matters	of	fact	and	hardened	by	observation,	regarding	
the expectation of a certain social behavior [...]”.153 However, a 
definition	of	the	concept	of	a	separate	right	(i.e.,	not	the	legal	
system as a whole) follows from Weber’s definition	of	a	social	
law which does not directly follow from Parson’s and Luh-
mann’s	concept	of	social	norm	but	which	does	fit	Coleman’s	
concept of a norm. For Weber, rights are “appropriated chances 
[opportunities]”154, which may sound too unilaterally related to 
individual interests from a system theory point of view.  How-
150 For example, Parsons says [1982], p. 175: “[…] [t]he component of norms 
is	the	set	of	universalistic	rules	or	norms	which	define	expectations	for	the	
performance	of	classes	of	differentiated	units	within	the	system	–	collectivi-
ties or roles, as the case may be […].” The concept of norms as a generalized, 
universal or simply basic expectation of behavior is, however, older and has 
often	been	attributed	to	Max	Weber and George Herbert Mead. For exam-
ple,	in	Wikipedia	under	“Norm	(social)”,	there	is	the	following	definition:	
“From a sociological perspective, social norms are informal understandings 
that	govern	the	behavior	of	members	of	a	society.”	https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Norm_(social)	(See	also:	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociology)
151 See Luhmann [1996], p. 396: Luhmann bases the concept of norm on [be-
havioral] expectations whereby he explains the concept of expectations 
(ibid. p. 139) and only incidentally mentions the generalization of expecta-
tion as a (more stable) feature in a footnote 73. In Luhmann [2008], p. 28, he 
then goes on to talk about norms as “stabilized behavioral expectations”, 
whereby the stabilization has more requirements than the generalization. 
While I don’t want to contradict this, I want to stay with the expression 
‘generalized behavioral expectation’ as the essential if not exhaustive fea-
ture of a ‘norm’ because of the topic here, namely the relationship between 
the individual and the collective.
152 Coleman [1994], p. 243.
153 Weber	[1972],	p.	9.	The	original	German	definition	reads:	“[Gesetze sind] 
durch Beobachtung erhärtete typische Chancen eines bei Vorliegen gewisser Tat-
bestände zu gewärtigenden Ablaufes sozialen Verhaltens […]“
154 Ibid., p. 23, in German: “appropriierte Chancen“.
140
8  Social Norms and Our Responsibility for their Fulfillment
ever, the	imputation	of	a	person	under	external	imperative	fits	
the idea of ‘appropriated chance’.
8.1 Norm dimensions
Even if we can discover both actions and thus also the actor as 
carrier of this action in a concrete event (which usually com-
prises many sub-events), it does not follow that norms have 
already been met or violated. Such an expectation can be de-
scribed in words; this is the content of the norm. It also falls un-
der a general norm type.	A	norm	can	also	vary	significantly	both	
in terms of its definitude in regards to its binding force as well as 
its formal ranking within the overall norm structure in which the 
individual norm is embedded. These categorical distinctions 
are what I call norm dimensions. Every norm dimension is a 
multiplicity	that	can	be	envisioned	as	a	scale	on	which	specific	
norms	can	be	positioned.	The	definition	of	the	terms	are:
Norm content: The	 symbolic,	 frequently	 written	 or	 orally	
transferred	 linguistic	 codification	 of	 a	 behavior	 that	 is	 owed	
and sometimes also includes the conditions under which it is 
owed to whom.
Norm type: Symbolically coded behavioral expectations 
originate	from	different	sources.	Moreover,	they	are	enforced	
through	different	means.	These	differences	combine	 together	
under the concept of norm type because the corresponding di-
vision (moral/traditional, conventional, legal, ethic/moral) is 
widespread in the sociological literature.
Distinctness: This dimension refers to the clarity and consis-
tency of a norm. The breadth of this dimension can be seen pri-
marily	in	the	difference	between	informal-conventional	norms	
and legal norms.
Binding force: Norms can vary in terms of social importance. 
This can be seen by the legal, political or informal sanctions for 
violating them, as well as the stringency with which their ful-
fillment	is	observed.
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Formal rank: Norms of the same type are at the same level in 
the hierarchy. This hierarchy is particularly visible at the legal 
level.	 In	Germany,	 the	official	provisions	 for	 implementation	
are at the lowest level, then comes the regulations, then the acts 
and above them the so-called body of laws with the constitution 
at the top. It is similar for more informal hierarchies at other 
levels. Conventions of courtesy in Germany, for example, say 
that it is more important to shake hands when greeting and less 
important to have a not-too limp or not-too strong handshake.
There are many examples that can easily demonstrate how 
large	the	area	of	flexibility	is	that	results	from	these	four	norm 
dimensions. For the sake of simplicity, I’ve set a measuring scale 
of quantitative intensity from 1 - 10  for all of the dimensions 
I’ve named (and regarding the sample norms without any claim 
to being empirically valid). ‘1’ is the lowest intensity while a ‘10’ 
is the highest. For example, a ranking of 1 means that the norm 
is very unimportant within its norm structure and a ranking of 
10 means that it’s very important. The last three dimensions re-
late only to the respective norm type concerned. The ranking 
of a moral norm, for example, can only be judged in terms of 
other moral norms. This theoretical basis can be used to set up 
the	following	table	for	empirical	studies,	here	based	on	fictional	
examples (see table 1 next page).
From this perspective, it is possible to map all norm types at 
the moral level: Even a formal violation of law, such as a compa-
ny manufacturing products that contaminate the environment, 
can have strong moral assignments of responsibility as a conse-
quence. As the sample table above shows, not all of these norm 
dimensions are equally important for the question of whether 
specific	moral	 responsibility	 can	 be	 assigned,	 no	matter	 who	
and what is involved. A high-level of distinctness for a norm is 
desirable, for example. But even a very distinct norm will only 
result in minor moral indignation in the event of a violation if it 
has a low ranking in the norm hierarchy. The same applies for 
the binding force: Even a norm with high binding intensity – 
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i.e., the probability of enforcement – doesn’t necessarily entail 
a strong assignment of moral responsibility as a consequence.155
8.2 The overarching importance of norm ranking in 
assigning collective moral responsibility
Above all it is the rank of a valid norm that plays a special role in 
assigning	moral	responsibility.	It	has	a	strong	significance	for	the	
155	 Think	of	a	fine	for	wrong	parking	compared	to	theft	of	small	value	in	mid-
dle-class circles.
Norm content Norm 
type
Distinct-
ness
Bind-
ing 
force
Rank
Aggression 
ought to be 
responded to 
with kindness
Moral / 
traditional 3 8 7
Promises 
ought to be 
kept
Conven-
tional and 
legal
6 9 10
Real estate con-
tracts require 
a notary’s cer-
tification	to	be	
effective
Legal 10 10 5
Refugees from 
Africa who 
risk drowning 
while coming 
to Europe must 
be helped
Ethical / 
moral 9 5 10
Table 1: The four dimensions of norms with sample entries
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formula developed above for when an organized collective, as 
a carrier, can be made morally responsible in toto for the actions 
of its organization, even if the organization is not taken into ac-
count. Because it is exactly the highest ranking moral norms that 
are not only applied when making a judgment (for example, of 
large political acts of violence) but also the ones that the individ-
ual members of a collective are most likely to be aware of. The 
ranking of a moral norm is also not simply arbitrary. A moral 
norm achieves its ranking usually through a long historical de-
velopment process over multiple and even many generations.
The result is that the conditions described above regarding 
the assignment of collective responsibility must be supplement-
ed with another condition: Collective moral responsibility can only 
be assigned if very high ranking norms have been violated. The ob-
jective	reason	for	this	is	that	the	high-ranking	norm	influences	
many other norms, which is why it is particularly important. 
All members of a collective can be expected to be aware of and 
uphold such high-ranking norms because without that aware-
ness and appropriate respect, social life would be at risk and 
the community under threat. This is a strong criterion which 
then allows us to put aside repeated recourse to joint intention-
ality or evidence of direct causality between individual and the 
results of collective actions.  As I showed above, these criteria 
are	virtually	never	verified	with	 the	necessary	certainty.	The	
violation of high-ranking norms, in contrast, has no such un-
certainty. Assuming awareness of high-ranking norms – legal 
and		moral	–	for	specifically	assigning	responsibility	is	not	at	
all arbitrary. It is a necessary condition for every social commu-
nity. Such an awareness is also rarely disputed by individual 
participants. Consequently, as long as it is not an individual 
case, members of a collective cannot dispute the violation of 
such high-ranking norms with a lack of awareness as long as 
at least the naked fact of the alleged event was known or must 
have been known based on a general, public meeting that an-
nounced it.
144
8  Social Norms and Our Responsibility for their Fulfillment
But when can one speak of a violation of a high-ranking norm 
as not being a unique case? What’s interesting here is that it is 
not dependent on the number of cases. It is the organizational 
purpose of the organization for which the collective is the carrier 
and the consequent systematicness of the violation of norm that 
is decisive for justifying the assignment of moral responsibility. 
If the intention to violate high-ranking moral norms  is already 
apparent in the purpose of the collective’s organization (such 
as state authorities for a society and its citizens), the collective 
and each one of its members is responsible simply because they 
have to accountably answer for an organizational structure that 
systematically brings such violations about.
Now	the	benefit	of	such	a	systematic	analysis,	as	I	showed	
above in section 5, becomes apparent. The initial result of this 
analysis was that we can only speak of collective moral respon-
sibility where a group has developed into an organized col-
lective with its own corporate actors. Such a corporate entity 
regularly acts in the name of such a collective. However, it does 
this only through the support that the collective allows it, par-
ticularly the provision of material and human resources, regu-
lar labor and, also, ideological gestures of solidarity, etc. This 
support, along with the fundamental norms that hold such a 
community together, is what I have consistently referred to as 
the collective carrier for its corporately independent organiza-
tion. However, the individual member of the collective body 
is not directly responsible for this norm-based collective carri-
er,	because	she	or	he	has	too	little	influence	on	the	emergence 
and enforcement of it. It is, however, presumed that she or he is 
well aware of the highest ranking, and thus value determining, 
norms that tower over the entire body of norms. If the purpose 
of the corporately acting actors, in the sense of a subordinate 
norm, contradict these generally known, high-ranking norms 
and this becomes obvious through corresponding behavior, all 
members of the relevant collective carrier are liable, especially 
if	they	do	not	intervene	with	all	available	means	at	first	knowl-
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edge of this obvious violation of a high ranking norm.156 This 
applies to ‘rogue’ states just as much as it does to globally act-
ing corporations that preach charity for all and are factually re-
sponsible for very serious crimes. Their employees, sharehold-
ers and, in particular, their management as mandated agents 
are all (i.e., collectively) very personally morally responsible 
for such systematic wrongdoing if the concrete organization 
of such a company produces such behavior with systemically 
high probability.
8.3 Private and public norms
It	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 look	 for	 the	 origin	 of	 specific	 separate	
norms independently from the general types in section 8.1:
a) Norms as generalized or stabilized behavioral expecta-
tions can privately emerge, for example, when an individual 
person such as the mother or father of a child, a teacher in a 
classroom,	 etc.	 invents	 an	 ‘ought’	 and	 justifies	 its	 fulfillment	
solely with his or her own will. Naturally, such individual 
norms may not be too contrary to the public norm structure; 
most of us, however, know of cases where such a description 
of individual generalization applies, whether to an arbitrary 
teacher, parent or other authority.
b) Norms emerge publicly and, as such, through collective 
and not individual acts of will. They are the result of a complex 
156 Article 20 para. 4 was inserted into the German constitution (Grundgesetz) 
in 1968 according to which the core of this idea was reversed and raised to 
an equal, basic right, namely the right to resistance against such develop-
ments. It says: “All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seek-
ing to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.“ 
(“Gegen jeden, der es unternimmt, diese Ordnung zu beseitigen, haben alle Deut-
schen das Recht zum Widerstand, wenn andere Abhilfe nicht möglich ist.”). Mor-
ally this right becomes a duty as soon as the corresponding circumstances 
arise. – Certainly the question arises here as to the extent to which such a 
resistance is morally reasonable. Can a citizen, for example, be required to 
sacrifice	his	own	life	in	the	struggle	against	a	murderous	regime?	I	do	not	
believe that. The view represented here is, however, completely indepen-
dent of the exact limit of what is reasonable in such cases.
146
8  Social Norms and Our Responsibility for their Fulfillment
and frequently long-term developmental process that is simul-
taneously based on pre-normative, practical habits among the 
totality of the norm addressees as well as on an authoritative 
imperative by the usually, also collectively formed, power elite.
Thus,	 this	 concerns	 two	 different	 forms	 of	 generalization	
which need to be clearly distinguished.157 The individual gen-
eralization only refers to the factual authority, or at least an 
attempt	by	the	creator	of	the	norms,	to	define	the	scope	of	the	
norms	in	general	terms.	For	example,	a	parental	figure	could	
say to a child: “From now on, you may no longer go to your 
friend’s	house	if	you	have	not	finished	your	homework.”	For	
the child, this is a clearly palpable case of an individually gen-
eralized norm to the extent that it applies to all correspond-
ing cases which concern exactly this child and his parents. But 
sociologists	usually	mean	something	different	with	‘general-
ization’ in the area of public norms; namely, the anonymous 
application of a behavioral expectation that is not related to 
specific	persons,	or,	 in	other	words,	a	generalization	both	 in	
view of the circle of norm addressees as well as – usually – in 
view of the authority enforcing the norm. Historically many 
collectives have had norms that only received their validity 
through the authority of a single person, such as a king, sultan, 
etc., but starting around the time of the French Revolution in 
Europe,	this	stopped	being	seen	as	sufficient	 justification	for	
accepting the validity of a norm. In most of today’s societies in 
the	world,	every	public	norm	must	also	be	justified	through	at	
least the assertion of a general will, otherwise it is rejected as 
tyrannical.
Such public generalization usually refers to larger collec-
tives, but it doesn’t need to. For example, among the Tibet-
an Buddhists, the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is chosen 
through a normatively anchored procedure addressed to a 
very small group of norm addressees.158 The norms underlying 
157 The following applies analogously to the Luhmann stability requirement.
158	 As	an	 introduction,	see	 the	English	 language	Wikipedia	entry	at	http://
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this, however, are public because they do not depend on the ex-
istence	of	a	specific	norm	addressee	but	rather	on	officials	(who	
can change at any time) and, because the validity of the norms 
must be accepted by the entire collective (i.e., the Tibetan Bud-
dhists), so that the subsequent symbolic facts have meaning.
Private norms can also bring responsibility for their fulfill-
ment solely in a private sphere. A mother can scold her child 
when, once again, homework is left undone. Third parties are 
not authorized to do this. The following only deals with public 
norms.	By	definition,	these	are	always	brought	forth	and	con-
tinued by collectives that determine their value in regards to 
the above mentioned features (and perhaps others) and ensure 
their steady enforcement.  Using this public body of norms, 
they justify their corporate organization. In the case of societ-
ies, this is the corporate organization of the state with all of its 
bodies and authorities.
The production and enforcement of a generalized and sanc-
tioned behavioral expectation, including a norm, prototypically 
falls exactly into that group of behaviors that we intuitively and 
formally perceive as cases of accountable actions. The same ap-
plies for the person-related, private and public norms. Follow-
ing Coleman’s definition	of	norms159, those persons who are di-
rectly involved carry joint responsibility for the establishment 
and enforcement of norms. That also applies when it is ‘only’ 
done	to	fulfill	a	duty,	i.e.,	in	fulfillment	of	other	norms.	As	far	
as I know, the principle of a person’s personal responsibility for 
their actions is valid across all cultures. This means that the ful-
fillment	of	an	unacceptable	norm160	can	never	be	justified	with	
the	duty	to	fulfill	a	different	norm.	Otherwise,	the	principle	of	
personal responsibility would be virtually repealed: all people 
naturally act to meet external norms. If, for example, a mother 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dalai_Lama, which is considerably more detailed 
than the German one.
159 See Footnote 121.
160 I have already mentioned the Radbruch Formula which considers exactly 
this issue. See footnote 122 above.
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in a small family with a tyrannical spouse watches her husband 
beat her child because of some crude educational norm, even 
though she herself deeply disagrees, she is also fully morally 
responsible for the action of her husband and, under circum-
stances, even criminally liable as a complicit. She cannot shrug 
off	her	moral	responsibility	with	the	argument	that	the	disci-
plinary measure was privately thought out by her husband and 
he alone is responsible for it. She is also morally responsible for 
it because she allowed a private, internal family norm to have a 
higher ranking than the physical integrity of her child.
This example only applies to individual people. Other 
examples concerning collectives, however, are not hard to 
find.	We	have	all	heard	stories	of	companies	with	tyrannical,	
grossly unfair, inconsiderate or in some other way behavior-
ally conspicuous managers and owners. In such situations, 
it is not uncommon for quasi-private sub-cultures to form 
where the group dynamics of the managing power establish 
rules that are incompatible with higher ranking moral and, 
perhaps even statutory norms. Here, the same applies as for 
the unhappy family. All participants in such teams carry full 
moral responsibility for the behavior of their boss if they do 
not undertake anything to change the existing unacceptable 
situation and even if they fear that their opposition will be a 
disadvantage. – This leads us to the essence of ‘ought’ and its 
social appropriateness.
8.4 Subjective ‘ought’ and personal responsibility
Norms	define	objectively	abstract	behavioral expectations and 
put pressure on the norm	addressees	to	fulfill	the	norms.	The	
system theory for understanding norms overlooks this.  Norms 
not only objectively change the statistical probability of a per-
son’s behavior, they also equally produce a directly palpable 
imperative for the person whose behavior is supposed to be 
controlled by the norm.
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Such an ‘ought’, at the level of a private norm, is face to face 
with a direct desire by the norm-enforcing authority. Public 
norms	have	an	asymmetrical	effect	here:	We	feel	that	we	ought 
to do something but we do not see who wants this from us. 
The ‘will of the law’ is, in practice, completely anonymous. 
This is even more so the case with traditional, custom-based 
and moral norms where there isn’t even a concrete legislator 
but rather just an anonymous historical development. People 
tend to normally not like subordinating themselves to such 
completely anonymous norms. But they know what to do, even 
if mostly subconsciously: The suitable remedy to make one’s 
self	feel	better	in	such	situations	is	called	‘social	identity’.	This	
concept describes a basically simple cognitive function: People 
yield to an external determination by appropriating the foreign 
collective norm as their own and, at this price, ‘purchasing’ 
affiliation	to	a	collective.	This	is	the	fundamental	social	‘busi-
ness’ that we all more or less master and with which we judge 
in a very nuanced way whether performance and services in 
return correspond. The individual’s performance consists of 
subjecting himself to the norm, which, in practice, is routinely 
connected to acknowledging the collective authority and ha-
bitually normalizing behavior. The service in return from the 
collective	 is	 solidarity	 against	 outside	 attacks	 on	 a	member,	
arbitration of disputes within the collective, constant mutual 
advice and, to a certain extent, also active help in the event of 
emergencies through no fault of one’s own. Performance and 
service	in	return	are	mostly	in	a	dynamic,	fluctuating	balance,	
otherwise the members would tend to leave the collective. As 
long as the dynamic balance generally exists, being embedded 
in a collective web of norms can be rather comfortable because 
it	offers	orientation	and	thus	a	matter-of-factness	to	daily	life	
that	significantly	reduces	general	stress.	But	there	is	also	a	risk	
in this comfort. If the collective develops in a crucial way (we 
are	practically	always	members	in	many	different,	nested	col-
lectives	at	the	same	time),	the	comfort	of	‘going	with	the	flow’	
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becomes	difficult	to	break	through	because	of	the	threat	of	mas-
sive anger by the other members of the collective. We all know 
of examples – from the homeowners association to the sports 
club to the political party. It is even more critical when a whole 
society threatens to slip into the intolerance of violent totalitar-
ianism or despotism. How can a member in such a situation be 
expected to publicly contradict the increasingly unacceptable 
common sense behavior? One can leave a sports club. But what 
to do when suddenly something like ethnic violence spreads 
through the entire social environment and one just happens to 
belong to the perpetrators collective, even though one was not 
involved in the violence?
From the principle of personal responsibility, it follows that, 
under such circumstances, one cannot simply excuse oneself by 
asserting that the situation grew ‘out of hand’ or took one by 
surprise. No one would make a collectively based accusation 
against another for truly surprising events. However, when 
seen	 in	a	 larger	developmental	context,	a	 specific,	 surprising	
event	–	such	as	a	racially	motivated	attack	on	a	friendly	neigh-
bor – is frequently not at all surprising but rather, statistical-
ly seen, mostly probable considering the given and generally 
known conditions.161 This clearly increased probability is there-
fore	already	a	justification	for	responsibility.
The principle of personal responsibility is normatively un-
surpassable. In other words, it is a normative prerequisite for 
any peaceful coexistence in all human-social relationships.162 It 
sets a certain, very general, top-level ‘ought’, the fulfillment	of	
161 See Horowitz	[2001],	who	has	carefully	investigated	the	development	of	
such uprisings.
162	 There	have	been	uncountable	numbers	of	attempts	to	justify	moral	per-
sonal responsibility in some kind of natural science or logical way, usually 
under the name of ‘freedom of will’. But none of the approaches that I 
know of have yet convinced me. Which is not to say that I see a defect 
in	a	purely	normative	justification	of	the	principle	of	personal	freedom.	
See Pothast [1987] regarding the inadequacy of the historically most well-
known human evidence of the so-called freedom proof. My own approach 
to this problem I have described in Sohst [2016], chap. 10.
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which is required even if there are disadvantages and consid-
erable inconveniences connected with it. But then, what does 
personal	 responsibility	 obligate	 us	 to	 in	 specific?	 It	 is	 a	me-
ta-norm	to	the	extent	that	it	does	not	prescribe	a	specific	behav-
ior but rather a consistent behavior. Immanuel Kant explained 
the idea that underlies the principle of personal responsibility 
most clearly in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Kant 
called	for	a	renunciation	of	the	‘benefit	principle’	as	well	as	an	
emancipation from ‘nature’, i.e., from blind behavior as a con-
sequence of biological drives or unconscious social control.
8.5 The obligation to morally acceptable and coherent behavior
In the following I would like to discuss Kant’s concept of mor-
als, to the extent that it needs mentioning for my context, fol-
lowing Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation.  In her book, 
Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity, she explains why 
the constitution of the individual person, i.e., ongoing preser-
vation and perpetuation, is, in itself, an evaluative instrument 
of action.163 In the process, both the desirability of the behavior 
as well as the material-ethical issues are in the foreground. She 
interprets Kant’s categorical imperative such that reason is pri-
marily an imperative to coherency and consistency. This means 
that every individual can only speak of himself as a uniform 
person beyond biological existence when she or he continuous-
ly undertakes everything possible to create consistency and co-
herency among her or his many conceptual acts with all of their 
diverse horizons of application and purpose. Only then can the 
‘self’ of a person emerge.
This is also the core of Korsegaard’s personal responsibili-
ty because no one can do this for a person other than him- or 
herself. Such a concept of personhood is not arbitrary, i.e., we 
cannot simply reject it. Whoever agrees to such consistency and 
163 See Korsgaard [2013]
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coherency in his concept of behavior does so freely. However, 
one	then	loses	the	possibility	of	validly	justifying	the	different	
standards of judgment for such behavior (now manifestly in-
consistent and/or incoherent). But that is not all: According to 
the inferential theory of meaning from Robert B. Brandom164, 
linguistic	 communication	 loses	 direct	 content	 significance	
when the relationships of social obligation and permission, 
perpetuated with every speech act, become unreliable and 
ultimately non-binding. In such cases, we say that a person is 
unreliable or that we don’t understand them anymore. These 
kinds of reactions from the environment indicate the serious-
ness of the social consequences when the zone of tolerance for 
acceptable incoherency and inconsistency in one’s behavior is 
exceeded.
Such a person can naturally insist that she or he didn’t mean 
it, or is not in a position to create consistency and coherency in 
his	behavior.	But	that	statement	ultimately	confirms	the	irra-
tionality of the respective behavior which in turn becomes the 
probability of correctly predicting the coming behavior. Since 
norms are objective behavioral probability and subjective be-
havioral ‘oughts’, however, irrational behavior tends to be seen 
as hostile to norms, even when such a person has fully agreed to 
all of the single norms expected of him. Norms should also help 
maintain coherency and consistency in behavior, and this goes 
beyond	just	a	confirmation	that	one	is	aware	of	some	norm.
Of course, every human admits to a certain amount of lat-
itude for irrationality in his personality, which can even be 
pleasant to a certain degree. We aren’t robots who have noth-
ing	better	to	do	than	think	about	the	consistency	and	coherency	
of our behavior all day. However, this latitude quickly shrinks 
as we climb the ladder of norm hierarchy. And as the latitude 
narrows, the horizon of responsibility under which we must 
answer for our actions broadens in reverse proportion in terms 
164 See Brandom [1994]
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of	the	interpretation	here.		This	specifically	means	that	as	the	
ranking of a moral norm which can be violated rises, personal 
responsibility –  and not just for one’s own behavior – towards 
the social environment for that norm also increases.
This is an important observation. I believe that it is not a pri-
marily normative nature but one of social reality. While we de-
mand (in a purely prescriptive sense) that our fellow humans 
make	an	effort	beyond	 their	own	personal	horizon	 in	affairs	
with	increasing	moral	significance,	this	expectation	would	be	
hollow if a community	 could	 not	 also	 have	 confidence	 that	
it would actually happen. As the ranking of a meta-norm in-
creases, it also extends beyond purely personal interests in a 
very real sense because the very general ‘ought’ corresponds 
to a very general acceptance. While this approach should be 
empirically	verifiable,	 I	could	not	find	any	scientific	research	
on it so I have to rely on my own life experience. And my ap-
proach is supported by a very broad term from one of Horace’s 
poems: Tua res agitur.165 Of course, there is always one’s own 
interests involved when things don’t go well; but that doesn’t 
stop personal responsibility from being expanded to the social 
environment. In contrary, just because we recognize our own 
interests in a socially intact environment, we simultaneously 
want the horizon of responsibility to be expanded. My analysis 
shows that this horizon expands, at least at the moral level, as 
the ranking of the moral norm in question rises.
The Kant’s moral imperative to reason as interpreted by 
Christine Korsgaard connects humans to the acts of its social 
environment through direct responsibility. This is the same 
as the socio-psychological core of collective responsibility, as 
presented here. Namely that: I, as a person, avouch that the en-
tire collective with which I am in a relationship is at least or-
ganizationally constituted such that no systematic violation of 
165 This term comes from Book 1, epistle 18, line 84. The original Latin quote 
is: “Nam tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet.“ (It is your concern when 
your	neighbor’s	wall	is	on	fire.)
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high-ranking moral norms is quite improbable. I do so by sub-
ordinating myself to these norms in the form of performance 
for solidarity (as service in return). If I fail in this regard, I am 
responsible even if I was not directly involved in the norm-vi-
olating act.
This	assertion	completes	my	justification	for	the	existence	of	
collective moral responsibility in the explicit sense presented 
here. Now we can at least touch on additional questions which 
lead to a deeper understanding of the approach developed here.
9   The Difference between 
Culpability and Responsibility
We have spoken only of responsibility up until now, not about 
culpability. Both terms are very close in meaning but they dif-
fer	in	a	significant	way.	And	it	is	this	difference	that	leads	me	
to speak of collective moral responsibility rather than collective 
moral culpability.
The	decisive	difference	between	the	two	terms	lies	in	the	so-
cial consequence of assigning culpability and/or responsibility. 
If an event occurs for which culpability or responsibility should 
be	assigned,	the	assignment	is	first	aligned	with	the	context	of	
justification,	 in	other	words,	 the	question	of	why this assign-
ment	is	taking	place	and	is	justified.	Such	a	question	is	directed	
to the past because empirical evidence for answering it is only 
in	the	past.	Let’s	assume	that	the	 justification	for	such	an	as-
signment is found. This temporally shifts the orientation of the 
context for judgment. Now the question is, what kind of conse-
quences can follow from such a legitimate assignment. This is 
more than just a practical question involving all kinds of specif-
ic interests on the side of the concerned parties. It also involves 
the future execution of the decision. This shift in temporal ori-
entation	and	‘reclassification’	of	a	reaction	to	past	actions	into	
a future behavior by the participants has a consequence which 
prompts a distinction between culpability and responsibility.
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The	basic	difference	between	the	two	terms	is	that	culpabil-
ity only indicates a past relationship or context while respon-
sibility applies to the scope of the future avowal of that por-
tion of the past. This would hardly be worth discussing (be-
cause culpability and responsibility are still directly linked) if 
it	weren’t	 for	another	psychological	difference	 involved:	The	
emotional link between culpability and responsibility. Here 
there is strong asymmetry. Culpability for past action has a di-
rect,	moral	emotional	affect,	independently	of	whether	punish-
ment, compensation or similar follows later from the culpabil-
ity. When punishment or restitution follows as a consequence 
of	a	justified	assignment	of	guilt, the valuing emotions can, and 
should,	settle	down.	This	is	called	atonement. When such mea-
sures fail, however, the emotionally loaded accusation of guilt 
is not relieved. And if no measures at all follow, the imputation 
of blame has a high probability of being continued (depending 
on the gravity of the culpability) until either it is simply forgot-
ten – which sometimes takes generations to happen in major 
conflicts	–	or	it	undergoes	revision,	for	example,	by	changing	
the historical evaluation of the situation. Either way, when the 
grounds for blame – assuming that this is accepted – disappear, 
so does the emotional content of the accusation.
As a result of what I call responsibility here, the still owed and 
future reaction to the culpable behavior is completely depen-
dent on the existence and scope of the past-oriented imputation 
of blame. We say, “You are responsible for your past behavior.” 
However, in fact, we mean that a connection has been deter-
mined	between	an	event	and	the	justification.	The	consequences	
will follow only later. However, the possibly emotional loaded 
demand for consequences receives its evaluative excitement en-
tirely through the past connection of blame. If one removes this 
emotional reference to the past from the term responsibility, a 
neutral emotional content remains that is nothing more than a 
sober demand for insight to the perpetrator plus a possible ex-
ecution of punishment and restitution. The concept of respon-
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sibility is thus more a social-technical one while the concept of 
culpability is more of a social-psychological one.
Something important follows from this for our theory of col-
lective moral responsibility. As my explanations have shown 
thus far, assigning collective responsibility is not an easy thing. 
There are good reasons for being extremely careful with this in-
strument	for	social	regulation.	And	even	more	so	if	significant	
parts of such a link for responsibility rest on a purely normative 
basis	and	are	thus	not	accessible	to	empirical,	ultimate	justifi-
cation.166 At the same time, moral judgment is always emotion-
ally loaded and frequently systematically very messy, as I have 
already shown at the beginning of this essay in the introduc-
tion. In addition, the most important and third circumstance is 
that the assertion of collective responsibility usually cannot be 
supported by evidence that shows that every single member 
directly participated in the event. That means that the normally 
indispensable empirical causal connection of direct agency is 
lacking. While I have indicated the important reasons as well as 
a	means	to	overcome	this	obvious	difficulty	above,	at	the	mor-
al-emotional level of an imputation of blame there is still an 
unsurmountable reason for exculpation if the member of the 
collective credibly disputes his direct participation in the act.
The entire construction of collective assignment of responsi-
bility developed here is thus only convincing if we can forego 
individual imputation of blame! And, in fact, we must forego 
this if we want to uphold any kind of collective responsibility. I 
have shown how collective responsibility is derived from a fail-
166	 I	follow	the	view	here	that	‘are’	and	‘ought’	belong	to	different	ontological	
categories and cannot be derived from one another. This approach, in its 
more concise form, is in G.E. Moore’s Principa Ethica: he declares every 
reduction of ‘are’ to ‘ought’ as a “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore [1993], § 10). 
Kondylis represents this idea even more drastically in his book Macht und 
Entscheidung (Kondylis [1984]), but he goes too far in deriving the conclu-
sion that all morals are just a veil hiding the blank desire for self-preserva-
tion and power.  Such a standpoint also obviously does not replace a more 
detailed	analysis	of	‘ought’	–	no	matter	what	one	thinks	about	it.	To	go	
into this here, however, would go far beyond the framework of this essay.
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ure of the corporately constituted organization of the collective. 
To this extent there is also culpability here in a broad sense of 
the	term.	However,	emotionally,	it	is	significantly	weaker	than	
direct personal blame. We are constantly being confronted with 
asymmetry as soon as individual members of a perpetrator col-
lective, e.g., for an ethnically motivated act of violence or ideo-
logically	justified	collective	act	of	violence	(mostly	from	terror	
groups around the world today), are pointed at for acts of its 
collective. Such participants then always say that they were not 
personally involved and therefore should not be made respon-
sible for the consequences. From the analysis developed here, it 
now follows that these people actually have no culpability for 
the accused events but still carry responsibility. Being relieved 
of blame has two aspects: For one, we can forego proof of di-
rect, causal complicity because it doesn’t play a role. For the 
other – and this is no less important – we forego the emotional 
accusation ad personam. We simply soberly determine that the 
person in question must also accept the consequences even if 
we cannot prove direct complicity and therefore cannot harbor 
any valuing emotions towards him or her.
The result of distinguishing between culpability and respon-
sibility is also very desirable for another reason. Namely, if al-
ready very reprehensible events have occurred and cannot be 
reversed, the subsequent emotions of outrage usually can’t be 
prevented and, to a certain degree, are even important in order 
to	affirm	the	moral	correctness	of	the	actual	behavior	expected.	
However, to the same degree, they are socially dangerous. If the 
emotionally charged accusations	do	not	settle	down,		violence	
could spiral. Social peace is a very great good; it is virtually 
the last measure of all domestic political action. And collective 
emotions also play a very important role in international rela-
tionships. Preparations for many wars in the recent past have in-
cluded massive emotional incitement of the populace before the 
attack	so	that	it	would	be	ready	to	carry	the	enormous	strains	of	
the war. This is why it is so important to deal with assignments 
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of blame in retrospect as well so that emotions can be quickly 
settled.	It	is	reason	enough	to	direct	the	assignment	of	collective	
responsibility at the perpetuating collective’s future responsibil-
ity when assigning collective responsibility, especially in major 
political issues, and not look backwards at culpability.
Perhaps	this	seems	a	little	like	an	oxymoron	for	the	reader,	
in	view	of	what	has	been	written	thus	far.	Isn’t	this	supposed	to	
be about questions and possible answers regarding the culpa-
bility of the actors? To repeat: No. That would be a great mis-
understanding. An collective imputation of blame is virtually 
impossible in its core, even with a very small collective, and 
especially when lacking the possibility to prove direct causal 
participation of individuals in collective events. The only thing 
that can be upheld, according to my analysis, is a very indirect 
accusation of passivity in spite of obviously wrong develop-
ments on the part of the corporate actor for a collective.  Such 
residual accusation strips the imputation of blame of its mor-
al-emotional basis, whereby the focus of the consideration – 
completely in the sense of a sober reaction to wrong behavior – 
shifts to the future, i.e., to consideration of the consequences of 
the collective wrongdoing. And here, the individual must carry 
responsibility for the proven wrongdoing of his collective even 
without his own assignment of culpability. Thus it follows, that 
there is no collective blame, but there is a collective responsi-
bility for the misconduct of the corporate actor for a collective.
10   The Temporal Horizon of 
Collective Moral Responsibility
The solution to the fundamental puzzle of how a member of a 
collective can still be responsible for something that the member, 
as an individual, did not do lies in the act of disconnecting cor-
porate actors from a collective carrier.  Herein also lies the pos-
sibility	of	finding	an	answer	to	an	even	more	difficult	question:	
Can	collective	responsibility	be	justified	for	the	generations	that	
follow the perpetrating generation, and if yes, for how long?
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I have already discussed this in section 5.4 with reference 
to Ton van den Beld’s work.167		He	reduces	the	justification	for	
such responsibility to a practical feeling of guilt on the part of 
the	involved,	which	is	definitely	not	a	sufficient	reason	to	objec-
tively speak of collective moral responsibility.
Even if the direct causal participation of the individual in the 
collective wrongdoing is not necessary according to the above 
interpretations, in order to assign moral responsibility it is still 
indirectly connected to the culpable events: It is part of the con-
tinued social structure that brought forth the event or, as Ber-
tolt Brecht said in one of his famous plays: “Der Schoß ist frucht-
bar noch, aus dem dies kroch.”(“The lap from which this crawled 
forth is still warm.”)168 In other words, it is not about the back-
wards looking question but rather the forward looking one as 
to whether something that should not have taken place will 
continue. The question is how long the ‘fecundity’ of a certain 
social structure remains responsible for a future one. Collective 
memory reaches back very far. Today even more so because of 
the technical assistance we have with digital reproductions of 
sound	and	image	and	the	unimaginable	reach	offered	through	
the internet where things can theoretically stay in the collective 
memory forever. We cannot make simply the remembrance of 
a collectively incriminating action the basis for responsibility, 
otherwise it would have no end. But, this must be possible and 
not only for theoretical reasons.
Large collectives, such as entire societies, nations, peoples, etc., 
have a lot of inertia in their world view and social identity. This 
has advantages and disadvantages. The inertia protects the col-
lective from spontaneous experiments with unknown forms and 
rules which end disastrously. Large collectives accumulate and 
change their customs and traditions very gradually according to 
the ultima ratio of social success. This evolutionary argument is 
167 See Van den Beld [2002]
168 Bertold Brecht: The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui	(epilogue),	written	in	1941	as	
an epic parable of the National Socialist regime in Germany.
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ultimately at the core of the belief in progress to which we are 
more	dedicated	than	all	other	previous	generations	for	better	or	
for worse. But inertia has its price. It does not allow us to easily 
get rid of systematic defects even though they have already been 
proven	to	be	bad.	And	herein	is	the	justification	for	change	as	a	
collective, so that the alleged events are not likely to repeat again 
and become the responsibility of those who come later.
The necessary changes that result from this are very te-
dious because they undermine the self-image of the people 
concerned in their social context, i.e., their social identity. In 
particular, they require an admission of failure in regards to 
the	alleged	events.	This	is	enormously	difficult,	particularly	for	
large collectives, because its members are constantly, mutually 
reaffirming	that	it	was	actually	‘the	other	person’	who	was	to	
blame. And sometimes they will even go as far as to dispute 
the entire alleged event, such as those who deny the holocaust.
The obstreperousness against recognizing personal respon-
sibility is rooted, paradoxically, in an eminently positive mo-
tivation in all our social orientation. The clear majority of all 
people want to be good in their social behavior, whatever they 
understand that to mean. In return for trying to be good (which 
is	always	an	effort	on	behalf	of	the	social	environment),	people	
demand a corresponding service in return in the form of col-
lective valuation of their personhood. We need to be constantly 
rewarded	 socially	 for	our	psycho-social	 effort	 of	 insight	 into	
our own wrongdoing and simultaneously the corresponding 
collective wrongdoing, because otherwise the insight is simply 
humiliating to our collective pride. We need this reward, in fact, 
to	even	be	willing	to	make	the	effort	of	this	insight.	The	name	of	
this reward is redemption or deliverance from culpability.169
Such deliverance is only possible in return for taking on 
responsibility for the structural changes that are necessary to 
169 How extremely important this redemption is can be seen by the fact that it 
and universal brotherly love comprise one of the leitmotifs for all types of 
Christianity.
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avoid a repetition of the allegations of wrongdoing. Disregard-
ing religious relationships of responsibility to higher powers, 
the source of the deliverance from an accusation can only come 
from those who have made the accusation, particularly those 
who were injured or victimized by the wrongdoing (for earthly 
social occurrences). These people will only be willing to excuse 
a wrongdoing if 
a) their loss is at least partially compensated to the extent pos-
sible, and 
b) the accused not only publicly expresses understanding 
regarding the wrongdoing but	 also	 take	 specific	 steps	 to	
change his attitude	in	such	a	way	that	the	risk	of	the	wrong-
doing being repeated is greatly minimized. 
In the case of collective moral responsibility, this goes be-
yond the double obligation to compensate the victims as fully as 
possible and to assure with high probability that similar events 
are not undertaken again by the carrier collective through long-
term, institutionalized guards. The burden of proof for these 
structural changes in the perpetrator collective is always with 
the carrier collective itself.170
The temporal duration of the resulting responsibility is there-
fore determined only qualitatively not quantitatively. It lasts 
until the members of the collective institutionally, as well as in 
the	mind	of	each	average	member,	are	assured	with	sufficient	
probability that the repetition will virtually never happen again. 
Such an assurance cannot be reached through a few glossy orga-
170 This is exactly what the Americans planned and executed after World War 
2 with the complete rebuilding of the German state institutions. Only the 
western part of the former Germany, the so-called Federal Republic of 
Germany, made extensive reparation payments to many victim groups, 
especially the Jewish people, in the subsequent years. All of these mea-
sures were in no way complete or perfect. Many former Nazis found new 
positions in the new government, and many victims were not compensat-
ed. Nevertheless, the project of rebuilding the German perpetrator society 
as a whole is seen as successful, especially because Germany, as a nation 
or as a society, did not shrink from taking unconditional responsibility for 
what happened.
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nizational changes; even a new constitution, a new government, 
etc.	are	not	nearly	sufficient	to	meet	this	condition.	That	would	
be just too easily done. It has to concern the public conscious-
ness and power structures - that all-encompassing political at-
mosphere that ultimately rests in the average individual con-
sciousness. Or, phrased another way, the detailed restructuring 
of the institutions based on the will for continued improvement 
by expressly remembering that which occurred. Something like 
this	takes	generations,	and	the	specific	amount	of	time	cannot	be	
theoretically	fixed.	But	those	involved	in	a	collective	must	par-
ticipate and persevere if they want to be freed of the accusation 
of co-responsibility for something that might already have been 
long	forgotten	but	that	is	still	present	in	the	collective	memory	
and can therefore still have enormous social impact. 
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